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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellate appearing at all times in propria persona recognized by and in pursuance 
to this Court's Adopted Rule of Rule I 0(a)(l) of the I.R.C.P. and concurrent polices of the State 
of Idaho that this appeal is brought pursuant to Section 9 of Article V of the Constitution of the 
State of Idaho which states that "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon 
appeal, any decision of the district courts" and in accord with the laws of this State as codified in 
chapter2 of Title I, more specifically described as Idaho Code§§ 1-202(2), 1-204 and 1-205 and 
are incorporated herein by their reference. 
August 23rd, 2010, Appellant instituted a suit in the Small Claims Department of the 
Magistrate's Division in the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho against Respondent for 
breach of contract on a promissory note. R Vol I, page 027. On October 6th, 2010 the presiding 
judge found for the Appellant and issued a judgment in an amount of $5,066.00. R Vol I, page 
034. 
On November 5th, 2010, Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. R Vol I, page 035. On 
December 1st, 2010 Appellant's Counsel filed two motions - Motion to Amend Complaint 
requesting additional relief over $10,000 at the trial de nova and Motion to Transfer. R Vol I, 
pages 041-057. The Appellate Judge was changed and re-assigned to Magistrate Debra A. Heise. 
Magistrate Heise in Error granted both motions on December 22, 2012. R Vol I, page 069-072. 
The Appeal was transferred to District Court and finally the appeal was re-assigned to 
Judge Simpson after Judge Yerby voluntarily disqualified himself. R Vol. I, page 075. June of 
2012 a Trial de novo was conducted and a Memorandum Decision was submitted by Judge 
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Simpson on July 25th, 2012. R Vol. II, 284-288. Judgment was filed on October 31st, 2012 
against Appellant in an amount of $11,885.50 after being riped-off by Respondent to the tune of 
over $25,000.00. R Vol II 316-317. 
On April 5th, 2013, Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney 
Fees and Costs with accompanying Affidavit and Brief in Support, challenging the District 
Court's jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Small Claims Department. Motion - R Vol. II, 
pages 325-326; Affidavit - R Vol. II, pages 327-346; Brief - R Vol. II, pages 347-368. Respondent 
filed an Amended Response to Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney 
Fees and Costs on May 2nd, 2013 R Vol. II pages 388-396; In Respondent's original Response 
there was an Affidavit in Support. See R Vol II, pages 380-384. Appellant filed a Reply Brief on 
May 23rd, 2013. R Vol II, pages 397-418. 
Through a freak occurrence of errors the case was re-assigned from Judge Simpson to 
promoted Judge Barbara Buchanan to Judge John T. Mitchell. On May 28th, 2013, Appellant's 
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs with accompanying Affidavit 
and Brief in Support; Reply Brief and Respondent's responses were heard by Judge John T. 
Mitchell. See Tr. of Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs filed into 
the record on September 12, 2013, pages 1-13. The Order Denying the Motion to Vacate 
Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs was filed on June 11th, 2013. R Vol. II, pages 
4 I 9-420. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on July 22nd, 2013. R Vol. TL pages 421-425. 
The issues on Appeal is centered directly on the issues and responses to the Motion to 
Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs with accompanying Affidavit and Brief 
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in Support, challenging the District Court's jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Small 
Claims Department emanating from the two motions which were granted by Magistrate Heise on 
December 22, 2012 and which continued through to the filing of this Appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Four questions are asked for determination by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the 
State of Idaho: First - Whether it was Error for Judge Heise to grant the Motions to Amend 
Complaint and Motion to Transfer. Second - Whether the District Court acted in excess of its 
lawful jurisdiction to hear and determine an appeal from the Small Claims Department while 
acting in its appellate capacity? And if so, then, Third - Are the judgments issued by the District 
Court acting in its unlawful appellate capacity void? Fourth - Whether the District Court failed to 
correct a jurisdictional defect by denying Appellants Motion to Vacate Judgment based on the 
Court's oral finding of facts and conclusions of law? 
In addition there are several ancillary issues concerning the return of monies extracted 
under duress, if this Court finds that the District Court acted in excess of its lawful jurisdiction to 
hear and determine an appeal from the Small Claims Department while acting in its appellate 
capacity and that the judgments issued by the District Court acting its unlawful appellate capacity 
void. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Appellant claims attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R Rule 40 in conjunction with chapter 1 of 
Title 12, more specifically described as I.C. § 12-114. 
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to wit: 
Additionally, Appellant claims Attorney Fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41 ( d) which states in part 
The claim for attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include 
paralegal fees shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the method of 
computation of the attorney fees claimed. 
For a great part of this case the Appellant has secured the assistance of a 
paralegal/specialized legal assistant to do most of his writing, research, and preparation of oral 
arguments before the court. Appellant asserts that should he prevail on Appeal he should be able 
to get attorney fees for his services as provided by the paralegal/specialized legal assistant. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant re-submits the filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees 
and Costs with accompanying Affidavit and Brief in Support, challenging the District Court's 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Small Claims Department. Motion - R Vol. II, pages 
325-326; Affidavit - R Vol. II, pages 327-346; Brief - R Vol. II, pages 347-368. Respondent's 
filed Amended Response to Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees 
and Costs on May 2nd, 2013 R Vol. II pages 388-396; Respondent's original Response there was 
an Affidavit in Support. See R Vol II, pages 380-384 and Appellant filed a Reply Brief on May 
23rd, 2013. R Vol II, pages 397-418, as part of Appellant's Argument and are incorporated herein 
by its reference. 
A transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees 
and Costs was conducted by Judge John T. Mitchell on May 28th, 2013 and was filed into the 
record on September 12, 2013, pages 1-13 and is incorporated herein by its reference. 
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Appellant re-asserts all the basis for challenging the jurisdiction of the District Court to 
hear the Appeal brought from the Small Claims Department and asserts new challenges for the 
District Court to hear the Appeal brought from the Small Claims Department based upon the 
findings of fact and law placed orally by Judge John T. Mitchell forming the Order of Denial to 
Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
Appellant begins with the presiding Judge Mitchell's announcement of his decision with 
oral findings of fact and law, quoted directly from the transcript itself, to wit: 
The Court: All right. I'm going to try to address all the issues raised in this 
motion, but I am going to, with all due respect, deny the motion to 
vacate judgment and award of costs and fees for the following 
reasons: First of all, I'm not persuaded that the Supreme Court 
does not have the ability to raise the jurisdictional amount as it did, 
and while I appreciate Ms. Evans citing my own case in 
Drumwright v. Scherr, which only serves to underscore how old 
I'm getting, that decision was eight years ago, and I reread that 
decision last night but I didn't read it with the idea of a 
jurisdictional issue in mind, and I was just reading through my 
analysis, and one thing I didn't find is that a District Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear a small claims appeal. I do discuss at length 
where a small claims appeal properly lies, but that's not saying that 
a District Court Judge lacks jurisdiction, and Judge Simpson when 
he handled this case and made his decision had general 
jurisdiction; in other words, a District Court in the State of Idaho 
can do everything that a Magistrate Judge can and more, and so 
Judge Simpson, I am finding specifically, had jurisdiction to enter 
the orders and judgment that he entered in this case. 
Even if he didn't then I do find that the plaintiff [ Appellant] 
in this case specifically asked this court to accept jurisdiction, and 
the Doctrine of Estoppel would apply. The Doctrine of Invited 
Error would apply. 
Also, I do specifically find, as an alternative ground, that 
the case is moot, that the judgment's been paid, the judgment being 
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satisfied. 
I'm not overly persuaded by the timeliness argument, but 
certainly a great deal of time did pass, and I think that really goes 
towards the issue of estoppel more than a strict time limit that was 
blown by, so I do specifically find there was jurisdiction by Judge 
Simpson to do what he did; even if there weren't, there are various 
alternative grounds for denying the Motion to Vacate Judgment of 
Award of Costs and Fees, so Mr. Mclaughlin, if you be so kind as 
to prepare an order to that effect, I'll sign it. Tr. page 8, lines 9-25, 
page 9. 
Before the Appellant disputes the Court's findings by Judge John T. Mitchell, paragraph 
by paragraph, the Appellant asserts that the standards to hear a Motion to Vacate Judgment 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4) is non-discretionary. However, relief from a void judgment 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) is nondiscretionary. Meyer v. Meyer, 135 Idaho 460, 462, 19 P.3d 
774, 776 (Ct.App. 2001); Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991 P.2d 369, 372 
(Ct.App.1998); Knight Ins., Inc., v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 59, 704 P.2d 960, 963 (Ct.App.1985). 
In order for a judgment to be considered void under Rule 60(b )( 4 ), there generally must 
have been some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, because the 
court lacked either personal jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. Puphal v. Puphal, I 05 
Idaho 302,306,669 P.2d 191, 195 (1983); Dufur v. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 128 Idaho 319, 
324, 912 P.2d 687, 692 (Ct.App.1996). Accord Cockerham v. Zikratch, 127 Ariz. 230,619 P.2d 
739, 743 (Ariz.1980); Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1988). Additionally, a 
judgment is void when a "court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a 
violation of due process." Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995); accord Dike v. Dike, 75 
Wash.2d 1,448 P.2d 490, 494 (1968); I I char/es A. Wright et al., wright Miller & Kane, Federal 
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Practice & Procedure § 2862, at 326-29 (2d ed.1995). c.f Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 
644, 647, 991 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.App.1998). See also Appellant's Brief in Support of Motion to 
Vacate Judgment and Award of Costs And Fees R. Vol II, page 348-349. 
The word "discretionary" wasn't even added to the lexicon in Black's Law Dictionary 
until the 7th Edition. Black's Law Dictionary, 7th Edition defines "discretionary" to wit: 
"(Of an act or duty) involving an exercise of judgment and choice, not an 
implementation of a hard-and-fast rule."\ 
Then the term "non-discretionary" would mean to be "(Of an act or duty" not involving an 
exercise of judgment and judgment, an implementation of a hard-and fast rule." Whether a court 
has jurisdiction over a cause are hard-and-fast rules, the court either does or it does not, there is 
no gray area to it. 
In addition, Appellant asserts the following legal principals attributable to the question of 
jurisdiction of a court. The first is - The Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho has 
held that " The right to Appeal and procedure on appeal are provided for in the Constitution and 
fixed by statute, and it is not within discretion of court to hear an appeal or not to hear it." Long 
et al. v. State Insurance Fund, 90 P.2d 973, 974-5 (1939); Daw v. School District 91 Board of 
Trustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (Idaho 2001) ("the right to appeal is statutory. Stiebeck v. 
Employment Sec. Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589 (1961 ); Miller v. Gooding Highway 
District, 54 Idaho 154, 30 P.2d 1074 (1934 )"); Matter of Estate of Spencer, l 06 Idaho 316, 678 
P.2d 108 (Ct.App. 1984) ("The right of Appeal is statutory. Villages of Eden and Hazelton v. 
Idaho Board of Highway Directors of Departmenr of Highways, 83 Idaho 554, 367 P.2d 294 
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(1961 ); Stiebeck v. Employment Sec. Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589 (1961 ); Haines v. State 
Insurance Fund, 65 Idaho 450, 145 P.2d 833 (1944 ); See also Evans State Bank v. Skeen, 30 
Idaho 703, 167 P. 1165 (1917); Utah Assn. of Credit Men v. Budge, 16 Idaho 751, 102 P. 390, 
rehearing denied 16 Idaho 7 5 8, 102 P. 691 (1909). ") 
The Constitution of the State of Idaho, has several provisions applicable here, the first is 
Sections 20 of Article V and section 13 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of Idaho 
which these provisions states respectively, to wit: 
"Section 20. Jurisdiction of district court. The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate 
jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." [Emphasis Added] 
and 
"Section 13. Power of legislature respecting courts. The legislature shall have no 
power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which 
rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the 
legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when 
necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the 
courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict 
with this Constitution, provided, however, that the legislature can provide 
mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be 
not less than the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory 
minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced." [Emphasis Added) 
Constitution of the State ofidaho, Article V, sections 20 and 13. 
The point being is that the Legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals and that 
such appellate jurisdiction dependent upon the laws of this State. Daw v. School District 91 Board 
of Trustees, 136 Idaho 806, 41 P.3d 234 (Idaho 2001); Miller v. Gooding Highway District, 54 
Idaho 154, 30 P.2d 1074 (1934); Smith-Nieland v. Reed et al., 231 P. 102 (1925). 
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In the Appellant's Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Costs And 
Fees, Appellant thoroughly asserted and shown that an appeal from the Small Claims Department 
lies only with the Magistrate's Division and the Magistrate's Division only has such jurisdiction. 
R. Vol II, page 347-348, 351-359. 
In addition, Appellant, included Judge Mitchell's Memorandum Decision and Order from 
the Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575, which Judge Mitchel clearly and succinctly describes 
why an appeal from the Small Claims Department lies solely with the Magistrates Division and 
that the Magistrates Division only has such jurisdiction. R. Vol II, page 360-368. Appellant also 
supplied excerpts from the Appellate manual written in part by Judge Judd and excerpts from the 
Supreme Court's Juror Manual in the Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment and 
Award of Costs And Fees, R. Vol II, page 401-402 and 410-415. 
Let's take it from another angle. Respondent alleged that the District Court can assume 
jurisdiction generally under Idaho Code 1-705. Historically this statute was passed prior to the 
State's Admission as one of the several States in the united States of America. The Session Laws 
indicate that this section was amended in 1969, in chapter 107, page 362, the legislature sought it 
fit to amend the District Court's appellate jurisdiction to include "all cases assigned to the 
magistrate's division of the district court." 
Also in the Session Laws of 1969 in chapter 103, pages 348-353, the legislature created 
the Small Claims Department in the Magistrate's Division in which all appeals were directly taken 
to the District Court. 
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In April of 1985 this court decided the case of Gilbert v. Moore, l 08 Idaho 165, 697 P.2d 
1179 concerning small claims appeals. The situation in this case was a catalyst for the legislative 
to change an appeal from the Small Claims Department in the Magistrate's Division specifically 
removing all inferences to the District Court and replacing the District Court with the Magistrate's 
Division in the Session Laws of 1985, chapter 167 amending I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312. 
So, now I.C. § 1-2311 reads as follows: 
"1-2311. APPEAL TO DISTRICT JUDGE LA WYER MAGISTRATE. If either 
party is dissatisfied he may within thirty (301 days from the entry of said judgment 
against him, appeal to a district judge of the county in which said court is located 
lawyer magistrate other than the magistrate who entered said judgment; and if the 
final judgment is rendered against him by such district judge lawyer magistrate, 
then he shall pay, in addition to any judgment rendered in the magistrate's 
division, an attorney's fee to the prevailing party in the sum of twenty-five dollars 
($25.00), provided, however, that appeals from the small claims department shall 
only be allowed in such cases as appeals would be allowed if the action were 
instituted in the magistrate's division as is now provided, and further provided that 
the appeal shall be heard in the county wherein the original small claims was 
filed." 
And, I.C. § 1-2312 reads as follows: 
"Such appeal shall be tried in the district court magistrate's division without any 
further pleading than those required in the magistrate's division small claims 
department originally trying the case, all papers in the case shall be certified to 
said district judge lawyer magistrate as is now provided by law in other cases of 
appeals in civil actions to the magistrate's division, provided, however, that said 
district judge lawyer magistrate may require such other or further statements and 
information as he may deem necessary for the proper consideration of said 
controversy." Idaho Session Laws of 1985, chapter 167, pages 443-444. 
See Addendum A which has Idaho Session Laws of 1969, chapters 103, pages 348-353; chapter 
107, page 362; Idaho Session Laws of 1985, chapters 167, pages 443-444. 
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This was specifically recognized by Judge Mitchell in his Memorandum and Order from 
the Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8 to wit: 
"The law changed just after Gilbert was decided. In, 1985, Idaho Session Law, 
Chapter 167, § 1, page 443 changed I.C. § 1-2311 and the small claims appeal 
process. Today the law requires an appeal from the small claims department to be 
heard as a trial de novo before an attorney magistrate. LC. § 1-2311; I.R.C.P. 
8l(n); 81(o)(2); 83(b). The rules state that an appeal from small claims 
department shall be conducted as a trial de novo before an attorney magistrate. 
I.R.C.P. 8l(n); 8l(o)(2); 83(b)." 
Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8. 
Further evidence that a District Court is without jurisdiction to conduct an appeal from the 
Small Claims Department in the Magistrate's Division, starting from Sections 13 & 20 of Article 5 
in the Constitution of the State of Idaho, various statutes in chapter 23 of Title 1 Idaho Code, 
court rules in I.R.C.P. 81(n); 8l(o)(2); 83(b), State of Idaho Appellate Manual and depicted in the 
Juror Manual, and Court case opinions. It can also be demonstrated through the rules of statutory 
construction. "The rules of statutory construction also provide that a more recently enacted law 
has precedence over the older statute." Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 139; 468 NW2d 
479 (1991); Travelers Ins v U-Haul of Michigan, Inc, 235 Mich App 273, 280; 597 NW2d 235 
(1999) "This rule is particularly persuasive when one statute is both the more specific and the 
more recent." Id.; Another rule of statutory construction is that the more recent statute supercedes 
the older statute. State v. Harris, 494 N.W.2d 619,622 (S.D.1993). Rule of statutory construction 
that the more recent statute has priority over the earlier one, Shelton v. United States, 83 
U.S.App.D.C. 32, 165 F.2d 241,244 (1947); In addition, under Arkansas law a more recent statute 
prevails over an older statute because a court must assume that the general assembly was aware of 
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the earlier act when it passed the later one. See Johnson v. State, 331 Ark. 421, 961 S. W.2d 764, 
766 (1998); Cole v. Harris, 1330 Ark. 420, 953 S.W.2d 586, 588 (1997); Kyle v. State, 312 Ark. 
274,849 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Ark. 1993). 
And the second is the principle that a more specific statute will be given precedence over a 
more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence. Freiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,411 
U. S. 489-490 (1973). Moreover, the rule that a specific statute should govern over a general 
statute should not be lightly disregarded. As the Court explained in Simpson v. United States, 435 
U.S. 6 (1978); A rule of statutory construction is that the more specific statute governs the more 
general statute. Faircloth v. Raven Indus., Inc., 2000 SD 158, 620 N.W.2d 198, 202-03; Dahn v. 
Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, 576 N .W.2d 535, 539; Meyerink v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 391 
N. W.2d 180, 184 (S.D.1986); Likewise, even where chronology is not at issue, the specific statute 
will always take precedence over the general statute where their provisions conflict. Greenbriar 
Hills Country Club v. Director of Revenue, 935 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Mo. bane 1996); Goldberg v. 
Administrative Hearing Comm 'n, 609 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Mo. 1980); Cantwell v. Douglas County 
Clerk, 988 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999). 
Based upon the foregoing and chronology the more recent statute of I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-
2312 has precedence over the older statute of I.C. § 1-705 based upon the rules of statutory 
construction. Also the more specific statute of I.C. § § 1-2311 and 1-2312 has precedence over the 
general statute of I.C. § 1-705 based upon the rules of statutory construction too. 
Therefore, looking back at the transcript of the hearing (page 5 of this brief) of Motion to 
Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs Tr. page 8, lines 9-25, page 9, lines 1-6, 
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three things come to mind: 
1) Judge Mitchell incorrectly stated that "one thing I didn't find is that a District Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear a small claims appeal." In his Memorandum and Order from the Drumright v. 
Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8 Judge Mitchell specifically recognized 
that the District Court lacks jurisdiction to hear a small claims appeal, to wit: 
"The law changed just after Gilbert was decided. In, 1985, Idaho Session Law, 
Chapter 167, § 1, page 443 changed I.C. § 1-2311 and the small claims appeal 
process. Today the law requires an appeal from the small claims department to be 
heard as a trial de novo before an attorney magistrate. LC. § 1-2311; I.R.C.P. 
81(n); 81(o)(2); 83(b). The rules state that an appeal from small claims 
department shall be conducted as a trial de nova before an attorney magistrate. 
I.R.C.P. 81(n); 81(o)(2); 83(b)." 
Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, page 366, lines 5-8; and 
2) Judge Mitchell stated that: "Judge Simpson when he handled this case and made his 
decision had general jurisdiction; in other words, a District Court in the State of Idaho can do 
everything that a Magistrate Judge can and more, and so Judge Simpson, I am finding 
specifically, had jurisdiction to enter the orders and judgment that he entered in this case." This is 
an incorrect finding of fact and law as demonstrated by the rules of statutory construction, the 
more recent statute of I. C. § § 1-2311 and 1-2312 has precedence over the older statute of I.C. § 1-
705 and the more specific statute of I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312 has precedence over the general 
statute of I.C. § 1-705. 
Therefore the District Court had no general jurisdiction over an appeal from the Small 
Claims Department of the Magistrate's Division in which I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312 controls the 
appellate process to an attorney magistrate over I.C. § 1-705 under the rules of statutory 
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construction. 
3) It is an incorrect statement that "the District Court in the State of Idaho can do everything 
that a Magistrate Judge can and more," due to the facts and the law indicates that the legislature 
specifically prescribed appellate jurisdiction for an appeal from the small claims department to be 
heard as a trial de novo before only an attorney magistrate and not the district court. See I.C. §§ 1-
2311 and 1-2312. This Court has recognized that the jurisdiction for an appeal from the small 
claims department to be heard as a trial de novo before only an attorney magistrate by adopting 
Rules of Court of I.R.C.P. 81(n); 81(o)(2); 83(6). All his findings of fact and law by Judge 
Mitchell on the Motion to Vacate judgment and Award of Costs and Fees in this paragraph are in 
error of the facts in this case and law and requires this Court to correct them. 
GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT: a) Party asked court 
to accept jurisdiction; b) Parties stipulated to jurisdiction; c) Doctrine of Estoppel and 
Invited Error. 
From the Transcript of the hearing (page 5 of this brief) on the Motion to Vacate Judgment 
and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, Tr. page 9, lines 7-10, Judge Mitchell committed more 
errors of fact and law, when he said, 
The Court: "Even if he didn't then I do find that the plaintiff [ Appellant] in this 
case specifically asked this court to accept jurisdiction, and the Doctrine of 
Estoppel would apply. The Doctrine of Invited Error would apply." 
This was clarified by Appellant by asking Judge Mitchell a question to wit: 
"Evans: Okay. So in your opinion then that an appeal in a small claims - - in 
a small claims court does not have to be heard by the attorney magistrate? It can 
go to a District Court? 
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The Court: Well, I think in this case - - well, I'm finding that Judge Simpson 
had the jurisdiction to hear the appeaL especially when the parties stipulated to 
amend the complaint to exceed $10,000 jurisdictional amount." 
Tr. page 10, lines 8-16. 
Appellant asserts that even if Appellant asked this Court to accept jurisdiction by 
amending the complaint to exceed $10,000 jurisdictional amount, such an act violated the 
mandatory jurisdictional requirement specifically prescribing appellate jurisdiction for an appeal 
from the small claims department to be heard as a trial de novo before only an attorney magistrate 
and not the district court. See I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312. This Court has recognized that the 
jurisdiction for an appeal from the small claims department to be heard as a trial de novo before 
only an attorney magistrate by adopting Rules of Court of I.R.C.P. 8l(n); 8l(o)(2); 83(b). See 
stare decisis of Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, pages 360-368. As Judge 
Mitchell's own actions in Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575 concur that the Motion to Amend 
the Complaint and Motion to Transfer should have been denied and the appeal remanded to the 
Magistrate's Division for further proceedings. That what he did in Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-
1999-1575 and it was error on Judge Mitchell's part to not have taken the same actions again in 
this case. 
It is worth noting that Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575. R. Vol. II, pages 360-368, a 
case decided by District Court Judge John T. Mitchell is stare decisis to all magistrates of the 
Magistrate's Division. With that in mind Magistrate Heise knew what the case of Drumright v. 
Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575 decided, before she granted the Appellant's Motion to Amend the 
Complaint and Motion to Transfer in error. 
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More on Jurisdiction 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is a key requirement for the justiciability of a claim and 
cannot be waived by consent of the parties. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626, 
586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1978). See R. Vol II, page 349. See also H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho State 
Bd. of Prof! Eng'rs and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987) (parties 
cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court by stipulation, agreement, or estoppel. Johnson v. 
Assured Employment, Inc., 277 Or. 11, 558 P.2d 1228 (1977); Hollister Convalescent Hospital, 
Inc. v. Rico, 15 Cal.3d 660, 125 Cal.Rptr. 757, 542 P.2d 1349 (1975); 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error§ 
43 (1981)); State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664, 239 P.3d 462 (Ct.App. 2010) (A court's lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by a party, and the parties cannot consent to the court's 
assumption of jurisdiction through conduct or acquiesecence, nor be estopped from asserting its 
absence. State v. J. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct.App. 2008)); Chester v. Chester, 
172 Or.App. 462, 18 P.3d 1111 (Or.App. 2001) (We consider jurisdictional issues regardless of 
when they are presented. Baty v. Slater, 161 Or.App. 653, 656, 984 P.2d 342, on recons., 164 
Or.,App. 779, 995 P.2d 1176, rev. den., 331 Or. 191 (2000). "Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by 
the parties by consent, nor can the want of jurisdiction be remedied by waiver, or by estoppel." 
Wink v. Marshall, 237 Or. 589, 592, 392 P.2d 768 (1964). Likewise, subject matter jurisdiction is 
not susceptible to the principle of invited error. St. Johns v. Yachats Planning Commission, 138 
Or.App. 43, 46, 906 P.2d 304 (1995)). 
See also Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs with 
accompanying Affidavit and Brief in Support, challenging the District Court's jurisdiction to 
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entertain an appeal from the Small Claims Department. Motion - R Vol. II, pages 325-326; 
Affidavit - R Vol. II, pages 327-346; Brief - R Vol. II, pages 347-368; Appellant's Reply Brief on 
May 23rd, 2013. R Vol II, pages 397-418 and are incorporated herein by its reference. 
Additionally, "Courts have the power to inquire into their own jurisdiction; they are 
obligated to ensure their own subject matter jurisdiction and must raise the issue sua sponte if 
necessary." In re City of Shelly, 151 Idaho 289, 255 P.Jd 1175 (2011); Laughy v. Idaho 
Department ofTransp., 149 Idaho 867, 233 P.Jd 1055 (2010). "A court has a sua sponte duty to 
ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case." State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 244 
P.Jd 1244 (2010). "The a court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case is a question of law, and maybe 
raised at any time." Dunlap v. State, 146 Idaho 197, 192 P.Jd 1021 (2008). "The question of 
jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be ignored; even if jurisdictional questions are not raised 
by the parties, the Supreme Court must address them on its own initiative." State v. Hartwig, 150 
Idaho 326, 246 P.Jd 979 (2011). "A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored 
when brought to the attention of the court and should be addressed prior to considering the merits 
of an appeal." State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 80 P.Jd 1083 (2003). 
Invited Error and Estoppel 
"The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or 
her own conduct induces the commission of the error. Thomson v. Olsen, 14 7 Idaho 99, 106, 205 
P.Jd 1235, 1242 (2009). One may not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in. 
Id. In short, invited errors are not reversible. Id. This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as 
well as rulings made during trial." State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462,465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 
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1990). In other words the doctrine of invited error issues are derived from the trial court and 
complained about in an appellate proceeding. 
The phrase "trial court" means "A court of original jurisdiction where evidence is first 
received and considered." Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 1349; 6th Edition, page 
1506; 7th Edition, page 360. The trial court in this case was the Small Claims Department of the 
Magistrate's Division. 
The Motion to Amend the Complaint and Motion to Transfer were submitted while the 
case was on Appeal in the Magistrate's Division in accord with I.C. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312. The 
Notice of Appeal was filed by Respondent on November 5th, 2010. R Vol I, page 035. Almost a 
month later on December 1st, 2010 Appellant's Counsel filed two motions - Motion to Amend 
Complaint requesting additional relief over $10,000 at the trial de novo and Motion to Transfer, 
while the case was in Appellate proceedings in the Magistrate's Division in accord with I.C. § 1-
2311. R Vol I, pages 041-057. So, the doctrine of invited error does not apply in this situation. 
Besides the citation of Chester v. Chester, 172 Or.App. 462, 18 P.3d 1111 (Or.App. 2001) 
supra., the question of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by the Court sua sponte. State, 
Department of Law enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, 100 Idaho 150, 152 n. 1, 595 P.2d 299, 
301 n. 1 (1979). See R. Vol. II pages 350-351 for other case citation from the Brief in Support of 
Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs and are incorporated herein by 
its reference. 
Further, since both estoppel and the doctrine of invited error are part of Equity. There are 
maxims of Equity. One such maxim is "Equity follows the law." In the case of Allen v. Ketchen, 
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100 P. 1052 (1909) the Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho stated this maxim 
under these terms to wit: 
"Courts of Equity are as much bound by positive enactments of law as are the 
courts of law. It was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hedges v. 
Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 14 S.Ct. 71, 37 L.Ed. 1044: "Courts of equity can no 
more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions than can 
courts of law. They are bound by positive provisions of a statute equally with 
courts of law, and where the transaction or the contract is declared void because 
not in compliance with express statutory or constitutional provision, a court of 
equity cannot interpose to give validity to such transaction or contract, or any part 
thereof." And likewise in Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. 282, 14 L.Ed. 696, it was 
stated 'that wherever the rights or the situation of parties are clearly defined and 
established by law, equity has no power to change or unsettle those rights or that 
situation, but in all such instances the maxim equitas sequitur legem [equity 
follows the law] is strictly applicable."' 
Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. 282, 14 L.Ed. 696 (1853) 15 How. 281. "In all such instances, 
equity must follow, or in other words, be subordinate to the law." Magniac v. Thomson, 56 U.S. 
282, 14 L.Ed. 696 (1853) 15 How. 281. Appellant requests the Court to TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE of the following cases and its citations to wit: 
"Yet another maxim provides that 'equity follows the law,' I.LE. Equity§ 22. In 
application, this means that 'an equitable right cannot be founded on a violation of 
law.' Noble v. Davison, 177 Ind. 19, 96 N .E. 325, 330 (1911 )." Hopper Resources, 
Inc. v. Webster, 878 N.E.2d 418, 422 (Ind.App. 2007) [9] 
"It is also frequently stated as a maxim of equity that equity follows the law. By 
this is meant that equity obeys and conforms to the law's general rules and 
policies whether the common law or statute law. See e.g. Provident Building & 
Loan Ass'n v. Pekarek, 52 Ohio App. 492, 3 N.E.2d 983 (1936)." Jarvis v. State 
Land Department, I 06 Ariz. 506, 4 79 P.2d 169 ( 1970). 
"The reason inheres in the maxim of equity that 'Equity follows the law.' This 
maxim in 30 C.J.S. Equity, p. 503, § 103, is explained generally as follows: 'In a 
broad sense the maxim means that equity follows the law to the extent of obeying 
it and conforming to its general rules and policies whether contained in the 
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common law or statute law.' Again as pointed out in 30 C.J.S. Equity, p. 503, § 
103, 'The maxim is strictly applicable whenever the rights of the parties are 
clearly defined and established by law, especially defined and established by 
constitutional or statutory provisions."' Dawson County Irrigation Co. v. Stuart, 6 
N.W.2d 602, 605-06 (1942) 
See Addendum B - Hopper Resources, Inc. v. Webster, 878 N.E.2d 418, 422 (Ind.App. 2007); 
Jarvis v. State Land Department, 106 Ariz. 506, 479 P.2d 169 (1970); Dawson County Irrigation 
Co. v. Stuart, 6 N.W.2d 602, 605-06 (1942) and are incorporated herein by its reference. 
The doctrine of invited error does not apply to questions of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Appellant requests the Court to TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE of the following cases and its 
citations to wit: 
"The invited error doctrine, however, does not apply to subject matter jurisdiction 
issues. As we earlier noted, Washington courts have long held that '[p)arties 
cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court by agreement between 
themselves; a court either has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not. In re 
Marriage of Furrow, 115 Wash.App. at 667, 33 P.3d 821 (emphasis added)." 
Angelo Property Co., LP v. Hafiz, 167 Wash.App. 789, 274 P.3d 1075 (Ct.App. 
Div. 2 2012) 
"Further, under the doctrine of invited error, if a party induces action by the court 
or an agency, he will not be heard on appeal to argue error based upon that action. 
Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo 1974, 519 P.2d 972, 978. However, 
there is an exception to that rule. As noted in Matter of Various Water Rights in 
Lake DeSmet Reservoir, Wyo. 1981, 623 P.2d 764, 767, a challenge to a court's or 
a quasi-judicial body's jurisdiction over the subject matter can never be waived. 
'[I]t is open for consideration by the reviewing court whenever it is raised by any 
party, or it may be raised by the court of its own motion.' Gardner v. Walker, Wyo. 
1962, 373 P.2d 598, 599." Appeal of Williams, Wyo. 1981, 638 P.2d 564 at 571. 
"Even if the confusion caused by KDR amounted to invited error, the invited 
error does not apply where the error is jurisdictional. Thompson v. Amis, 208 Kan. 
658,661,493 P.2d 1259 (1972)." In Re PEC, 134 P.3d 661,665, (Kan. 2006). 
See Addendum C - Angelo Property Co., LP v. Hafiz, 167 Wash.App. 789, 274 P.3d 1075 
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(Ct.App. Div. 2 20l2);Appeal of Williams, Wyo. 1981, 638 P.2d 564 at 571; In Re PEC, 134 P.3d 
661,665, (Kan. 2006) and are incorporated herein by its reference. 
Based upon the points and authorities submitted in the Motion and herein, that it was error 
for Judge Mitchell to deny the Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs 
on the basis that "plaintiff [ Appellant] in this case specifically asked this court to accept 
jurisdiction, and the Doctrine of Estoppel would apply. The Doctrine of Invited Error would 
apply" or on the basis that "Judge Simpson had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal, especially 
when the parties stipulated to amend the complaint to exceed $10,000 jurisdictional amount" 
GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT: 
In the Alternative - Mootness. 
Going back to the Transcript of the hearing (page 5 of this brief) on the Motion to Vacate 
Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs, Tr. page 9, lines 11-13, Judge Mitchell added 
another baseless alternative ground for not granting Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment and 
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs for jurisdictional issues duty bound to do. Judge Mitchell said, 
"Also, I do specifically find, as an alternative ground, that the case is moot, that 
the judgment's been paid, the judgment being satisfied." 
"Under the mootness doctrine: 
This Court may dismiss an appeal when it appears that the case involves only a 
moot question. A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live 
or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. A case is moot if it 
presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no 
practical effect upon the outcome. 
State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410,419,272 P.3d 382, 391 (2012) (quoting Goodson v. Nez 
Perce Cnty. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 851,853,993 P.2d 614,616 (2000)). See also State 
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v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338,343, 127 P.3d 954, 959 (2005). There are three exceptions: 
(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the 
person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade 
judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot 
issue raises concerns of substantial public interest. 
Koch v. Canyon Cnty., 145 Idaho 158,163, 177 P.3d 372,377 (2008) (quotingAmeritel Inns, Inc. 
v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851-52, 119 P.3d 624, 626-27 (2005)). See also 
State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682, 99 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2004)." State v. Long, 153 Idaho 168, 
280 P.3d 195 (Ct.App. 2012). 
In this case, whether a favorable judicial decision would result in any relief depends on 
whether the court rendering the judgment had subject matter jurisdiction of the action and the 
parties. If the District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, then its judgments are void. 
"[V]oid judgments can be attacked at any time. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 
502, 508 (2003). Generally, the Court may declare a judgment void only for defects of personal 
jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. Catledge v. Transp. Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 607, 691 
P.2d 1217, 1222 (1984). However, a judgment is also void if the 'court's action amounts to a plain 
usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process.' Dept. of Health and Welfare v. 
Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.3d 321,325 (2004)" Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,221 P.3d 
81 (Idaho 2009). 
In this case we have both issues a court acting arbitrary and capricious lacking in subject 
matter jurisdiction and a court's action amounting to a plain usurpation of power constituting a 
violation of due process. 
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This appeal is an appeal specifically challenging the District Court hearing an appeal from 
the Small Claim Department of the Magistrate's Division in which constitutional and statutory 
provisions specifically preclude the District Court from such subject matter jurisdiction. 
Therefore the issues presented are not moot because the parties have a legally cognizable interest 
in the outcome surrounding jurisdiction, legal fees and costs returned of $10,000.00, legal fees 
and costs paid by Respondent on this Appeal of a few thousand dollars, and due process on an 
appeal before a court of competent jurisdiction to uphold my judgment initially won in the Small 
Claims Department of $5,066.00. How much interest do I need? 
The dollar amount for attorney fees and court costs was challenged before the District 
Court who did not have appellate jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Small Claims 
Department of the Magistrate's Division. See R. Vol. II pages 303-307 and is incorporarted herein 
by its reference. 
Additionally in the Reply Briefing on the Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of 
Attorney Fees and Costs, Appellant demonstrated that she was under duress by Respondent to pay 
the amount or legal action was threatened. See R. Vol. II, pages 399-400 &406-407. 
Coupled with the subject matter jurisdictional question was another question relating 
directly to the first question of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists for appellate review to be 
conducted by a district court, especially, when the constitutional and statutory provisions 
specifically denying a district court jurisdiction from appellate review, by legislative amendment 
of LC. §§ 1-2311 and 1-2312, as demonstrated earlier herein. 
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According to the Court of Appeals for the State of Idaho in the case of Matter Of 
Kappelman, 114 Idaho 136, 754 P.2d 449 (App. 1988) held that Court rules have the force of law 
in which the Court said to wit: 
On the other hand, more recent cases, which we choose to follow, hold that rules 
of the court have the force of "law." Mann v. Cracchiolo, 38 Cal.3d 18, 210 
Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134 (1985); Department of Finance v. Sheldon, 381 Ill. 
256, 44 N.E.2d 863 (1942); State v. Mitchell, 672 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1983); Goldston v. 
Karukas, 180 Md. 232, 23 A.2d 691 (1942). 
If then, including the fact that there are court rules that states that the jurisdiction for an 
appeal from the small claims department to be heard as a trial de nova before only an attorney 
magistrate by adopting Rules of Court of I.R.C.P. 8l(n); 8I(o)(2); 83(b), then, Magistrate's 
Heise's error of granting the Motion to Amend Complaint and Motion to Transfer becomes even 
greater. And it also becomes even a greater issue that Judge Simpson didn't even question whether 
he had subject matter over the appellate process from an appeal from the Small Claims 
Department. And when jurisdiction was squarely questioned, Judge Mitchell of all people who 
wrote a decision specifically on point on the issue in Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575, 
failed to correct and perpetuated the error. 
As an ancillary issue Appellant challenged this Court's adoption of I.R.C.P. Rule 82(c)(2) 
(A) on constitutional grounds. Appellant re-asserts this challenge and re-submits the original 
briefing from the Motion to Vacate Judgment and Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. R Vol. II, 
pages 325-326; Affidavit - R Vol. II, pages 327-346; Brief - R Vol. II, pages 347-368. Changing 
this rule to be in conformity with legislative statutory jurisdiction limitations would alleviate all 
circumstances of amending complaints while on appeal from the Small Claims Department. 
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CONCLUSION 
Judge Mitchell's statements of finding of facts and law, decisions to deny Appellant's 
Motion to Vacate Judgment was a deliberate act of non-discretion to violate well established laws 
of this State concerning Appellate Jurisdiction from Small Claims Division of the Magistrate's 
Division and a complete failure to keep his duty to the laws of this State and the Code of Judicial 
Conduct. 
"The question of jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be ignored. Even if jurisdictional 
questions are not raised by the parties, the Court must address them on its own initiative." 
Diamond v. Sandpoint Title Ins., Inc., 132 Idaho 145, 148, 968 P.2d 240, 243 (1998) ( citing H & 
V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Prof! Eng'rs and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 
55, 57 (1987)). See also State v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 598, 242 P. 787 (1925) wherein the justices of 
the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that: "The question of jurisdiction is primary and 
fundamental in every case, and cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked by the court." 
(Apache State Bank v. Vzoght, 61 Ok!. 253, 161 Pac. 214; Mansfield C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 
111 U.S. 379, 4 Sup. Ct. 510, 28 L. ed. 462; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 9 Sup. Ct. 289, 32 L. 
ed. 690.)" See R. Vol II, pages 350-351. 
See also Fairway Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 804 P.2d 294 
(1990) wherein it was held "Defense of lack of jurisdiction is never waived and must be asserted 
by court if it finds that it lacks jurisdiction of subject matter."; State v. J Armstrong, 146 Idaho 
372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct.App. 2008) ("A court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived 
by a party, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 
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227-28, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131-32 (2004), and parties cannot consent to the court's assumption of 
jurisdiction through conduct or acquiescence nor be estopped from asserting its absence. Fairway 
Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121, 125, 804 P.2d 294,298 (1990). Accordingly, 
a party may assert a lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal, Idaho State 
Ins. Fund v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190,191,938 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1997); State v. McCarthy, 133 
Idaho 119, 122, 982 P.2d 954, 957 (Ct. App. 1999), and the issue may even be raised sua sponte 
by a trial or appellate court. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); 
State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482,483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003); State v. Lopez, 98 Idaho 581, 
585, 570 P.2d 259, 263 (1976); State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 534, 148 P.3d 1278, 1280 (Ct. 
App. 2006)." State v. J Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct.App. 2008). 
Judge Simpson failed in making sure that he had jurisdiction to hear an Appeal from the 
Small Claims Division of the Magistrate's Division. Magistrate Heise failed in abiding by Stare 
Decisis of Drumright v. Scheer, S-CV-1999-1575 decided by District Court Judge John T. 
Mitchell and well established laws of this State concerning Appellate Jurisdiction from the Small 
Claims Division of the Magistrate's Division. 
What's worse is that they knew or should have known the law and chose to ignore it to the 
detriment of the Appellant and in violation of Section 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the 
State of Idaho. Section 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Idaho states to wit: 
"Justice to be freely and speedily administered. Courts of justice shall be open to 
every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or 
character, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or 
prejudice." 
Page 26 of 31 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal 
Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. Judge Mitchell also failed in his 
duties to me as a litigant, the people of this State and to preserve the integrity of the judiciary of 
the State of Idaho, thus violating his Oath of Office. This Court is equally duty bound to correct 
errors of jurisdiction sua sponte and remand the case back to the Magistrate Division to 
Magistrate Heise for further proceedings. 
Further this Court is obligated to award to the Appellant Costs and fees on Appeal and 
issue all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction for the 
return of the $10,000.00 paid under duress to Berg & McLaughlin Law Offices, counsel for the 
Respondent, pursuant to section 9 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and in 
conformity with Section 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the State ofidaho. 
Dated this 16th day of December, 2013. 
Appellant's Brief on Appeal 
(/ 
V t'U,,,lk..(_}._ 
Laur Evans, Appellant 
Appearing In Propria Persona 
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348 IDAHO SESSION LAWS C. 102 '69 
the district court shall be jury sessions; 
(f) arranging for the reporting of civil cases by court 
reporters or other authorized means; 
(g) arranging sessions, to the extent practicable, for the 
trial of specialized cases, including traffic, domestic relations, 
and other types of cases, and assigning district judges to 
preside over these sessions so as to permit maximum 
practicable specialization by individual judges; 
(h) promulgating a schedule of offenses for which 
magistrates and clerks of court or other designated persons 
may accept written appearances, waivers of trial, and pleas of 
guilty, and establishing a schedule of fines and bails therefor; 
(i) assigning magistrates to temporary duty outside the 
county of their residence, but within the district; 
U) acting as chairman of the district magistrates 
commission of the district; and, 
(k) assigning to other district judges in the district various 
powers and duties in this act provided. 
SECTION 2. This act shall be effective at 12:01 a.m. on 
January 11, 197 l. 
Approved March 11, 1969. 
CHAPTER 103 
(S. B. No. 1115) 
AN ACT 
CREA TING A SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT IN THE 
MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT; 
PROVIDING FOR COMMENCEMENT OF SUCH ACTIONS; 
PROVIDING FOR TIME, NOTICE AND FEE FOR ACTIONS IN 
SAID DEPARTMENT; PROVIDING FOR FEE OF OFFICER 
SERVING NOTICE; PROVIDING CONDITIONS TO THE FORM 
AND CONTENTS OF SAID SMALL CLAIM; PROVIDING 
CONDITIONS TO THE FORM AND CONTENTS OF SAID 
·.' l 
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NOTICE OF CLAIM; PROVIDING VERIFICATION OF CLAIM BY 
REAL CLAIMANT AS A CONDITION OF RECOVERY; 
PROHIBITING THE USE OF COUNSEL IN ANY ACTION IN SAID 
DEPARTMENT; PROVIDING THAT FORMAL JUDICIAL 
PLEADINGS ARE NOT A NECESSARY CONDITION; 
PROVIDING FOR JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT IN ANY 
ACTION OF SAID DEPARTMENT; PROVIDING FOR APPEAL OF 
AN ACTION TO THE DISTRICT COURT; PROVIDING FORM 
FOR SAID APPEAL; PROVIDING FOR CERTIFICATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 
IN SAID DEPARTMENT; PROVIDING A SEPARATE DOCKET 
FOR SAID SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT IN THE 
MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION; JURY TRIAL PROHIBITED IN 
SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE 
DATE. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. In every magistrate's division of the district 
court of this state, the district court may create and organize 
a "Small Claims Department of the Magistrate's Division," 
which shall have jurisdiction only in cases for the recovery of 
money where the amount of each claim does not exceed two 
hundred dollars ($200) and where the defendant resides 
within the county of such magistrate's division. Either party 
to an action may request a change of venue as provided by 
chapter 4 of title 5, Idaho Code. 
SECTION 2. Actions in such small claims department 
shall be deemed commenced by the plaintiff subscribing to, 
verifying and filing a claim as hereinafter provided. 
SECTION 3. Upon filing said complaint the magistrate 
shall appoint a time for the hearing of said matter and shall 
cause to be issued a notice of the claim, as hereinafter 
provided, which shall be served upon the defendant by 
personal service of process in the manner provided by law, or, 
when request is made therefor by the plaintiff, service of 
process may be made upon the defendant by mail, as herein 
provided. The plaintiff may request service upon the 
defendant by mail by endorsing in writing upon his 
complaint, which request shall include the address to be used 
in mailing. The magistrate shall mail to the defendant at the 
address given in the endorsement a copy of the complaint 
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and a 1:1-agistrate summons. Service of process by mail is made 
~y registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and 
1s c~mpl~te upon return to the office of the magistrate of the 
re~e1pt SI~ned by the defendant. Service by mail is proved 
pn~a fac1e by t~e signature of the defendant upon the return 
receipt. The plaintiff must bear the cost of service of process 
by mail. 
The magistrate shall collect in advance upon each claim the 
sum of five dollars ($5), which shall be in addition to the 
costs necessary to bring service of the claim upon the 
defendant. 
~ECTION 4. The officer serving such notice shall be 
entitled to receive from the plaintiff the same fees as are 
all~wed for other service of process from the district court, 
which sum, together with the filing fee named in section 3 
shall be added to any judgment given the plaintiff. ' 
SECTION 5. The claim hereinabove referred to shall 
contain the name of the plaintiff and the name of the 
defendant, followed by a statement, in brief and concise 
form, of the nature and amount of said claim and the time of 
the: accruing of such claim, and shall also state the name and 
residence of the defendant, if same be known to the plaintiff, 
for the purpose of serving the notice of claim on such 
defendant. 
SECTION 6. Said notice of claim shall be directed to the 
defendant, naming him and shall contain a statement in brief 
and concise form notifying such defendant of the name 
addre~s, a1:1ount and nature of the alleged claim of plaintiff: 
and directing and requiring defendant to appear personally in 
court before the magistrate of said magistrate's division at a 
time certain, which shall not be less than five nor more than 
ten days from the date of service of such notice, said notice 
~hall furthe~ provi?e that in case of failure to so appear, 
Judgment will be given against defendant for the amount of 
claim. 
~ECTION 7. All claims must be verified by the real 
claimant, and no claim shall be filed or prosecuted in such 
department by the assignee of such claim. 
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SECTION 8. No attorney at law or any other perso'.1 than 
the plaintiff and defendant shall coi:icem himself or m any 
manner interfere with the prosecut10n or defense of such 
litigation in said department, n_or. shall it be necess~y to 
summon witnesses, but the plamhff and defendant_ m any 
claim shall have the privilege of offering evidence m t~e1r 
behalf, themselves and witnesses appearing at such h~anng, 
and being duly sworn as in other cases, and the magistrate 
shall render and enter judgment as in other cases. 
SECTION 9. No formal pleading other than the said claim 
and notice shall be necessary to define the issue between_ the 
parties, and the hearing and dispo~ition of .an su~h act10ns 
shall be informal with the sole obJect of d1spensmg speedy 
and quick justice between the litigants, prov~ded, how~ver, 
that no attachment, garnishment or executio_n shall issue 
from the small claims department on any claim except as 
hereinafter provided. 
SECTION 10. If the judgment or order shall be again~t the 
defendant, it shall be his duty to pay the same forthwith or 
execution may ensue as in other cases. 
SECTION 11. If either party is dissatisfied_he m~y, within 
30 days from the entry of said judg~ent a~amst ~1m, appe~l 
to a district judge of the county m which s~d co~nt 1s 
located; and if the final judgment 1s rend~red ag~~nst him by 
such district judge, then he shall ~ay '. 1_n_ addition to any 
judgment rendered in the ~agistrate s dIV1s1on, an ~ttorney s 
fee to the prevailing party m the sum of twenty-five dollars 
($25 .00), provided, however, that appeals _from such small 
claims department shall only be a!lowed 11: s~ch ca~es as 
appeals would be allowed if the a~tion were mstituted m the 
magistrate's division as is now provided. 
SECTION 12. An appeal from the magistrate's division 
may be in the following terms: 
In the District Court for ____ -=_County, 
Idaho, _____ Plaintiff, vs.______ Defendant. 
Comes now _____ , resident of ____ ---c:Cou1'.ty, 
Idaho and appeals from the decision of the sma~l ~!~ms 
department of the magistrate's d1v1s1on 
for ______ County, Idaho, wherein a judgment 
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for the-_____ dollars was d awar ed ___ ,day of _____ , 19_. 
against him on 
(Signed) 
Such appeal shall be fil . -----
accompanied by bond w· e~ with the magistrate and 
pay~ent of such judgr:ite~~atisfactory surety, to secure the 
rov~ded for in section 11 s' ~osts and attorney fees as 
ist~ct court without . uc appeal shall be tried in the 
requrred in the magistra~~7 o_t~~r pleadings than those 
~ause, all_ papers in the case !h dIV1s10n O!lginally trying the 
J~d_ge as_ is now provided b I all _be certified to said district 
CIVll ac!10ns in the magisti t ~w l'.1 _o!her cases of appeals in 
that said district judge m: e s di~ision, provided, however 
statements and information y ~equrre such other or furthe; 
proper consideration of sa·d as e may deem necessary for the i controversy. 
SECTION 13 If no a . 
the defendant fails to :::a!t t_aken by the defendant and 
terms an~ conditions thereof et~udgm~nt according to the 
sue~ heanng was had, ma ' e fr!agI~trate before whom 
certify such judgment ins b' t°n _apphcat10n of the plaintiff u s antially the following form: , 




In the Small Cl · D 
This is to certify th t . aims ~partment 
undersigned, had on ath{; :h~ertam action before me, the 
19 __ , wherei.:------ __day of ____ _ 
was defendant jurisd· t' was plaintiff and ' 
personal servi~e (or ~fh::io\said defe~dant having had by 
and there entered judgme t se ? as p~ovided by law I then of n against said defi d · ' ·--:-:-::-____ dollars which · d en ant m the sum 
Witness my hand th: d JU gment has not been paid is_~_ ay of ____ - , 19 .. 
Magistrate sitting in the small c1a· d ims epartment 
The magistrate of said ill' . ' . . . . enter such judgment t a!pstrate s d1V1s10n shall forthwith 
ranscnpt on the judgment docket of 
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such magistrate's division, and thereafter execution and other 
process on execution provided by law may issue thereon as 
obtains in others cases of judgments of magistrate's division 
and a transcript of such judgments may be filed and entered 
in judgment lien dockets in district courts with like effect as 
in other cases. 
SECTION 14. Each magistrate shall keep a separate 
docket for the small claims department of his division in 
which he sh~l make a permanent record of all proceedings, 
orders and Judgments had and made in such small claims 
department. 
SECTION 15. No party may have his cause heard before a 
jury in the small claims department of the magistrate's 
division of the district court. 
SECTION 16. This act shall be effective at 12:01 a.m. on 
January 11, 1971. 
Approved March 11, 1969. 
CHAPTER 104 
(S. B. No. 1116, As Amended) 
AN ACT 
ESTABLISHING A MAGISTRATE DIVISION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT FOR EACH COUNTY; PROVIDING A DEFINITION OF 
THE TERM MAGISTRATE; PROVIDING FOR ESTABLISHMENT 
OF DISTRICT MAGISTRATES COMMISSION IN EACH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT, AND FOR THE MEMBERSHIP THEREOF; 
PROVIDING FOR MEETINGS OF THE DISTRICT 
MAGISTRATES COMMISSIONS, QUORUMS AND REQUIRED 
AFFIRMATIVE VOTE THEREOF; PROVIDING FOR THE 
DUTIES AND POWERS OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATES 
COMMISSIONS IN DETERMINING THE NUMBER, LOCATIONS 
AND SALARIES OF MAGISTRATES AND IN APPOINTING 
MAGISTRATES, SUBJECT TO APPROVAL OF MAJORITY OF 
DISTRICT JUDGES OF THE DISTRICT; PROVIDING 
NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE OFFICE OF 
MAGISTRATE WITH EXCEPTIONS FOR EXISTING PROBATE 
JUDGES, JUSTICES OF THE PEACE AND POLICE COURT 
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SECTION 2. This act shall be effective at 12:01 a.m. on 
January I 1, 1971. 
Approved March 11, 1969. 
CHAPTER 107 
(S. B. No. 1119) 
AN ACT 
AMENDING SECTION 1-705, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT, SO AS TO PROVIDE 
THAT SUCH COURT HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN ALL 
CASES AND PROCEEDINGS AND FOR THE ISSUANCE OF 
CERTAIN WRITS, AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN ALL 
CASES ASSIGNED TO MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION OF DISTRICT 
COURT AND IN ALL OTHER MATTERS AND CASES WHEREIN 
AN APPEAL IS ALLOWED BY LAW; AND PROVIDING AN 
EFFECTIVE DATE. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho : 
SECTION l. That Section 1-705, Idaho Code , be , and the 
same is hereby amended to read as follows: 
1-705. JURISDICTION ORIGINAL AND 
APPELLATE.-The district court has original jurisdiction : 
l. In all cases both at law and in equity and proceedings. 
2. In all special proeeedings. 
.;,.2. In the issuance of writs of mandamus, certiorari, 
prohibition, habeas corpus and all writs necessary to the 
exercise of its powers. 
-4:3. In the trial of all indictments and informations. Its 
appellate jurisdiction extends to all cases arising in probate or 
·ustie~' courts assigned to magistrate's division of the district 
court; and to all other matters and cases wherein an appeal is 
allowed by law. 
SECTION 2. This act shall be effective at 12: 01 a.rn. on 
January 11 , I 971. 
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SECTION 5. There is hereby appropr iated from the General Account 
for Public School Support an amount not t o exceed $¼,808,888825 ,000 
for the Unemploymen t Insurance Pr ogram to be expended according t o 
Section 72-1349C, Idaho Code, for t he period Jul y 1, 1984, through 
June 30, 1985. 
SECTION 6. There is hereby appropr iat ed from the General Account 
for Public School Support an amount not to exceed 
$~t,68z,38821,777,300 for deposit in the Soc ial Security Trust Account 
to be expended accord ing to Sec tion S9-1115, Idaho Code, for the 
period July 1, 1984, th rough June 30, 1985 . 
SECTION 9. An emergency exis ting therefor, whic h emergenc y is 
hereby declared to exis t , Sect ion 8 of t h is act shall be in full force 
and effect on and afte r its passage and approval. 
Law Without Si gnature. 
CHAPTER 167 
(S . B. No. 1011) 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO THE SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT OF THE MAGISTRATE'S DIVISION 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT; AMENDING SECTION 1-2311 , IDAHO CODE, TO 
PROVIDE THAT AN APPEAL FROM THE SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT SHALL BE 
TO A LAWYER MAGISTRATE OTHER THAN THE MAGISTRATE WHO ENTERED THE 
SMALL CLAIMS J UDGMENT AND THAT THE APPEAL SHALL BE HEARD IN THE 
COUNTY WH EREIN THE ORIGINAL SMALL CLAI M WAS FILED; AND AMENDING 
SECTION 1-2312, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THE FORM FOR APPEAL FROM 
THE SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT TO A LAWYER MAGISTRATE AND TO ELIMI-
NATE THE REQUIREMENT OF POSTING A BOND WITH SATISFACTORY SURETY TO 
SECURE PAYMENT OF A JU DGMENT ON APPEAL. 
Be It Enacted by t he Legislature o f t he State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Sec t i on 1-23 11, Idaho Code , be , and the same 1s 
hereby amended to r e ad as follows: 
1-23 11 . APPEAL TO BiSlRf€l-~HB6E LAWYER MAGISTRATE. If either 
party is dissatisfie d he may, within thirty (302 days from the entry 
of said j udgment against him, appeal to a district-jadge-0£-the- coanty 
i n-whieh-sai d-eoart-is-rocated lawyer magistrate other than the magis-
trate who entered said judgment ; and i f the final judgment is rende r ed 
against hi m by such district- jcdge l awyer magistrate, then he s ha l l 
pay , 1n addit ion to any judgment rendere d in the magistrate's d i vi-
s ion , an a t torney ' s fee to t he prevai l ing pa r t y in t he sum of t wenty-
five dollars ($25.00) , prov i ded, however , t hat a ppea ls from s uch smal l 
cl a ims depar t me nt s ha ll only be a llowed in such cases as appea l s would 
be a ll owed if t he act ion were insti tuted i n t he magis tra te ' s division 
as is now provided, and further prov ided t hat the appeal shal l be 
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heard in the county wherein the original small claim was filed. 
SECTION 2. That Section 1-2312, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
1-2312. FORM FOR APPEAL - - FILING AND DISPOSITION. An appeal from 
the mag±strateis-division small claims department may be in the 
following terms: 
In the Magistrate's Division of the District Court for 
County, Idaho, .... Plaintiff, vs, .... , Defendant. Comes now .... , 
resident of County, Idaho and appeals from the decision of the 
small claims department of the magistrate's division for .••• County, 
Idaho, wherein a judgment for .•.• dollars was awarded against him on 
the •••• day of •••• , 19 .•• 
. . . . • • • . • . • • . • • • . . • , .•.• , . , .• , , (Signed} 
Such appeal shall be filed with the magistrate's division and 
aeeompanied--by--bond,-with-satisfaetory-sorety,-to-secore-the-payment 
of-soch-jodgment,-eosts-and-attorney-fees-as-provided-for--in--section 
±-r3±±. Such appeal shall be tried in the distriet-coort magistrate's 
division without any other pleadings than those required in the 
magistrateis--division small claims department originally trying the 
cause, all papers in the case shall be certified to said district 
jodge lawyer magistrate as is now provided by law in other cases of 
appeals in civil actions in the magistrate's division, provided, how-
ever, chat said district--jodge lawyer magistrate may require such 
other or further statements and information as he may deem necessary 
for the proper consideration of said controversy. 
Approved March 21, 1985. 
CHAPTER 168 
( S. B. No. 10 21} 
AN ACT 
RELATING TO THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF IDAHO; AMENDING 
SECTION 59-1310, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE SERVICE RETIREMENT ELIGI-
BILITY BASED ON AGE 65 REDUCED TO NOT LESS THAN AGE 60 ON THE 
BASIS OF A RATIO THE YEARS OF SERVICE CREDITED AS A POLICE OFFICER 
REPRESENTS IN RELATION TO YEARS OF TOTAL CREDITED SERVICE TO 
REPLACE THE PRESENT PROVISION WHICH PROVIDES A SERVICE RETIREMENT 
AGE BASED UPON MEMBERSHIP CLASSIFICATION AT THE TIME OF RETIRE-
MENT; AMENDING SECTION 59-1319, IDAHO CODE, TO CLARIFY LANGUAGE 
RELATING TO CREDITED SERVICE, A DEFINED TERM, SERVED IN EACH 
MEMBER CLASSIFICATION; AMENDING SECTION 59-1321, IDAHO CODE, TO 
PROVIDE FOR AN UNREDUCED EARLY RETIREMENT ALLOWANCE WHEN THE SUM 
OF ACE AND SERVICE IN YEARS EQUALS NOT LESS THAN 80 AN_D GRADUATED 
TO 90 BASED ON A RATIO OF YEARS OF SERVICE CREDITED AS A POLICE 
OFFICER TO YEARS OF TOTAL CREDITED SERVICE TO REPLACE THE PRESENT 
c. 168 1 85 
PROVISION WHIC 
EQUALS EITHER 
THE TIME OF 
PROVIDE A MET! 
MEMBER'S RETH 
CODE, TO PR( 
WHICH IS UNClJ 
FOR PAYMENT A'. 
Be It Enacted by t 
SECTION 1. 




five (5) years of 
ship serviceT--~ 
e±igi bte-f or-s erv· 
at-±east-five-f5¾· 
of--membership-se, 
below, based upon 
retirement ratio , 
(a} The numl 
was classifie, 
( b) The memb, 







A person who was ; 
have a service 
police officer or 
ret i remenc or i : 
been that of a po 
(2) An activ, 
is eligible for , 
least ten (10) ye. 
membership servic , 
(3) An acti· 
retirement or dis. 
if he has at l , 
( 6) months of mem· 
eligible for serv 
gible for early r , 
provided by secti, 
(4} An inact 
ADDENDUM B 
Hopper Resources, Inc. v. Webster, 878 N.E.2d 418, 422 (Ind.App. 2007) 
Jarvis v. State Land Department, 106 Ariz. 506,479 P.2d 169 (1970) 
Dawson County Irrigation Co. v. Stuart, 6 N. W.2d 602, 605-06 ( 1942) 
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words of _the statutory definition and de~ 
terrriine the substance is a narcotic as a 
matter of law." White v. State, 161 Ind: 
App. 568, 316 N.E.2d 69f!, ., 702 (1974). 
Further, it is well settled that. a .. statute 
may adopt a p~rt 0~ . all of a~~th~r law or 
statute, state pr federal, b,y a sp12cific, ref-
erence to the se~tion sought to be i~corpo-
rated. See id.. at 704. And the ~f{ect of 
the incorp~rat;ion by ref~rence is the same 
as if the law_ p~ statute or the part thereof 
adopted ' had been written into the adopt-
ing 'statute:· Siate v, Doane, 26~ Ind. 75, 
311 N.E.2d 803, 805--06 (1974). 
Here, the statute defining "legend,drug" 
incorpor,ates by refeli'.ertce 21 U.S.C. 
§ 353(b )(l); which does notinclude a 'list of 
drugs, and the Orange Book, which ex-
pressly includes Ritalin .in its list ofdrugs. 
While not a statute, the Orange Book is 
promulgated by. a federal agency, arid we 
hold that th12 statute properly incorpo~:;i_tl'ls 
the Orange Book by reference. Because 
of that incorporation, Ritalin is, ~s a mat-
ter 0~ law, specificaily listed ,as a legend 
drug under Indiana (;pdeSection ,16-i_g_:. 
2-199. See White, 316 N,E.2d at 704. Ac-
cordingly, here, the trial court need only 
refer to the statutory definition and cl_eter-
mine that Ritalin is a legend drug as a 
matter of law. See id. at 702; .Bari-(,et4 
579 N.E.2d at 86. The State presented 
sufficient evidence to support Porod's con-
viction. 
Affirmed. 
BAILEY, J., and CRONE, J ., concur. 
w ___ _ 
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No. 82A0~706-CV-309: . 
Court of Appeals of Indiana. 
Dec. 27, .2007. 
Rehearing. Denied Feb. 14, 2008.-1 
Background: Contractor brought · 
,(I 
to foreclose mechanics' Hen arid for- ! 
tional damages against homeowner. 
bench trial, the Superior Court, V , 
burgh County, J. Douglas Knight;-J 
tered judgment for homeowner. Cort 
tor appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, D' 
J., held that: 
(1) trial court's refusal to grant fi:{ 
. sure of mechanics' lien w~s not cl . 
erroneous, and 
(2) homeowner did not breach 
·. · struction contract. 
Affirmed. 
1'. Appeal and Error e,,,770(1), 901 
When the appellee does not. , 
b,rief, the appellant may prevail by ~ 
lishi_ng a, prima facie. case of error. 
2. Appeal and Error e=>901 
· For purposes of an appellant's b 
on · appeal · without an opposing bri 
appellee, "prima facie error" is defitf 
at first sight, on first appearance, on> 
face ofit. 
See ·publication·words and Phr- -
es for other judicial constructioriii 
. and d!!finitions . .. 
3. Appeal and Error e=>IOOS.1(4, 5) 
The standard for the appellate r 
of ,claims tried to the bench provides . 
the reviewing court shall not set aside 
HOFFER RESOURCES, INO. v .. WEBSTER · 
Cile as 878 N.E.2d 418 (Ind.App. 2007) 
Ind. 419 
. ,unless clearly erroneous; and 
,shall'be given to the opportuni-
. trial court to judge the credibility 
tnesses. 
,1. :. •, . . :·, 
al and Error e=>994(3), 101i.l.(2) 
~l!'!rrn~ing whether \1 jud~~4i )~ 
, , . neous, the appellate c~urt_,:vv,ill 
'gh _tl.1e evidenc{l qr deterII\iP.e ,\h~ 
' of witnesses but will consid~r 
e'vidence that suppor,ts t~eJµ_gg,,: 
. , the reasonable inferences . to-~ -
m that evidence. '- ' • 
,and Err.or e=>996, 1008.1(5)· 
ia patty appeals from a-negativ~ 
"it must demonstr-ate that' 'the 
point& unerringly to a ·con&lusion 
m that · reached by · the · trial 
when the trial court ehtei:'s fihd-
ii - and conclusions of law, the 
'.J_court may only reverse" if the 
~i:' -conclusions are clearly erronec 
J l,\nd Error e,,,1008.1(5) 
,'.trial court's ju~gment is clearly 
iW1ly if its findings of fact. do not 
i , conclusions or its conclµsio!}s 
J)port its judgment. 
&l ~nd Error e=>S50(1) 
(~;{.. . ' . .. 
n ·,tht tri:;il court en~r,i? findings 
, the specific findings contr.91 
' , '11es they cover, for pl.U'poses of 
_;review under the clearly errone-
aard; while a general . judgment 
'aP,plies tp any issue not found by 
' .. ,. ' 
qliitable maxim that "one who comes 
µl.ty must come with clean hands".is 
pie that denies relief to one whose 
concerning the matter-, in contro" 
h been fraudulent, illegal, or un-
n le as .. to another such that the 
party is harmed, which means, that 
one who seeks relief"m ; a court of equity 
must be free of wrongdoing in ,the matter 
before the court. · " · · · 
See publication Wo,-ds,and Phras-
es for other judicial constructions 
and definitions. · ·· · 
9 .. Equity e=>62 
, 'Eqiiitable maxim that "equity follows 
th'e' law'' means that an equitable right 
cannot be founded ori!'a violation bf law . 
See publication Words and Phras-
es for other judicial constrnctions 
and definitions. 
10. Equity e=>65(2) 
Trial court's judgrn~qt denying equita-
ble relief to contractor riri claim to fore-
close mechanics' lien .on house on grounds 
of contractor's un~lean hands was not 
clea:rly erroneous; buiiding perinit was .re-
qfiired to perfor~ the work, permit was 
is~ued based on fraudulent homeowner af-
fid~'vit signed by contractor in name of 
home'owner, and contractor performed 
"'."~rk without a valid pern'lit. 
11. Contracts e:,,312(1) · 
· , H6meowner did 1 not breach · construc-
tion ; contract by refusing to allow contrac-
to~ . to enter the property and refusing t.o 
pay for the work performed in building an 
additi~n; h~meowner refused 't~ :i.llow fur-
ther work by contractor after building in-
sp~ctC>r found that contractor's work fail~~ 
t6 c'drriply with the building code, honie-
own~r affidavit on which building permit 
wa;, i,ssued required that a master installer 
be 'employed to correct any code violations, 
and contractor failed to sho:w that it had 
credentials as a master installer. 
,Robert R. Faulkner, Evansville,- lN, At-
torney for Appellant . . 
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OPINION· 
' DARDEN, Judge. 
STATEMENT ·OF THE CASE 
Hopper Resources, Inc., Construction 
Division ("Hopper"), appeals the trial 
court's order denying judgment to Hopper 
on its claim asserted agaii:ist Vfe,nd~ll_Web-
ster in a complaint Stlelting the foreclosure 




Whether the trial court erred in denying 
judgment to Hopper·. 
FACTS 
John Shamo is a geologist and president 
of }lopper Resources, Inc., which under-
takes construction projects through its 
Construction Division. Shamo learned 
that Wendell Webster wanted to have an 
addition built on his ~ome. . After meeting 
with Webster, Shamo presented Webster 
with a proposal date~ S.eptember 27, 2003, 
from !'Hopper Construction, Inc., A Divi-
sion of Hopper Resources, Inc.," as "Con-
tractor," to "furnish all equipment, materi-
al and labor necessary" to add a finished 
bathroom, pour a concrete patio adjoining 
the finished bathroom and the back of 
Webster's house, and extend the house 
roof over both. (Ex. 7). The total cost for 
the proposed work was $15,900.00. The 
proposal was signed by Sham<,>, as Presi-
dent; and reflects that on October 8; 2003, 
Webster signed his "acceptance of propos-
al" and "authorized" Hopper "to do the 
work as specified." Id. Webster gave Sha-
mo $8,000.00 as a down payment. 
Hopper directed John Claspell, Tony 
Dorris, and James Clark to perform the 
contracted project at Webster's home. 
"Half way [sic] through the project, Mr. 
for the bathroom] be divided and .an e 
rior .bathroom access" be installed, su 
that the addition would also contain a h 
bath that could be reached from the new 
pout~d adjoinirig patio. (Tr. 29). Ari Ii 
dendum" from Hopper, dated November 
2·003, proposed '. to "furnish all equipmett 
materials and labor necessary' to" add, 
wall, and install and finish the reque~ . 
half•bath 'for an additional cost ) 
$2,100.00. (Ex: 11). Webster signed · 
acceptance on November 5, 2003. 
Sometime thereafter,. Shamo learn 
that ther~ had been no building 
obtained. for ~he work being done at,Jtl 
ster's .-~ome, -On_November 21\, 200&," 
mo went-to the Building Commission o 
and obtained an Improvement Loca • 
Permit for the addition of a bathroqm 
a porch to . Webster's residence. . Sh 
completed a "Homeowner Affidavit" 
ing that "Wendel [sic] Webster" the . · 
swore that "either [he] or a member 
[his] immediate family" would "perfo 
the . . . work" of adding the room 
porch at his residence, "for which Bui! 
Permit # 106771E" was being issued, 
that he would not be "subcontracting1 
any of the work" thereon. (Ex. A). S 
mo signed Webster's name on the affi '_.,, · 
The Commission then issued to "appli 
Wendel [sic] Webster" building" 'pe 
# 106771E authorizing the . "bathroorrf 
, ,t·_· '-)t 
porch addition" at Webster's residei:I 
(Ex. 10). The permit in Web~ter's n . 
for the work at the residence was there 
ter posted on the site. 
The Hopper workers proceeded to cci 
plete most of the work specified . in th 
contracts. According to John Cl_aspell, · 
March 10, 2004 (Shamo believed it was a~ 
later date in March ,but could not iden · 
an exact date), he and other Hopper wor 
ers went to the Webster home to install, 
vapor barrier and pea gravel under 
.HOPPER RESOURCES, INC. v. WEBSTER · 
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ordered by "Cod~ Enforce-
~ to ."bring everything into [C]ode.'' 
82:, 25). Claspell testified that the 
were told that Webster wanted 
off the property and not to return. 
f.pril 19, 2004, Shamo sent Webster 
'1'voice from Hopper demanding 
00 in payment for the workcomplet-
', May 13, 2004, Shamo signed and 
l!.d a notice asserting· Hopper's enti-
t, to a lie~ of $7,500.00 for HopP,er's 
1, or . . . materials or machinery for 
_,E;t~ents to" Webster's property, and 
Hopper "performed labor on the 23rd 
.ot . arch, ~004." (Ex. 15). 
tober 19, 2004, Hopper filed a 
nt on mec):lanic's lien, asserting 
bster had refused to pay $7,500.00 
: ·e, improvements and seeking judg-
of''foreclosure of the mechanic's lien 
amount of $7;500.00, plus pre-judg-
t _'interest, attorney fees, and costs. 
I) ·. ember 9, 2004, Webster filed an 
r that also asserted the affirmative 
.of "fraud." (App.14) . . On August 
Webster , filed a co1mter-claim, 
· g Hopper's breach of contract-;--by 
_·.· · g "unworkm:i,nlike" and "inferi-
'tk that. "need[ed] to be razed" and 
(App.16). On September 8, 2005, 
filed a motion .to strike both Web-, . . . . . 
, counterclaim and, affirmatiNe de-
.-- .. Hopper asserted that the counter-
. ''i_ untimi:!ly, and was filed 'without 
of the court; and that the affirmative 
· failed to comply with Indiana Trial 
)'s· requirement' that the· 'circum-
. constituting f~aud be . specifically 
' on Januru·y 13, 2006, the trial court 
·: ·· at Webster would !Je allowed to file 
specific pleading of his affirmative 
e. On January 24, 2006, Webster 
· more specific affirmative · defense, 
ng that Hopper had "held [it]self 
to .be a licensed . and bonded contrac-
th t Hopper obtained a building.per-
mit · by "pull[ing] a homeowner's permit" 
and "forg[ing] · [Webster-J's name on the 
homeowner's affidavit," and that Hopper 
was . "not a licensed and bonded contractor 
and his;,'tsic]fo1·ging of (\1/ebster]'s name 
on ari affidavit c_onstiiuted . fraud.'' 
(App.24). 
At the. outset of trial on February, -8, 
2007, the motion to strike Webster's coun-
terclaim .,Was discussed. The trjal, court 
ruled that the. late filed. caunterclaim was 
denied and :stated, "[T]here isrno ·Counter-
claim.'' (Tr.-·58). Hopper then presented 
its case,,·with Glaspell and Shamo as the 
only witnesses. Webster did not call wit-
nesses · but did introduce as an exhibit the 
Homeowner Affidavit ·(during,its cross ex-
amination ·of Sharilo). On May 9, 2007, the 
trial , caurt · issued its judgment order, 
which fincludes sita sponte findings· and 
C\:mclusions. , Therein, the trial court found 
inter 0alia that "a lawful permit was a 
necessary -con'dition precedent · to" Hop-
pe;r!s ·performance of work "and any recov-
ery for, the value thereof'; that ·. because 
Hopper ·"had :no· legal permit to perform 
the work''. on Webster's residence, Web-
ster "was .. justified in refusing to allow'' 
Hopper's workers "to return to the job site 
and perform any further illegal· opera-
tions''; and that Hopper could "not benefit 
from its/his · own wrongdoing." (App.37). 
The trial court .. concluded.that Hopper was 
not "-entitled to 1:ecover any further com-
pensatory , damages" and entered "final 
judgment against ,[Hopper] on [Hopper]'s 
claim.'' Id. 
DECISION 
[1;·2] We note at the outset, that Web~ 
ster has not filed a brief in response to 
Hopper's appeal:. When the appellee does 
not file a brief, the "appellant may prevail 
by establishing a prima facie case of er-
ror." Trinity Homes, LLC v. Pang, 848 
N.E .2d 1065; 1068 (lnd.2006). Pri.mafac,ie 
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error in this context is defined as, "ati first 
sight, on first appearanee, or on the face of 
it." Id. 
[3-7] The standard for the appellate 
review of claims tried to th~ bench pro-
vides that the reviewing cour t shall not set 
aside the judgment unless clearly errone-
ous; and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility · of · the witnesses. Bennett v. 
Broderick, 858 N.E .2d 1044, 1047 (Ind.Ct. 
App.2006),. trans. denied. In determining 
whether a judgment is clearly erroneous, 
we will not reweigh the ,evidence or deter-
mine the credibility cif witnesses • but will 
consider only the evidence that supports 
the judgment and the·· reasonable infer-
ences to be drawn from that evidence. Id. 
at 1048. Here, Hopper .bore the burden of 
proof on its complaint at trial .and; did not 
prevail; therefore, it appeals from,a nega-
tive judgment. Id. When a party appeals 
from a negative judgment, it must demon-
strate that the evidence points unerringly 
to a conclusion different from that reached 
by the trial court. Id. Further., when the 
trial court enters findings of fact and con-
clusions of law under Indiana Trial Rule 
52(A), the reviewing court may only re-
verse if the findings · or conclusions are 
clearly erroneous.- Butterfield v. Constan-
tine, 864 N.E.2d 414, 417 (Ind.Ct.App. 
2007). The, trfal court's judgment is clear-
ly erroneous only if its findings .·offact do 
not support its conclusions or its conelu~ 
sions do not support its judgment. Id. 
However, when, as here, the trial .court 
enters findings sua sponte, the specific 
findings control only the issues they cover, 
while a general judgment standard applies 
to any issue not found by the court. Id. 
We begin with the observation that Hops 
per's action-which was styled "Complaint 
to Foreclose Mechanic's Lien," (App,9)-
sought relief in equity. See Brighton v. 
White, 128 Ind. 320, 27 N.E. 620, 621 
(lnd.1891) ("where a lien upon real e 
is to be foreclosed the equity power . of th 
court is called into exercise"). Hence, 
begin by citing some "maxims of equity. 
12 I.L.E. Equity (2001). 
[8] First, "one who comes into equit;y 
must come with clean hands"; a principl 
that denies "relief to one whose condu' 
coricerning the matter in controversy ' 
been fraudulent, illegal; or unconscionable" 
as to another such that the other party 
harmed. Id. at § 24; see also Traylor · 
By-'-Pass 46 Steak House, Inc., 259 Ind. 
224, 285 N.E.2d ·820, 822 (19'72) (citm, 
Ferguson v. Boyd, 169 Ind. 537, 81 N.E. '7 
(1907)). In application, this principl 
"means that one who seeks relief in a co · 
of equity must be free of wrongdoing 
the matter before the court." Commun' 
Care Centers, Inc. v. Sullivan, 701 N.E 
1234, 1242 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. d.. 
nied. 
Another maxim provides that "whomev-
er seeks equity must do equity"; a prin 
pie whereby "relief which ·involves pe~ 
tration of an injustice will be denied." · 
I.L.E. Equity § 25. Thus, "he who would 
invoke the aid of a court of equity 'mu, 
show that he has . done equity to him o 
whom he complains.'" Shaw v. Mey 
Kiser Bank, 199 Ind. 687, 156 N.E . 552, 
554 (1927) (citations omitted): r 
[9] Ye.t another maxipi provides th \ 
"equity follows the Jaw," 12 I.L.E. Equit 
§ .22, In application, this means that " 
equitable right cannot be founded on .· 
vioiation of law.," Noble v. Davison, 17,'l 
Ind. 19, 96 N,E. 325, 330 (1911). 
The trial court found · Hopper "obtained 
the requisite building permit ,by applying: 
for and obtaining a homeowner's permit",, 
that the application therefor was a "Home1' 
owner's Affidavit" on which Shamo signed . 
Webster's name as homeowner; and this- · 
affidavit led to the Building Commissio 
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uanee of "the requisite permit for 
rm.ing the work in question." 
. 1 . 37). . The trial , co~, coqcluded 
,"lawful per:mit was a condition prec-
1,tQ Hopper'~·_«perfbrmance of work 
recovery for. the value _thereof.'; 
opper could "not benefit f~om its/his 
ongdoil).g"; a~d that Hopper "had 
aljd permi( to perform ..the work in 
t n." (App.36, 37). 
01 ! Hopper did not introduce into evi-
·1 and in its arguments to the trial 
. ,it did not reference, the require-
19,f . the Evansville Zoning Ordinance 
. · _g l,rnilding permits. However, 
1'tentt:> <;>f the. : .\'lx;hibits introduced 
,the inference that .a -~.uilding per-
·,pi;erequisite for work such as the 
n to. Webster!,s .hc;mse, . and that _only 
owner . rnay optain a permit. based 
Hpmeowner's Affidavit.1 The Affida-
. that. the homeown.er or an imme-
. ily member, will perform the work 
,residence in wtl,ich the hc;imeowner 
' . , The Affidavit also in.eludes a re-
.; ent that the homeowner disclose 
1 f. pcontr.acting out of .any work out-
in the permit iss,ued to [the ho.me-
,;, and further states in bold print 
"all subcontractors must be licensed 
' 
0erl;mrgh Cou~ty." (Ex. A). More~ 
, · 1;1hamo admitted that he was the 
ri.who went to the Building Commis-
, Wee and signed Webster's name on 
p~eowner Affidavit. .· · 
WI; the evidence supports the trial 
:findings .that a building permit was 
ary to perform the work, that the 
't obtained was one issued based on a 
. W)1er Affidavit signed by Shamo-
W ~p/'l~er, the homepwner. According-
-~.tria,) ,coi.µ-t's conclusion that Hopper 
no v_al(9 . permit to -perform the work 
1 1,,;e Affidavit ;efers to provisions , of "Article 
. S'.3'140 of the· Vanderburgh County Building 
ode or Article 15.150.134 of the Municipal 
· on Webster's residence is supported by the 
findings. Moreover, given that Hopper's 
complaint sought relief based on the trial 
court's equity jurisdiction, and the trial 
court's express conclusion that Hopper 
could not profit from its own wrongdoing, 
the 'trial court's judgment denying relief to 
Hopper is not clearly erroneous. 
Hopper p1:~sents a series of challenges 
to the trial court judgment, but all seek to 
persuade us to reverse the trial court's 
judgmen:t ·and remand for judgment in fa-
vor of Hopper on its claim to foreclose 
mechanic's lien 'or breach of contract: 
However, we ·find those arguments una-
vailing. 
Hopper argues that the trial court co~-
mitted reversible efror "in failingto apply 
an adverse . inference against W eb_ster 
based upon his failure'to testify and failure 
to call any witnesses." Hopper's Br. at 9. 
However, Hopper presents no authority 
for the proposition thlit such shifts the 
burden of proof. As the plaintiff, Hopper 
bore the burden · cif proof: to establish its 
claim by a preponderance of the evidence.' 
The trial court concluded that it had failed · 
to satisfy its burden, and we agree. 
Hopper next argues that . the evidence 
does not support the trial. court's "conclu-
sion that the ·work was being perfoi;med 
illegality [sic]," and , that even if that were 
so, recovery may be had. J d, We have 
already found that the evidence supports 
the trial court's findings and conclusion 
that the addition to Web.ster's house re-
quired a building permit, · and that the 
permit Shamo obtained for Hopper was 
not a valid permit, i.e,, the work was being 
performed illegally. Hopper cites Ph~nd 
v. Midwest Engine~r:ing .and Equip. Co., 
93 Ind.App. 165, 177 N.E. 879 (1931), and 
Code of Evansville" regarding the conse-
quences "if the inspector should find work in 
vi'olation of the Code." (Ex. A). 
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Drost v. Professional Bldg. Serv. Corp., 
153 Ind.App. 273, 286 N.E.2d 846 (1972); 
for the proposition that there may be re-. 
covery on a contract performed. in a man-
ner not allowed by law. However, such 
authority does not establish error by the 
t1ial court here, where the matter is within 
equity jurisdiction and the facts establish 
the failure of Hopper's actions to meet the 
standards of equity. ' .. 
Hopper cites Greenhaven Corp. v. 
Hutchcraft & Assocs., Inc., 463 N.E.2d 283 
(Ind.Ct.App.1984), for the proposition that 
recovery ~ay be had on a contract con-
taining specifics not in compliance with 
local building codes. However, in Green-
haven, the parties had agreed as to the 
nonconforming code matter. There was 
no evidence that w ebster agreed that the 
construction need not meet Code require-
ments. 
Throughout its brief, Hopper argues 
that Shamo's signature of Webster's name 
was with Webster's acquiescence an.d at 
Webster's request. However, th!' credil?il-
ity of witnesses is a matter for the trial 
court. See Bennett, 858 N.E.2d ,at 1048. 
Further, the validity of . the Homeowner 
Affidavit rests on its execution in compli-
ance with its own terms, i.e., that it is 
executed by "the [o]wner" of the residence 
to be improved. (Ex. A). Finally, we 
have found that if parties bear "equal 
fault" in an "illegal contract," such as Sha-
mo and Webster agreeing that Shamo 
would sign an affidavit which not only stat-
ed on its face that it was being signed by 
Webster but also that Webster would per-
form work that had been contracted to be 
performed by Hopper, "justice would re-
quire that we left the parties where we 
found them, even where [the one party] 
had fully performed." Monsignor Bernard 
P. Sheridan Counsel No. 6138 Knights of 
Columbus v. Bargersville State Bank, 620 
N.E.2d 732, 735 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). 
This result is exactly that obtained by 
trial-court's judgment here. ··, 
Hopper also argues that the trial' ' 
erred in finding that Hopper 0 ·"could1 
recover under the contract "based 
the principle of illegality" because We 
failed to expressly plead ''illegality" :',' 
affirmative defense. Hopper's Br. a" 
we ·again return to the f;ct that by 
nature of its complaint; Hopper so. 
equitable relief and that it bore the b. 
of proving its entitlement to relief .. T,)l 
fore, this argument fails. 
In a similar vein, Hopper argues·:;· 
Webster "failed to meet his burde 
proof on his affirmative defense of · · 
by not establishing all of the eleme 
fraud. Id. at 17. Inter alia, he 
the lack of any "intent to· deceive'\ o· 1 
part of Shamo, citing Shamo's · tes · ·. 
that the staff of the Building Commis 
office were aware "that he was · not •W 
dell Webster but John Shamo" arid · 
rected" him "to execute the homeow'b 
affidavit on behalf of Mi:. Webster" ail 
sign Webster's name. Id. at 19. 
we note that whether this testimony · 
credible was a matter for the · trial 
Bennett, 858 N.E.2d at 1048. Mort 
Shamo's signing of Webster's name oil 
affidavit-swearing that he was W eba 
the owner of the residence to be impro 
and that he personally or a member or 
immediate family would perform the 
and not subcontract it out-would sup' 
the reasonable inference that this con 
was a fraud upon the Building Co 
sion. 
Next, Hopper argues that the evid ' n 
fails to support the trial court's fin 
that Hopper's "work was performed in 
defective manner and caused ·the· Buildin 
Inspector to require additional correc 
work:'' Hopper's Br. at 22. As recoqn 
in FACTS, Hopper's workers were 
Webster's residence in mid-March to 
, .. L.H., "· STATE Ind. 425 
Cite as 878 N.E.2d 425 (Ind.App. 2007) 
on .as ordered by "Code Enforce-
~ ,:\',bring everything into [C]ode." 
) . This evidence supports the 
Je infere.nce that constructio~ 
hj.ch fails to meet the construction 
defective work. 
r argues that he "is entitled to 
, on the mechanic'~ lien" because it 
tially conforme[ed] with statutory 
ents." Hopper's Br . at 24. Hop-
Premier Investments :v. Suites of 
644 N.E.2d 124, 130 (Ind.1994), 
l)l'Oposition that "the purpose of 
!sJien laws is to prevent the ineq-
ptoperty owner enjoying the ben-
. the labor and materials furnished 
That 
Next, Hopper argues that it "was 
: 6 recover on breach of contract," 
' · refuted evidence" that it "was 
'a ha[d]incurred damages" in the 
of $7,500.00 "as a result of Web-
!fching the parties' contract by 
'~1,1iopper off the job and refusing to 
' "ripper's Br. at 29, 30. The evi-
,.., that Webster refused to allow 
·1work by Webster after the inspec-
'l:i that the work failed to coqiply 
Olide. The Homeowner Affidavit .ex-
. provides that "if the Inspector 
cf.tfod the work in the violation of the 
tb .n [the homeowner] shall employ 
er installer of the required trade or 
to change, alter, .or repair the work 
' i-n violation." (Ex. A). Hopper 
cl ,no evidence to establish that it held 
credentials. . The only· evidence as to 
· ing was Shamo's testimony that on 
projects, Hopper had "worked under 
body ·.else's license . . . many times." 
(Tr. 53). Absent a showing that Hopper 
held credentials to perform the corrective 
work required by the Homeowner Affida-
vit,. the circumstances here did not require 
that Webster allow Hopper worll-ers to 
perform further work. ., Therefore, Hop" 
per's breach of. contract. claims mueyt fail. 
·· Affirmed. 
MAY, J ., and CRONE, J., concur. 
L.H., Appellant-:-Respondtmt, 
v. 
STATE of Indiana, Appellee,-,Petitioner. 
No. 49A04--0701' .. JV-45;. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana. 
Dec. 27, 2007. 
Background: Juvenile was · adjudicated 
delinquent in the Marion Sup.erior Court, 
Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate, and Marilyn 
Moores, J ., of child molesting and battery. 
Ju~enile appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Robb, J., 
held that: 
(l) incorporating testimony, evidence, and 
exhibits from child hearsay hearing 
into fact-finding hearing denied juve-
nile fact-finding hearing to which he 
was entitled, and 
(2) ramification ·of the requirements of the 
child hearsay statute not being met-is 
not necessarily reversal if o_ther evi-
dence is sufficient to support the adju-
' ditation. 
Reversed_and remanded. 
Kirsch, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
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Appellant complains of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to sustain the submission 
of an instruction to the jury by the lower 
court on contributory negligence. 
We have said the test of negligence is 
whether in the light of existing dangers 
one is exercising ordinary care for his own 
safety, Bryant v. Thunderbird Academy, 
103 Ariz. 247, 439 P.2d 818. We have also 
said that if the evidence was such that rea-
sonable men might differ as to whethi:r qn 
act WqS performed while exercising ordi-
nary care the decision was for the trier of 
facts, Campbell v. English, 56 Ariz. 549, 
110 P.2d 219. The question here is wheth-
er the facts of this case reasonably present 
a question of whether the appellant was 
exercising ordinary care for her own safe-
ty at the time of the accident. 
As to this question, three witnesses tes-
tified to certain statements made by the 
appellant immediately after her fall. One 
witness testified: 
"Q Did you overhear Mrs. Prophet 
making any statements at that time, did 
she say anything? 
A Yes. While we were trying to 
make her comfortable for the arrival of 
t.he· ambulance, I asked her if she wanted 
a drink of water and she said yes. I got 
her a drink of water. And she said 
'Oh, honey, don't worry, I will be ali 
right. I have fallen in these shoes be-
fore.' 
And she told her companion to take 
these shoes and throw them just as far 
as she can throw them." 
Another testified 
"Q Can you tell me what, if anything, 
she said about her shoes? 
"A She said that she had fallen with 
those shoes. She showed me: a 
bruise or a scratch on the other 
leg, knee or leg, where she had 
fallen before. It was scabbed 
over. 
"Q What did she say specifically, if you 
can recall, about her shoes? 
"A She just said these shoes, 'I have 
fallen with these shoes before; I 
should have thrown them away, 
and I should have got some new 
ones.' And she said that is why 
she had come to the store, to get 
new shoes. 
"Q -Who was she talking to then? 
"A To everyone around. We were all 
standing there close, not directly, I 
don't think her answers were to 
anyone in particular." 
A third testified: 
"Q. Okay. Can you tell us what was 
said by Mrs. Prophet? 
A Some-they started to pick her up 
and put her on the stretcher. And there 
was some woman who I don't know it 
was started to pull her shoes off. And 
· she said, 'Throw those darn things away, 
this is the second time they have made 
me fall.'" 
The general rule is that statements ei-
ther oral or written made by or attribut-
able to a party to an action which tend to 
establish or disprove any material fact in 
the case constitute admission against inter-
est and are competent evidence in the ac-
tion. Deike v. Great Atlantic and Pacific 
Tea Co., 3 Ariz.App. 430, 415 P.2d 145; 
Pope v. Pope, 102 Cal.App.2d 353, 227 P.2d 
867; Casey v. Burns, 7 Ill.App.2d 316, 129 
N.E.2d 440; Hallett v. Rimer, 329 Mass. 
61, 106 N.E.2d 427; Lowen v. Pates, 219 
Minn. 566, 18 N.W.2d 455; Dorn v. 
Sturges, 157 Neb. 491, 59 N.W.2d 751; 
Harrison v. State, 19 Misc.2d 578, 197 N. 
Y.S.2d 662. 
[1] When shortly after the accident the 
appellant said that she had fallen before 
with these shoes and should have. thrown 
them away and should have got some new 
ones, she made statements against interest. 
Her admissions could have been taken ·by 
the jury as establishing why she fell. 
They, together with the type of shoes she 
was wearing, were sufficient to present the 
issue of contributory negligence. Volls-
tedt v. Vista-St. Clai r, Inc., 227 Or. 199, 
361 P.2d 657. 
[2] Appellant further complains that 
it was error to fail to strike certain testi-
JARVIS v. STATE LAND DEPARTMENT 
Cite as 4 79 P .2d 169 
Ariz. J.69 
tiy which compared the slipperiness of 
tile in front of appellee's store with tile 
la f.tont of another store. The testimony 
1-'' to the effect that the comparison 
wed that the results of rubbing the ap-
llant's shoes upon the tile in front of 
lloth , stores was about the same. A com-
rlaon of the tile in front of appellee's 
're with the tile in front of another store 
ing that they were about the same in 
ppcriness does not appear. to have any 
rial significance to any issue in the 
, But we do not think the failure to 
·c KWOOD, C. J., and UDALL, Mc-
·AND and HAYS, JJ., concur. 
106 Ariz. 506 
V,, JARVIS, for and on behalf of him-
If a-nd other persons or legal entitles 
litt!tuting• a class too numerous to be 
ani,~ as parties, Petitioners, 
v. 
t <!\TATE LAND DEPARTMENT, a De-
rtment of the State of Arizona, Andrew 
Bettwy, State Land Commissioner of 
lllt .State of Arizona; and . CITY OF TU-
N, a munlclpal corporation, real party 
j1 h1terest, Respondents. 
No. 9488. 
'. 
,·,. ·supreme Court of Arizona, 
In Banc. 
Dec. 28, 1970. 
Or-iginal proceeding by landowners for 
I .ction to require State Land Depart-
11nd State Land Commissioner to can-
I Q'lly existing grants of rights-of-way 
r:iatate lands by which city might trans-
' ,wnter and to enjoin Land Department 
··. Land Commissioner from permitting 
'-, to transport water through pipeline 
,179 P.2d-111/2 
over state lands. The Supreme Court, 104 
Ariz. 527, 456 P.2d 385, granted injunction, 
and landowners subsequently petitioned for 
an order to show cause why injunction 
should not be strictly enforced. The Su-
preme Court, Struckmeyer, V. C. J., held 
that city could not transport water through 
its pipelines to lands which lay within wa-
tershed but outside critical ground water 
area from where· water was taken, but that 
in view of statute giving priority to needs 
of municipalities for approptiable wat,ers, 
injunction would be modified to allow the 
withdrawal of water from basin for mu-
nicipal uses to same extent as water pre-
viously withdrawn for use of those lands 
which city might purchase in basin, and 
water could be withdrawn either from wells 
on land so acquired or from city's existing 
wells in the basin, but water could not be 
withdrawn both for use on the lands and 
for transport off the lands for municipal 
purposes. 
Petition granted. 
William W. Nabours, Superior Court 
Judge, sat in place of Udall, J., who disqual-
ified himself. 
I. Waters and Water Courses <S::>107(3) 
Under injunction against city embody-
ing rule that percolating waters may not be 
used off lands from which they are pumped 
if thereby others whose lands overlie com-
mon supply are injured, and that such wa-
ters can only be used in connection with 
land from which they are taken, city could 
not pump water from its wells and transport 
water so pumped through its pipelines to 
lands which were within watershed but 
outside critical ground water area from 
which water was taken. 
2. Waters and Water Courses <S::>107(2) 
A "critical ground water area" from 
which the conveyance of ground waters off 
the lands will be enjoined is a ground water 
basin or subdivision not having sufficient 
ground water to provide a reasonably safe 
supply for irrigation of cultivated lands in 
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the basin at the then current rates of with-
drawal. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Waters and Water Courses cS=>IOI 
Fact that statute prohibited only new 
irrigation or drainage wells in critical areas 
did not evidence legislative intent to permit 
pumping for municipal purposes without 
restriction. A.R.S. § 45-301 et seq. 
4. Waters and Water Courses cS=>l07(3) 
Under injunction prohibiting transpor-
tation of ground waters by municipality to 
municipality or elsewhere outside critical 
ground water area, city was not prohibited 
from delivering water to airfield for lawful 
purposes where airfield supply was from 
common basin over which it lay and from 
which it could legally withdraw water by 
sinking its own wells for domestic purposes. 
5. Waters and Water Courses ,S::,107(3) 
In absence of proof by municipal cor-
poration that its water customers outside 
critical ground water area but within drain-
age area from which water was taken over-
lay water basin so as to be entitled to with-
draw water from it, there were no equities 
which would relieve city of injunction 
against transportation of water to customers 
outside the critical ground water area from 
which water was taken. 
6. Eq u lty cS=>62 
"Equity follows the law" means that 
equity obeys and conforms to the law's gen-
eral rules and policies, whether the common 
law or statute law. 
See publication Words and P hrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
7. Waters and Water Courses cS=>I07(3) · 
In view of statute giving priority to 
needs of municipalities for appropriable 
waters, injunction prohibiting city from 
transporting water to city or anywhere out-
side the critical ground water area from 
where water was taken some 15 miles from 
city would be modified to allow the with-
drawal of water from basin for municipal 
uses to same extent as water previously 
withdrawn for use of those lands which 
city might purchase in basin, and water 
could be withdrawn either from wells on 
land so acquired or from city's existing 
wells in the basin, but water could not be 
withdrawn both for use on the lands and 
for transport off the lands for municipal 
purposes. A.R.S. § 45-147. 
Elmer C. Coker, Phoenix, and Donald C. 
Cox, Eloy, for petitioners. 
Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Peter C. 
Gulatto, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for re-
spondent, State Land Commission. 
Lewis C. Murphy, Tucson City Atty., by 
Richard H. Day, Asst. City Atty., and Rob-
ert 0. Lesher, Sp. Asst. City Atty., T ucson, 
for respondent, City of Tucson. 
Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes, by Burton M. 
Apker, Phoenix, amici curiae, American 
Smelting and Refining Co. 
Chandler, Tullar, Udall & Richmond, 
Tucson, amici curiae, Anaconda Co. and 
Boyd Land and Cattle Co. 
T witty, Sievwright & Mills, Phoenix, 
amicus curiae, Banner Mining Co. 
Fennemore, Craig, von Ammon & Udall, 
Phoenix, amici curiae, Duval Corporation 
and Duval Sierrita Corporation. 
STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice. 
This is an original petition by W. W. 
Jarvis and others, requesting that respond-
ents, the City of Tucson and the State Land 
Department, show cause why an injunction 
heretofore. issued under the original juris-
diction of this Court, Constitution of Ari-
zona, Article VI, § 5, A.R.S., should not be 
strictly enforced. The petition is a con-
tinuation of the dispute Jarvis v. State 
Land Department, City of Tucson, 104 Ariz. 
527, 456 P.2d 385, wherein petitioners, who 
cultivate 33,000 acres of land in the Avra-
Altar Valleys within the Marana Critical 
Ground Water Area by means of irrigation· 
wells, invoked the original jurisdiction of 
this Court to obtain an injunction against 
the City and the State Land Department. 
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lo W69, Tucson drilled six wells 
r Y.-1-lley for the purpose of pump-
flln~pqrting water to its customers 
~(n,~nd w;ithout the City, a distance 
' 9£ fifteen miles. Our injunction 
the State Land Commissioner to 
snt~ of way across State lands for 
' 'ti.01;1 of the waters from the Avra-
ijC}'.;S to Tucson or elsewhere. In 
en;,sircisron we said that upon ap-
:t&r~his Court accompanied by such 
flf C:S . as would permit the legal 
,#d transportation of ground wa-
i?,junction would be modified or 
s . the facts warranted. 
n re in the present action now as-
·.e, City of Tucson, although not 
~ . '.water to Tucson prope-r, has 
"ii:><pump water from its wells and 
u'ated water to areas both within 
'ea in violation of the Court's in-
,. '.f1\lcson acknowledges that it is 
t1,r from its wells and is deliver-
t to an installation known as Ryan 
I ·n the Marana Critical Ground 
.ea and to certain residences out-
,;:\\:farana Critical Ground Water 
but .. ,:within the Avra-Altar Valleys' 
,,11rea. Several questions which it 
csi-:pertinent have been propounded 
tjbners in order that there be a final 
ion of the dispute between the par-
' f ' 
·;,court's second decision in Bristor 
Htham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P .2d 173 
) 1 ·lhe doctrine of prior appropriation 
' wat ers was rejected and the doc-
f ·ri:asonable use was adopted. In 
()~_cision in this case we pointed out 
~Pristor it was alleged that the plain-
s! been the owners since 1916 of cer-
flls f~om which they had supplied 
_.es with water for domestic pur-
n 1949 the defendant sank a num-
f !n~ge irrigation wells which by their 
I t[Qn sucked the ground water from 
r _t~e plaintiffs' lands, thereby destroy-
Jlli!illtiffs' · supply fo r thei r wells. De-
da.1\t transported the water a distance 
of three miles where he developed agricul-
tural lands not theretofore irrigated. W e 
held in Bristor, which holding was repeated 
in our first decision here, that this was not 
a reasonable use of ground waters. 
In our first decision here, we also held 
that the American rule of reasonable use 
permitted percolating water to be extracted 
for the beneficial use of the land from 
which it was drawn. W e emphasized this 
aspect of the. doctrine of reasonable use by 
requoting from Bristor tha t part of the de-
cision in Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Wa-
ter Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87, to the ef-
fect that the modern decisions are nearly 
harmonious in holding that a property own-
er may not convey waters off the lands 
from which they a re pumped if the wells of 
another are thereby damaged or impaired. 
This limitation on the use of ground waters 
has the overwhelming support of American 
precedent. Percolating waters may not be 
used off the lands from which they a re 
pumped if thereby others whose lands over-
lie the common supply are injured. See 
Midway Irrigation Co. v. Snake Creek Min-
ing & T unnel Co., 271 F. 157 (CCA 8th, 
1921 ) , aff'd, 260 U.S. 596, 43 S.Ct. 215, 67 
L.Ed. 423 (1922); Katz v .. Walkinshaw, 141 
Cal. 116, 70 P. 663 (1902), on rehearing, 74 
P. 766 (1903); Cohen V . La Canada Land 
& Water Co., 151 Cal. 680, 91 P. 584 (1907) ; 
B~rr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 154 Cal. 
428, 98 P. 260 ( 1908) ; City of San Bernar-
dino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 198 
P. 784 (1921) ; Koch v. W ick, 87 So.2d 47 
(Fla.1956) ; cf. Willis. v. City of Perry, 92 
Iowa 297, 60 N.W. 727 (1894) ; cf. Barclay 
v. Abraham, 121 Iowa 619, 96 N.W. 1080 
(1903) ; Schenk v. City of Ann Arb9r, 196 
Mich. 75, 163 N.W. 109 (1917) ; Bernard 
v. City of St. Louis, 220 Mich. 159, 189 N.W. 
891 (1922) ; cf. Stillwater Water Co. v. 
Farmer, 89 Minn. 58, 93 N.W . 907 (1903) , 
and 99 Minn. 119, 108 N.W. 824 (1906); 
Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks, Power 
& Light Co., 100 Minn. 481, Ill N.W. 391 
( 1907) ; Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 
N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 ( 1909); Crane v. 
Borough of Essex Fells, 67 N.J.Super. 83, 
169 A.2d 845 (1961), aff'd, 36 N.J . 544, 178 
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A.2d 196 (1962); Smith v. City of Brook-
lyn, 18 App.Div. 340, 46 N.Y.S. 141 ; 54 
N.E. 787 (1897); Westphal v. City of New 
York, 34 Misc. 684, 70 N.Y.S. 1021 (1901), 
aff'd, 75 App.Div. 252, 78 N.Y.S. 56, aff'd, 
177 N.Y. 140, 69 N.E. 369 (1901), rearg. 
den. 177 N.Y. 570, 69 N.E. 1133; Forbell 
v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 
644 (1900); Dinger v. City of New York, 
101 App.Div. 202, 92 N.Y.S. 1120, aff'g. 42 
Misc. 319, 86 N.Y.S. 577 (1903), aff'd 182 
N.Y. 542, 75 N.E. 1129 (1905); Hathorn v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., .194 N.Y. 326, 
87 N.E. 504 (1909); Rouse v. City of 
Kinston, 188 N.C. I, 123 S.E. 482 (1924); 
Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 120 N.W.Zd 18 
(N.D.1963); Canada v. City of . Shawnee, 
179 Oki. 53, 64 P .Zd 694 ( 1937) ; City of 
Enid v. Crow, 316 P.Zd 834 (Okl.1957); cf. 
Ross Common Water Co. v. Blue Mountain 
Consol. W. Co., 228 Pa. 235, 77 A. 446 
(1910); Horne v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 
59 Utah 279, 202 P. 815 (1921); Glover v. 
Utah Oil Refining Co., 62 Utah 174, 218 
P. 955 (1923). 
Such waters can only be used in connec-
tion with the land from which they are 
taken. See Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron 
Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511, 165 So. 764 
(1936), reaff'd on sub. app., 236 Ala. 173, 
181 So. 276 (1938); Sycamore Coal Co. v. 
Stanley, 292 Ky. 168, 166 S.W.Zd 293 
( 1942); Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 251 
Md. 428, 248 A.2d 106 (1968); Smith v. 
City of Brooklyn, 18 App.Div. 340, 46 
N.Y.S. 141, 54 N.E. 787 (1897); State 
ex rel. Ericksen v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 
308 P.Zd 983 (1957); Bayer v. Nello L. 
Teer Co., 256 N.C. 509, 124 S.E.Zd 552 
(1962); Volkmann v. City of Crosby, 120 
N.W.2d 18 (N.D.1963); Canada v. City of 
Shawnee, 179 Oki. 53, 64 P.Zd 694 (1937); 
Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 
339 Pa. 129, 14 A.2d 87 (1940); Silver King 
Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 
39 P.Zd 682 (1934); Evans v. City of Seat-
tle, 182 Wash. 450, 47 P.Zd 984 (1935) . 
[ 1] Tucson questions whether it may 
pump water from its wells and transport 
the water so pumped through its pipelines 
to lands which lie within the watershed but 
outside the Marana Critical Ground Water 
Area. From what has been said concern-
ing the American rule of reasonable use, 
the answer to Tucson's question is, of 
course, that it may not. 
"There is no apparent reason for say-
ing that, because defendant is a m_u-
nicipal corporation, seeking water for the 
inhabitants of the city, it may therefore 
do what a private owner of the land may 
not do. The city is a private owner of 
this land, and the furnishing of water to . 
its inhabitants is its private business. It 
is imperative that · the people of the city 
have water; it is not imperative that they 
secure it at the expense of those owning 
lands adjoining lands owned by the city." 
Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 196 Mich. 
75, 163 N.W. 109, at 114 (1917). 
(2) We also pointed out in our first 
decision in this case that the Avra-Altar 
Valleys are a part of a critical water area, 
being included within the Marana Critical 
Ground Water Area. For the reason that a 
critical ground water area is a ground water 
basin or subdivision "not having sufficient 
ground water to provide a reasonably safe 
supply for irrigation of the cultivated lands 
in the basin at the then current rates of 
withdrawal," we held that additional users 
would necessarily deplete the supply of the 
existing users. Consequently, the convey-
ance of ground waters off the lands on 
which wells in the Avra Valley are located 
impairs the supply of the other land owners 
within the critical area. 
[3) Tucson argues that since by statute 
A.R.S. § 45-301 et seq. only new irrigation 
or drainage wells in critical a reas having a 
capacity of more than 100 gallons per 
minute are prohibited, the Legislature must 
have intended to permit pumping for mu-
nicipal purposes without restriction. But 
the illegality of the use of ground water is 
not dependent upon whether the Legisla-
ture has not forbidden the sinking of wells 
as a source of supply to be used for mu-
nicipalities. The right to exhaust the com-
mon supply by transporting water for use 
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l;rnds from which they are pumped 
nd pf law controlled by the doctrine 
onable use and protected by the con-
0 ' · ..of the state as a right in property. 
1 ;irncson questions whether on equi-
prmciples it should be prohibited from 
Ytrl~g ;water to Ryan Field. Ryan Field 
r'field which we understand has ex-
~
.Jtast as 'long as petitioners have 
i . 
• ln agriculture. Its lands overlie 
vri:!A!'tar water basin and geographi-
lt ' lies· within the Marana Critical 
Water Area so as to entitle it to 
raw water from the common supply 
purposes except agriculture. Tucson 
li6t be prohibited .from delivering 
to' Ryan Field for lawful purposes 
lh~ ,iRyan Field supply is from the 
i>asin over which it lies and from 
h ,could legally withdraw water by 
u,.?wn wells for domestic purposes. 
'l'li'cson's delivery of water to pur-
• :w'ifhin the Avra-Altar drainage 
ut 'out~ide the Marana Critical Ground 
r Area is, however, without equitable 
• . There is no indication in the 
t~11t these customers of Tucson over-
water basin so as to come within 
rh1ciple applicable to Ryan Field. Un-
On" can establish that its customers 
,; the Marana Critical Ground Water 
\It within the Avra-Altar Valleys' 
· areas overlie the water basin so 
-entitled to withdraw water from it, 
rf 'no equities which will relieve it 
. )l\i\ption heretofore issued. 
1i:'·~etitioners request this Court to 
e whether Tucson by acquiring 
ln):ultivation in the Avra-Altar Val-
:"t, .remove the ground water used 
lh9sc lands to other areas contrary 
· '4-octrine of reasonable use. The 
·' 'n<l Department joins petitioners in 
ing that the first Jarvis decision be 
rited by clarifying the rights of the 
It . in this respect. Tucson also asks 
·;;rt to pass upon a like question al-
II h'. in somewhat a different form. 
lol 0C11riae, however, oppose the request 
of the parties that the Court expand on the · 
legal rights in question. _ 
We think, however, that the problem is 
critical to municipalities in Arizona and so 
justifies our consideration even though not 
strictly embraced . within the limits of t:he 
issues of the original lawsuit. As indicated, 
Jarvis' action invoked this Court's equitable 
jurisdiction. We issued the injunction but 
stated that we reserved the right to modify 
or dissolve upon application accompanied 
1:iy a showing of circumstances as would 
permit the legal pumping and transportation 
of ground water by the City. Our decree 
was consistent with the almost universal 
rule that a court of equity when requested 
will determine all the equities connected 
with the main subject of the suit and grant 
all the relief necessary to a complete adjust-
ment of the litigation: 
"It is a prirn;iple of equity that it does 
justice completely and not by halves. 
When a bill had been brought in good 
faith to obtain relief within the jurisdic-
tion of the court, the bill may be re-
tained to do complete justice with rd-
erence to the subject matter, even thou1~-h 
upon the facts the specific relief pqyed 
for cannot be given, and a bill wo1,1l,ci ,.~9t. 
lie for the sole purpose of obtainil'\g · t~J 
specific relief that is given. Reynolds v. 
Grow, 265 Mass. 578, 580, 164 N.E. 650; 
Booras v. Logan, 266 Mass. 172, 175, 164 
N.E. 921 ; Degnan v. Maryland Casual ty 
Co., 271 Mass. 427, 430, 431, 171 N.E. 
482; Peerless Unit Ventilation Co., Inc., 
v. D'Amore Construction Co., 283 Mass. 
121, 125, 126, 186 N.E. 280 ; Geguzis v. 
Brockton Standard Shoe Co., 291 Mass. 
368, 371, 197 N.E. 51; Somerville Na-
tional Bank v. Hornblower, 293 Mass. 363, 
368, 199 N.E. 918, 104 A.L.R. 1107." 
Fields v. Othon, 313 Mass. !15, 46 N.E.2d 
546, at 547 (1943). 
[6, 7) It is also frequently stated as a 
maxim of equity that equity follows the 
Jaw. By this is meant that equity obeys and 
conforms to the law's general rules and 
policies whether the common law or stat-
ute law. See, e. g., Provident Building & 
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Loan Ass'n. v. Pekarek, 52 Ohio App. 492, 
3 N.E.2d 983 (1936). By A.R.S. § 45-147 
the relative value of uses in appropriable 
waters has been fixed by the Legislature 
as first, · domestic · and municipal uses, and 
second, irrigation and stock watering. The 
creation of such a priority clearly evidences 
a legislative policy that the needs of agri-
culture give way to the needs of municipali-
ties. Hence, we hold that the decree in this 
case will be modified if Tucson purchases or 
acquires the title to lands within the Avra-
Altar Valleys which are now cultivated and 
uses the water which would have been used 
in cultivating such lands as a source of 
supply for its municipal customers. Tucson 
may withdraw an amount equal to the an-
nual historical maximum use upon the lands 
so acquired. 
The · record in this case compels the con-
clusion that underlying the Avra-Altar Val-
ley floor is a basin of gently percolating 
waters. It is our decision, therefore, that 
if Tucson acquires lands within the Avra-
Altar Valleys overlying the Marana Critical 
Ground Water Area it may withdraw water 
from the basin for municipal uses to the 
same extent as water previously withdrawn 
for use on those lands. The water with-
drawn may be either from wells on the lands 
so acquired or from Tucson's presently ex-
isting wells, but in no event may water be 
withdrawn both for use on the lands and 
transported off the lands for municipal pur-
poses. Any withdrawals shall be through 
water metering devices available for in-
spection by all parties to this litigation 
or their agents, and the devices will indicate 
the current rates of withdrawal together 
with the quantity of water withdrawn 
monthly. Tucson will furnish quarterly 
records of its water withdrawals to the 
Office of the State Land Commissioner 
where they will be held available for ex-
amination by the public. 
The injunction heretofore issued will be 
continued in effect except insofar as it has 
application to the installation known as 
Ryan Field. 
LOCKWOOD, C. J., McFARLAND 
and HAYS, J ., and WILLIAM W . NA-
BOURS, Judge Superior Court, concur. 
NOTE: The Honorable JESSE A. 
UDALL, J ., having disqualified himself, 
the Honorable WILLIAM W. NABOURS, 
Judge of the Superior Court of Yuma Coun-
ty, was called to participate in his stead. 
w.._ __ _ 
0 ~ KlY NUHIU SYSfH4 
T . 
106 Ariz. 511 
NAVAJO COUNTY, Arizona, Mohave Coon• 
ty, Arizona, Apache County, Arizona, CO· 
conlno County, Arizona, Yavap·a1 County, 
Arizona, and State Department of Prop· 
erty Valuation, Appellants, 
v. 
FOUR CORNERS PIPE LINE COMPANY, 
Appellee. 
No. 10139-PR. 
Supreme Court of Arizona, 
In Banc. 
Dec. 31, 1970. 
Pipeline owner brought action against 
five counties and state department of prop-
erty valuation to recover ad valorum tax-
es on pipeline paid under protest. From 
judgment of the Superior Court, Maricopa 
County, Morris Rozar, J., in favor of pipe-
line owner, counties and department ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, 12 Ariz. 
App. 348, 440 P.2d 496, affirmed. Qn petition 
for review, the Supreme Court, McFarland, 
J., held that substitution by trial court of 
such court's method of evaluation for that 
of department exceeded court's jurisdicti'on, 
absent finding, or evidence sufficient to 
warrant finding, that department had em-
''lfAVAJO COUNTY v. FOUR .CORNERS PIPE LINE COMPANY Ariz. 175 
Cite as 479 P.2d 174 
inequitable vapai County, hereinafter referred to as 
of, evaluation. the State) . The Company is the ownei: of 
clsfon of Court of Appeals vacated, certain property involved in this case which 
and consists of a 16-inch diameter pipe-line 
originating in the Four Corners area of 
Arizona and thence crossing the counties in-
volved into the Los Angeles area and which 
Inf of Superior Court reversed 
Ide/ and matter remanded. 
\ruckmeyer, J ., not participating. 
; · ' 
tlon ¢=>494(1) 
ldlary does not have function of 
I t ing tax assessment regulations in 
of ijudicial opinions, but rather has 
on ·with respect to such area of taxa-
f reviewing actions of administrative 
nd ·of superimposing its opinion only 
i that agency has abused its legisla-
•tegated duty. 
Oh @=>543(8) 
t i,tution by trial court, in action by 
owner against five counties and 
~rtment of property evaluation to 
ad.· valorum taxes on pipeline paid 
,Jlt,o,test, of court's method of evalua-
tli at of department exceeded court's 
cdon, absent finding, or evidence 
nt to warrant finding, that Depa rt-
had employed inherently unjust or 
ble method of evaluation. A.RS. 
12;t01, 42--147, 42-147, subsec. B, 42-
' Carlock & Ralston by George Read 




tan petition £or review of a decision 
, tate Court of Appeals, 12 Ariz.App. 
:p.zd 496 which affirmed the judg-
' ~f the Maricopa County Superior 
ft fn favor of the Appellee, Four Cor-
lpe Line Co,, (hereinafter referred to 
-Company) and adverse to the ap-
11nd the defendants in the court 
< (Navajo County, Mohave County, 
. hi! County, Coconino County and Ya-
is used primarily for the gathering and 
transportation of crude oil. The pipe-line 
was constructed in 1958 at the approximate 
cost of $45,000,000.00. In 1967 it was valued 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
for rate making purposes at $35,000,000.00. 
It has been stipulated by the parties here 
that the portion of the pipe-line which is in 
Arizona represents 45.4% of the total sys-
tem. The sole question involved in this 
matter is the valuation of the pipe-line by 
the State Department of Property Evalua-
tion for the purposes of ad valorem taxes. 
It is contended by the Company that the 
proper valuation should be $8,141,128.00. 
On the other hand the State takes the 
position that the valuation made by the De-
partment was properly assessed at $19,799,-
985.00. 
The Company, in accordance with the 
statutes paid the taxes that were levied 
against it by the State on behalf of the 
various counties and then appealed the 
taxation to the Superior Court. After a 
lengthy trial, having heard witnesses from 
both sides, it decided in favor of the Com-
pany that the proper assessed valuat ion 
was, as claimed by the Company, $8,141,-
128.00. From this judgment the State ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals sustained the 
lower court and it is now before this Court. 
In the lower court the Company raised 
the question of the constitutionality of the 
taxing system, claiming that they were de-
prived of due process of law in that a valua-
tion, or method of evaluation, was placed 
upon their property differing from that 
used for other similar businesses. This has 
not been an issue in the appellate courts 
and apparently has been abandoned by the 
Company on appeal. However, the question 
of due process as far as taxation of com-
panies, such as railroads and pipe-lines, has 
recently been answered by this Court in the 
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son "or" another without words of joint 
tenancy or right of survivorship is not 
within the provisions of the statute. To so 
hold would require us to overrule the John-
son case. 
ties or by answer in nature of cross-action 
in same action, and sufficiency of evidence 
to support such portion of decree may not 
be considered on appeal from another por-
tion thereof. 
[5-7] In that case, decided 14 years ago, 
we expressed our views of the legislative 
intent. We reiterated that statement in the 
Kehl case eight years ago. We see no error 
in the conclusions announced in those cases. 
W_e feel that the Legislature intended by 
this act to get away from the "confmion, 
contradiction and perplexing distinctions" 
and the uncertainties, resulting in such 
transactions, occasioned by the judicial 
opinions in the various states on this sub-
ject. The Legislature passed an act which 
we have construed. Our construction has 
not been since questioned by the Legislature. 
The construction which we have placed 
upon the act has been accepted and followed 
by banks in their dealings with depositors 
and by depositors in their dealings with the 
banks, each other, and in their handling and 
disposing of their funds. That construction 
has become a rule of property in this state. 
The judgment of the district court is af-
firmed. 
0 i t:·',EYc,No,UMc-:B-:cER-SY_S_TE""M 
T 
DAWSON COUNTY IRRIGATION CO. v. 
STUART et al. 
No. 31441. 
Supreme Court of Nebraska. 
Nov. 27, 1042. 
I. Easements <!P7(2) 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Law of the Case'-' and "Res Judicata". 
3. Limitation of actions <S:->55(5) 
Where possession of land by corpora-
t!on, claiming easement therein for irriga-
tion canal, began ten years or more before 
c?mmencement of corporation's suit to quiet 
htle to such easement, right of action of de-
fendants or their predecessors in interest 
for damages was barred by statute of limi-
tations at time of filing of their answer 
claiming damages. Comp.St.1929, §§ 20-
207, 20-212. 
4. Equity <!P66 
L.imitation of actions .g::,155 
A litigant, asking affirmative equitable 
relief, will be required to do justice with 
regard to any equity, arising out of subject 
matter of action, in his adversary's favor, 
and statute of limitations is no bar to im-
position of such condition. 
5. Pleading <!Pl48 
Under the Code, chancery practice is 
so enlarged that answer in nature of cross-
petition may properly seek affirmative re-
lief beyond t_hat which is merely defensive, 
and such rehef need not be based on equit-
able grounds, but matters set up in such 
answer must be germane to original suit. 
6. Adverse possession <!Pl 
The right to "title by prescription" 
comes into being by lapse of time under 
conditions which have been fulfilled, and 
every incident thereof must have ripened 
before commencement of action to quiet 
such title. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Title by Prescription". 
An "easement by prescription" cannot 
be acquired except by open, notorious, ex-
clusive and adverse user for ten years. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Easement by Prescription". 
7. Equity <!P62 
2. Courts <!P99(1) 
Judgment <!l=>720 
A portion of decree not appealed from 
becomes "law of the case" and is "res 
judicata" as to issue decided thereby when 
raised in another action between same par-
The maxim that "equity follows the 
law" means in broad sense that equity 
follows the law to extent of obeying it and 
conforming to its general rules and policies, 
whether contained in common or statute 
law. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Equity Follows the Law". 
DAWSON COUNTY IRRIGATION CO. v. STUART 
6N.W.2d 602 
Neb. 603 
8. Equity e:::>62 
The maxim that "equity follows the 
law" is strictly applicable whenever parties' 
rights are clearly defined and established by 
law, especially by constitutional or statu-
tory provisions. 
9. Equity <!P66 
The maxim that "he who seeks equity 
must do equity" does not justify imposition 
of arbitrary conditions in order to carry out 
what would amount to substantial justice 
between parties in chancellor's individual 
opinion, but only requires plaintiff to do 
"equity", that is, what he should be required 
to do on established legal principles, and 
should never be applied so as to require 
plaintiff to perform an act not devolved on 
him by such principles. 
See Words and Plu»ses, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Equity" and "Ile Who Seeks Equity 
Must Do Eqnity". 
10. Equity <!P87(3) 
Where claim for damages for taking of 
land for irrigation canal and reduction of 
value of adjacent lands not taken is barred 
by statute of limitations, maxim that "equity 
follows the law" prevents assertion of such 
claim by answer in irrigation company's 
equity suit to quiet title to easement for 
such canal. Comp.St.1929, §§ 20-207, 20-
212. 
Syllab·us by the Court. 
1. An easement by prescription cannot be 
acquired except by open, notorious, exclu-
sive and adverse user for a period of ten 
years. 
2. A decree from which no appeal has been 
taken becomes the law of the case, and is 
res adjudicata as to the same issues raised 
by answer in the nature of a cross-action. 
3. "If a litigant asks affirmative equitable 
relief, he will be required to do justice him-
self with regard to any equity arising out 
of the subject-matter of the action in favor 
of his adversary, and the statute of limita-
tions is no bar to the imposition of such 
conditions." Bank of Alma v. Hamilton, 
85 Neb. 441, 123 N.W. 458, 133 Am.St.Rep. 
676. 
4. Under the Code our chancery practice 
has been so enlarged that an answer in the 
nature of a cross-petition may properly 
.~eek affirmative relief beyond that which is 
merely defensive, and such relief sought 
need not necessarily be based upon equitable 
grounds. 
5. Affirmative relief, under our chancery 
practice, sought in an answer in the nature 
of a cross-petition must be germane to the 
original suit. 
6. The maxim "Equity follows the law" 
in its broad sense means that equity follows 
the law to the extent of obeying it and con-
forming to its general rules and policies 
whether contained in common or statute 
law. 
7. "The maxim is strictly applicable 
whenever the rights of the parties are 
clearly defined and established by law, es-
pecially when defined and established by 
constitutional or statutory provisions." 30 
C.J.S., Equity, p. 503, § 103. 
8. A claim for damages having been 
barred by statute of limitations, the maxim 
"Equity follows the law" prevents i,ts asser-
tion in an answer in the nature of a cross-
petition in an action to quiet title to an 
easement obtained by prescription. 
Appeal from District Court, Dawson 
County; Nisley, Judge. 
Action in equity by the Dawson County 
Irrigation Company against Leonard J, 
Stuart and others to quie.t title to an ease-
ment for an irrigation canal, in which de-
fendants affirmatively claimed damages fo:r 
taking of land for the canal and reduced 
value of adjacent lands. From a judgment 
awarding defendants damages, plaintiff ap-
peals. 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
Lyman M. Stuckey, of Lexington, 'for 
appellant. 
Cook & Cook, of Lexington, for appel· 
lees. 
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J.,_ and 
EBERLY, CARTER, MESSMORE and 
YEAGER, JJ. 
YEAGER, Justice. 
This is an action in equity by Dawson 
County Irrigation Company, a corporation, 
plaintiff and appellant, against Leonard J.' 
Stuar,t and Winifred S. Stuart, husband and 
wife, Wilfried V. Stuart and Mary T. Stu .. 
art husband and wife, Charles Francis 
St~art and C. Stuart, first real 
name unknown, husband and wife, and 
Helen Stuart and --- H. Stuart, first 
real name unknown, wife and husband, de-
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fendants and appellees. On the pleadings, 
in form and substance, the plaintiff sought 
to have title quieted to an easement for an 
irrigation canal extending in an irregular 
course and direction across the south one-
half of section thirty-six, township ten 
north, range twenty-one west of the sixth 
P. M., in Dawson county, Nebraska, and the 
defendants denied the right of the plaintiff 
to the easement claimed, and affirmatively 
claimed damages for the value of the land 
actually taken for the irrigation canal, and 
for damages to adjacent lands not taken but 
the value of which was reduced by reason 
of the construction of the canal. Defend-
ant Leonard J. Stuart is the owner of two-
. fifths of the land, and defendants Wilfried 
V. Stuart, Charles Francis Stuart and 
Helen Stuart are each owners of one-fifth 
thereof. 
The case was tried. to the court and 
decree was entered quieting title in · the 
plaintiff or its successors· in interest so long 
as the easement shall be used for the irriga-
tion purposes of the irrigation system, and 
for ten years after abandonment of its use 
in case it shall be abandoned. In case of 
abandonm.ent for t en years the easement 
shall revert to the then owners of the land. 
As a part of the decree the defendants 
were awarded judgment against the plaintiff 
in the sum of $785 for the taking and dam-
age to land. 
The defendants have not appealed, but 
the plaintiff has appealed from the judg-
ment rendered against it for damages. 
Plaintiff bases its right to have the 
judgment rendered against it reversed on 
the proposition that the statute of limita-
tions bars a right of recovery of damages 
for taking and for reduction of value of 
lands not taken. The theory of the defend-
ants is that the action of the plaintiff being 
in equity, and though it has a prescriptive 
right to the easement which it has a right 
to have enforced, the court may require 
payment of damages as a condition of 
quieti ng title to the easement. They con-
tend that this condition may be enforced 
under the maxim of equity that he who 
comes into equity must do equity. 
The obvious effect of this contention is 
that a court of equity solely and alone under 
the authority of this maxim, without the 
interposition of other considerations or con-
ditions, has power to suspend the operation 
of a statute of limitations against an action 
at Jaw. 
The theory on which plaintiff presented 
its case and obtained the decree favorable 
to it was that a prescriptive ·right had 
ripened in its favor, that is, that it had 
possession of the land involved for ten 
years or more before the commencement of 
the action under factual and lega l condi-
tions, which entitled it to have title to an 
easement declared therein by decree of 
court. 
(l] An easement by-prescription cannot 
be acquired except by open, notorious, ex-
clusive and adverse user for ten years. 
Roe v. Howard County, 75 Neb. 448, 106 
N.W. 587, 5 L.R.A.,N.S., 831; Agnew v. 
City of Pawnee City, 79 Neb. 603, 113 N.W. 
236; Dunbar v. O'Brien, 117 Neb-. 245, 220 
N.W. 278, 58 A.L.R. 1033; Onstott v. Air-
dale Ranch & Cattle Co., 129 Neb. 54, 260 
N.W. 556. 
(2] Whether or not this portion of the 
decree was supported by sufficient evidence 
may not be considered here. From it, as 
has been pointed out, no appeal was taken, 
hence, it, to that extent, becomes the Jaw 
of the case and is res adjudicata as to that 
issue in another action between the same 
parties, or as to the same issue raised by 
answer in the nature of a cross-action in 
the same action. Wilch v. Phelps, 16 Neb. 
515, 20 N.W. 840; Morgan v. Mitchell, 52 
Neb. 667, 72 N.W. 1055; Wittenberg v. 
Mollyneaux, 60 Neb. 583, 83 N.W. 842; 
State v. Savage, 64 Neb. 684, 702, 90 N.W. 
898, 91 N.W. 557; Shepard v. City of 
Friend, 141 Neb. 866, 5 N.W.Zd 108. 
[3] The court in its decree found that 
plaintiff's possession began ten years or 
more before the commencement and, a 
fortiori, found that the right of defendants 
or their predecessors in interest to damage 
accrued with the entry into possession un-
der conditions which would ripen into an 
easement with the lapse of time. 
It must follow then that the right of 
action claimed by defendants for damages, 
since no continuing damage was claimed 
but only for taking and depreciation in 
value, accrued more than ten years before 
the filing of the answer. It also follows 
that the right of action of the defendants 
or their predecessors in interest had ex-
pired long before the commencement of 
this action and the filing of the answer. 
See section 20-207, Comp.St.1929; also sec-
tion 20-212, Comp.St.1929. 
In support of their contention that they 
have a right to their damage, the action of 
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plaintiff being in equity, notwithstanding articles of adoption by which she was made 
at law their action was barred by the statute an heir of the estate. The defendants' 
of limitations, the defendants cite Hobson answer asserts, by way of defense, that the 
v. Huxtable, 79 Neb. 340, 116 N.W. 278; plaintiff is a trustee ex maleficio. Th_e 
Bank of Alma v. Hamilton, 85 Neb. 441, effect of that defense is to define and hmit 
123 N.W. 458, 133 Am.St.Rep. 676 ; Pettit the ti t le interest which the plaintiff claims. 
v. Louis, 88· Neb. 496, 129 N.W. 1005, 34 The statute of limitations would not be 
L.R.A. ,N.S., 356; Bell v, Dingwell, 91 Neb. avai lable to the plaintiff to prevent such 
699, 136 N.W. 1128; Love v. Park, 95 N eh. a defense. * * * 
729, 146 N.W. 941; Wiseman v. Guernsey, "Though 19 years have elapsed since the 
107 Neb. 647, 187 N.W. 55. death of Anthony Shovel, it appears that 
Susan Shovel, his widow, is still living and 
had become entitled to a dower interest and 
possessory rights in the property. During 
her Ji fetime there was no urgent reason 
why the matter of the interests of ·:he 
plaintiff and the defendants should be 
settled. There is no suggestion that the 
plaintiff ever repudiated the trust or denied 
that James Shovel or his heirs were en-
titled to an interest in the estate, until the 
commencement of this suit. It was not un-
til that time that the defendants became 
apprised of the fact that she w~s auempt-
ing to exclude them from the mhentance 
and that she did not intend to carry out 
the implied promise contained in the adop-
tion agreement. It is not suggested that the 
defendants were aware of her attitude prior 
to that time nor that they were guilty of 
any !aches i~ failing to assert their right_s. 
The statute of limitations does not begm 
to run against the rights of the h:neficiaries 
of such a constructive trust until they are 
apprised of the fact that the t~u~tee did not 
intend to carry out the prov1s1ons of . the 
trust. In this case, they were not ~ppnsed 
of that fact until the trustee repudiated 1t. 
The statute of limitations, therefore, had 
not run against the claim of the defend-
[4] In the first paragraph of the sylla-
bus in Bank of Alma v. Hamilton, supra, 
the rule is laid down as follows: "If a 
litigant asks affirmative equitable relief, he 
will be required to do justice himself with 
regard to any equity arising out of the sub-
ject-matter of the action in favor of his 
adversary, and the statute of limitations is 
no bar to the imposition of such conditions." 
An examination of the opinion discloses 
that the action was to quiet ti.tie in plaintiff 
as mortgagee in possession. The defendant 
claimed an equity in the land which plain-
tiff insisted was barred by the statute of 
limitations. It will be seen that this was 
a situation where there were conflicting 
equitable interests in and to the same sub-
ject-matter. 
In the eighth paragraph of the syllabus 
in Wiseman v. Guernsey, supra, it is stated: 
'-'Where a party comes into a court of 
equity asking affirmative equitable relief, he 
may be required to do equity w_i th regard to 
the subject-matter of the action, and the 
statute of limitations is not available to him 
as a defense against the imposition of such 
requirements." 
The action here was to quiet title by an 
adopted child to lands which had belonged 
to the adopting parent, who was deceased at 
the commencement of the action, against 
the heirs of one who claimed the right to 
take from the deceased adopting parent 
under an agreement for adoption. 
From an examination of the opinion it 
is apparent that the syllabus is but the state-
ment of an abstract principle. No such 
question was decided by the court. In the 
opinion appears the following: 
"Plaintiff pleads the statute of limitations 
as a bar to any claim of interest by the 
defendants to the property in question. 
The defendants, however, did not bring this 
action to establish a constructive trust in 
the property, but have set .up such a trust in 
defense of the plaintiff's action. The plain-
tiff claims under the agreement in the 
ants." 
We do not discuss the other cited cases 
since they are not in point from the stand-
point of either fact or law. 
[SJ It is ,true that under our Code the 
chancery practice has been so enlarged _:hat 
a·n answer in the nature of a cross-petition 
may properly seek affirmative _relie f bey ond 
that which is merely defensive, and that 
such relief sought need not necessarily be 
based on equitable grounds. Armstrong v. 
Mayer, 69 Neb. 187, 95 N.W. 51. How-
ever the matters set up m such answer 
mus~ be germane to the original suit. 
No decision of this court has been found 
which passes upon the question of whether 
or not the claim of defendants here for 
damages is germane to the subject-ma.tter 
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of plaintiff's cause of action. Reason sup-
ports the view, and there is authority sus-
taining it, that the two are not germane. 
51 C.J. 237, sec. 198. 
[ 6] The right to title by prescription is 
a right which has come into being by lapse 
of time under conditions which have been 
fulfilled. If it exists at all, every incident 
of the right has ripened before the com -
mencement of the action to quiet title based 
upon the right. Moreover, in an action at 
Jaw for ejectment by another from the 
lands held, holding by prescriptive right 
would be available as a defense and it need 
not, agreeable to good authority, even be 
pleaded specially. It may be proved under 
a general denial. 1 Am. Jur. 924, sec. 235. 
Furthermore, the action to quiet title is an 
action in rem and the action for damages 
is in personam, each pertaining to entirely 
different subject-matter. 
[7, 8] There is another convincing rea-
son why defendants may not have their 
claim for damages in this action. The reason 
inheres in the maxim of equity that "Equity 
follows the law." This maxim, in 30 C. J . 
S. Equity, p. 503, § 103, is explained gen-
e rally as follows: "In a · broad sense the 
maxim means that equity follows the law to 
the extent of obeying it and conforming to 
its general rules and policies whether con-
tained in the common or statute law." 
Again, as pointed out in 30 C. J. S. Equity, 
p. 503, § 103, "The maxim is strictly applic-
able whenever the rights of the parties are 
clearly defined and established by law, es-
pecially when defi,ned and est ablished by 
constitutional or statutory provisions." 
This court, following the principles thus 
announced, in a case not similar as to facts 
but comparable in principle, stated: "When 
it is determined that the fund is an asset 
of the bank in the hands of the receiver, a 
court of equity must follow the banking law 
specifically dealing with it as such." J or-
genson v. Department of Banking, 136 Neb. 
1. 284 N.W. 747, 749. 
[9) In the case of Alexander v. Shaffer, 
38 Neb. 812, 57 N.W. 541, 542, the defend-
ant set up in his answer a claimed lien ob-
tained by reason of purchase of tax cer-
tificates on which he had not obtain~d tax 
deed, nor had he foreclosed his lien within 
five years which was the statutory period 
within which he was required to take .a tax 
deed or foreclose the lien. Demurrer to the 
answer was sustained. The court said: 
"It seems therefore established by the 
statute and by the later decisions of this 
court that the limitation fixed in the revenue 
law is not merely a limitation as to the 
right of action, but it is a limitation upon 
the duration of the lien itself, and that, 
upon the expiration of the period, it is not 
merely the remedy to enforce the lien which 
expires, but the lien itself is extinguished 
absolutely. 
"The max im that 'he who seeks equity 
.must do equity' has never been so applied 
as_ to justify a court in imposing arbitrary 
conditions in order to carry out what, in the 
individual opinion of the chancellor, would 
amount to substantial justice between the 
parties. The rule only requires the plaintiff 
to do 'equity;' that is, to do what, upon 
established legal principles, he should be 
required to do. It has sometimes been ap-
plied in cases where the defendant was not 
in a position to affirmatively seek relief 
himself, but the vast preponderance of 
authority is that the maxim should never 
be applied so as to require that the plaintiff 
should perform an act not devolved upon 
him by established legal or equitable prin-
ciples." 
[10] The claim of defendants for dam-
ages having been barred by the appropriate 
statute of limitations, the maxim "Equity 
follows the law" prevents its assertion in 
the answer in this case. 
The decree of the district court to the 
extent that it awarded judgment in favor 
of the defendants is reversed and the claim 
of the said defendants is dismissed. Oth-
erwise the decree is affirmed. 
Reversed in part. Affirmed in part. 
APPLICATION OF THOMSON Neb. 607 
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Application of THOMSON. 
.THOMSON v. NEBRASl<A STATE RAIL· 
WAY COMMISSION. 
limited amount of shipping, the fact that 
no essential shipping service _wou!d be dis-
continued, and the prospective mconven-
ience to few shippers concerned. 
No. 31449. 
Supreme Court of Nebraska. 
Dec. 4, 1942. 
I. Public service commissions €::=>32 
On appeal from order of railway c_um-
mission the only questions to be determmed 
are whether commission acted within scope 
of its authority and whether order com-
plained of is reasonable, and where act10n 
of commission is not arbitrary and does 
not exceed -its powers or violate a_ rule 
of law the Supreme Court will not mter-
fere ;ith commission's findings of fact 
since they involve "administrative" and 
" legislative" rather than "judicial ques-
tions". 
See Words and Phrases, P ermanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
''Administrative Question", "Judicial 
Question" and "Legislative Question". 
2. Rallrnads €::=>225. 
The matter of time necessary to be de-
voted to performance of duti_es by an agent 
of a railroad is important m determ1mng 
whether railway commission acted arbi-
trarily in denying an application for dis-
continuance of an agency and substitutmg 
caretaker's service. 
3. Carriers €::=> 11 
A "common carrier", in addition to 
being a commercial a?d tra~spor~ation en-
terprise for profit, 1s a public service 
facility" with duties owing to the domam 
it traverses, and to the people resident and 
commercially engaged in areas tnbutary 
to the carrier, and the necessities, require-
ments and convenience of tributary areas 
must be considered and reasonably pro-
tected. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other defi_uitions of 
"Common Carrier" and "Public Service 
Facility''. 
5. Railroads ¢:::>225 . . 
While income of a railroad stat10n_ 1s 
an element to be considered in determmmg 
whether an agency shall be d1scontmued, 
it is not in itself controlling but must. be 
considered with all other elements bearmg 
upon reasonableness under the circum-
stances. 
6. Railroads P9(2), 225 
The ruling of railway comm1ss10n _or 
of Supreme Court on quest10n. of c.1s-
continuance of an agency at any given time 
does not amount to an adjudication for : he 
future, but is only a judgment O',' the condi-
tions presented by the apphcat10? . and re-
la tes only to the time and cond1t10n pre-
sented. 
Syllabus by the Court. 
1. "On an appeal to th_e supreme 
court from an order of the ra1_lway co1'.1-
mission administrative or leg1slat1v e_ m 
nature, the only questions to be. determmed 
are whether the railway comm1ss1on acted 
within the scope of its authonty and if 
the order complained of is reasonable and 
not arbitrarily made. Where the actwn 
of the railway commission is not unrea-
sonable or arbitrary and does not excee_d 
its powers or violate a ru!.e o_f law, _this 
court will not interfere with its ~ndmgs 
of fact for the reason that they mvolve 
administrative and legislative rather than 
judicial questions." Furstenberg v. Omaha 
& C. B. Street R. Co., 132 Neb. 562, 272 N. 
w. 756. 
- 2_ The matter of time necessa ry to be 
devoted to the performance of duties . by 
an agent of a railroad is a matter of im-
portance in determining whether _ or not 
the railway commission . acted arbi_tranly 
and unreasonably in denymg an apphcat10n 
for the discontinuance of an agency. 
3_ Historically and legally a common 
. · a·ddition to being a commercial earner, 1n , . . . 
4. Railroads €::=>225 
The railroad commission's denial of 
authority to railroad's trustee to discontinue 
se rvice of an agent and to substitute ther~-
for a caretaker was arbitrary under . evi-
dence disclosing the amount of service re-
quired of an agent, the saving to be ef-
fected by substitution of caretaker, the 
and transportation enterprise for_ profit, is 
a public service facili ty with duties owmg 
to the domain it traverses and to the 
people resident and commercia lly engaged 
in the areas tributary to the earner, and 
the necessities, requirements and - conven-
ience of the tributary areas must be ·con-
sidered and reasonably protected. 
ADDENDUM C 
Angelo Property Co., LP v. Hafiz, 167 Wash.App. 789,274 P.3d 1075 (Ct.App. Div. 2 2012) 
Appeal of Williams, Wyo. 1981, 638 P.2d 564 at 571 
In Re PEC, 134 P.3d 661,665, (Kan. 2006) 
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city requested numerous , corrections to an 
application, but had not yet issued a decision. 
129 W:ash.i\pp. at 58~1, 590, 120 P.3d 110. 
The court .stated, "Sympathetic .though : we 
may be to the CaHfases' frustration ove; four 
years of delay, we c:mnot read chapter 64.40 
RCW as pei,nitting a ge1wral caU;,e of-action 
for . arbitrary and capricious administrative 
delay "1, pro~essing a permit app,lj_c~j;io~.''. 
Id. a~ 592, 120 P.3d 110. We eJqJlahie<f.that, 
"dela:ir ip , processing or granting a permit 
may be ac.tionable under chapter 6_4.40 -~cw 
as __ an 'ar)Jiti:~ and capricious,' final .deci-
sion, or an 'ar,pitrary and capricious' f;iiiure 
to ac_t . within t~e time limits estiibl,ished by 
lav,::' _Id. at 596, 120 P.3d 110.2 But, the 
claim her~ is not what was contemplated by 
that statement. ·· · · 
II 21 .,Rather, the Hayes and · l\,1.issi011, 
Springs, Inc. v: City of Spokan~, . .134-
Wash.2d 947, 954 P.2d 250 (1998) decisions 
are examples of how the statute 'applie.~ ;;;; 
delay damages under the ,fina\ decision 
prong. In Mission Springs, the city c9uncil 
vo~d to with~old a grading permit from an 
appHcarit,, that had a legally vested right t{J_ 
the permit. 134 Wash.2d at 953-54, 954 P.2d 
250. The applicant sued for delay cia'mages 
within 30 days of the vote, and the ' city 
ultjn:!ateiy rescinded its vote . ..J:G-,Id. at 954, 
957, 954 P.~d 250. The Supreme Court de-
termined that the applicant could p~rs~e de-
lay damages. Id. at 961-62, 954 ' P.2d' 250. 
But, those danil\ges were only incµrred after 
the city COU!f Cil :nade a final . decision by 
affirmatively voting to withhold the _ pe'rnrit. 
Likewise, the Hayes court allowea' d:(rii~kes, 
but th~. damages were incurred after,t'.~f c_i~ 
council placed ari arbitrary restrictioh.on' 'th'e 
permit. 131 Wash.2d at 717-18, 9lll'fl:za' 
1179. . . . 
II 22 Under the final decision d~img, · the 
final decision is the act which triggers the 
cause of action. The definition of d~rnages 
limits recovery to those damages 'that occur 
after the cause of action accru~~: ffollply 
put, the statute does not conteniplate · dam-
ageg.....;.for delay or otherwise-under the · fi-
2 .. Callfas stated, "[i]ndeed, a permit applicant 
like the Callfases would have a claim under 
chapter . 64.40 RCW for delay damages, as' .we 
noted above, without a writ once the tardy per-
mit was issued." Cal/fas, 129 Wash.App. at 597, 
nal decision prong that occurred prior, to · 
fmal decision-. 
11 23 . Insofar -as Birnhaurn's claims e 
based ;\!po_n arbitrary an_d capricious req · 
fm,-,, mqre informatioi:i aI!d,:delay prior to . 
nnal d_ecis~on, · the. _cla~,.s.eeks ,damages 
recoy/lrablf:l um;ler thi;l prong . of the tatµ 
Qis.II\issal of these clai:tns,,under CR l,2(b 
W!l,S .proper. 
n .. ''The-Adequate Relief Theory 
.. . r , ,;: !1 - .i . , • ' , ' , . '.' ( • 
-~ 24 '.fh,~ tri~ coru,:t 'iietimni~,eg 'thlll-.,. 
~ -~~e, the pe~t -'r~: ~a11,~g l3irn~ , 
~e1yl~d, ;~?eq\lfte .re\ief ,fnd, PW:~~1~~ 1!:w'«(~r1 was n.ot ent1tl~d_ t;o daJI1age~ ,u . 
ch;iptiir. 64.,W RCW. Tl'ie Browers . 
sh~h,_v]at application with'th~ Pierce; Qq 
Plam:ung and Lands Servi.ce· De 
(PALS). : ~rower, 96 Was~.Ap~-' a( ~ 
P. :~?. W?~· · _They, belie~ed;tii~f lp;ir,fcff ~qil 
to an existing access road Would tie ' ex 
from ' wetlands review. ta. at 56i, 934·' 
1036, But, PALS did not gtaiit the well 
review exemption becausi it determin ' 
access point was just a dirt p'ath, 'lriot' 
exisf}ng ~oad: Id. The Broi#ers· app-eai' 
P 4S ·decislon to :a; hearin~ wmillef'! 
Tl'ie . hearirig" examiner reversed, coriclu 
that: the iirtlprovements were' exempt" , 
wetlari'dsreview. "Id. The Btowers -,i.to 
silant to , chitpter 64.40 RCW fo ds:magee· 
"the· expense of defa·y 'and either harms- ' 
·curred subsequent ' to the hearing e 
decfaicin during the administrative :ap 
u h 
~11 25. This court reasoned -that ah i~p 
cant ll'annot ibring a claim unless {l)i 
have ;exhausted: all administrative rerti1 
and (2) :the relief granted by the ad · · 
tive remedy·· is inadequate. Id.: at,, 
984 P.2d 1036. ,The .Browers dministn 
ly appealed the adverse wetlands exem 
decisfon and obtained the reliefthey 'sou 
reversal. Id. at 561, 984 P:2d 1036: ''Becll 
the l;lrowers received . adequate reiief:: 
had no cause of action-and no right fu··: 
120 P.3d 110. This statement is not reconci\o 
:.:-with the. statutory definition of damages, ·w ' 
tha~ opinion had no occasion r0 analyze. · . 
respectfully reject it. 
ANGELO PROPERTY , CO., LP v, HAFIZ Wash. 1075 
Cite as 274 P.3d 1075 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2012) 
s-while exhausting:administrative reine; original application,mot;as · a ._new .application. 
• l;d. at 566, ,984 P.2d;1036 .. ; · ·· +\'loreover, Birnbaum ,is challenging -the 
26 -However, Brower does not stand for Coun.ty's requ~i;;ts .for more ,'information: that 
tbll proposition that, as a matter of law the occurred):>e~een, ~he 2006.!leaision allfthe 
grant 'of :a permit >is adequate relief .,;hich 2010 approval, not tbe ,request for more -i!l.-
p.recludes . every· action for damages under format1on in the 2o06' decision itself . . it .b~-
i,apter 64:40 RCW. 'Fhe Brower court was lies logic to say thatbet' dai~{ w~re: b;;;~d 
~t asked to decide that question,,, Hllre, before the County even made cthe .r,equlist's: 
adequ~w relief from exhaustion of adminis- 11 29 We agree that if this were a -c'hafti!hge 
tia.tiv'e remedie's w~ riot' availdble.· ··unlike to , the -2006 decisiQll it wo1;1ld , qe , prr,i(!Juded 
B~ ; the County's allege_d 'arbitrary' and d · . 1W er · one o:r more tr. ,e9tj~s_,J,i · ,fl<i;,yeve,r,· the 
p:ricious · requests for' tnore ' inforitfation C ' ounty s argum~ptilHl,t~:Pll-~ed _on a mis~har-
ere part and · parcel 'of the j:Jennit1 review acterization cif Birnbaum's claims. Accord-
. and ·were 'not the · subject' of · arf ad~ ingly,·'Bitnbaunfr1awsuit' i~ ·not ari imperniis-
lfative· ap·p' eal or other forrifof 'el'L'a·u· s·0 ·1-1 II . , , , "-'1 s11;,e co ateral a:ttack·,,m the -- 2006 ''decision 
. ll of administrative iemedy'. Likewise, that; should have :been brought as ·a L UPA 
tbere :.~!!11 no , adtninist,r11tiv~ , remedy ,.t<J .,ex- claim., .Likewise, her claim is not collaterally 
a_ust t;o~_the claiIJ?ed vio)atio.ripf the 120 clay estopped. 
~ ; _ ~1-, 'Brdwer does !lot ·· ~p}\f hefe· 
• ·,·Ill, Collateral Attack and Collaterat1!Jl1 ·, IV. Atiorn_ey's Fees_ 
.; ' · ' toppe'l · i"' :-. . · ·':rt,, ; 11 30 ~oth parties · reHu~~~i ,a~torney',S-,,f ees 
pursuant to RAP 18.1 and. RCW 64.40.020(2), 
w~ich provides tjlat_,' ~~e ;prevailing party 
"may. be entitled . to reasonable CQ~fu and 
attorney's fells ." Because''\.he County is the 
prevailing party, we award it reasonable 
costs and fees. .. · 
... II 27 The County also argues · that J3irn-
~ ·s laws1;1it is an impermissibl,e, colillteral 
. erig~ .. tQ _ the 2006 decision -that,-should 
~ ve bee11 ~rQught as a l,~nd '!)s~ P~titi~n 
i\ct -;(~UPA), chapter 36.7QQ ,RCW,.,,.cl~m. 
li'11rt~n!r, it 3-\'gues that the la,wsuit is. barred 
collateral estoppel because challenging 
hearing exafoiner's ' 2006' decision , -re~ 
questing more 'information would be,a second 
Jitigition of issues already decided. 
.:•·· II 28 The 2006decision stated! . 
0Th~-request for a conditional use permit to 
.. , anow _establishment of'a·camp-ground and 
; '·' a~!lodfated recreational uses 'is · hereby i-e-
. ' .. tumed to Pierce County Planning. arid 
Lai:id Sertices and the· Pretce County Enc 
' 'vfronmetital Official for furll'i~i: review as 
'. ....1.zj9set forth above. In the ai;,,;;rnative',' the 
' applicant 111ay consider .-this decision a final 
d,~ni11I of th~ conditional use application f~r 
pUrp0S!JS, Of appeal. :(Jp9n 'cpmpletion .Of 
r¢view or'th~ abqye ite.m,s an'd the prepara, 
. , .tj9n of a more _detailed site plan, this mat-
. fer, may be ' rescheduled for hearing wi~)l 
notice as in the 'first instance and 'specific 
written notice to parties of record. · 
Birnbaum diif not treat it as a 'final decision 
· and exercise her option to appeal. She exer-
cised her option to· submit a revised plan, 
which the County treated as part of · the 
1131 We affirm. 
WE CONCUR: SPEARMAN, A.C.J:, and 
BECKER; J. 
w. . 
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Maged HAFIZ, an individual 
dba''The Nile; A:ppellant. 
No. 4086&--S--: IL 
Court of Appeals of y\lashjngton, 
Divisiori Z: · 
: r-i -
April 17, 2q12. :. 
B.ackground; Landlord· brought unlawful 
detainer action against tenant, and tenant 
1092 Wash. · 274 PACIFIC REPORTER; .3d SERIES· 
ii 51 Maged!/!. return )o Angelo of hath set forth the legal basis for the trial 
actual and legal possession· of the property first .to "convertt>,65 the unlawful detainer; 
resolved .. the "right to possession" and extin- tion iii.to an ordinary civil action for d 
guished the trial court's narrow subject mat- and then to hear his counterclaims undeIV· 
tel' .. jurisdiction conferred by the unlawful trial: court's general subject matter j · 
detainer statute; therefore, . the trial court tion; (3) · he di~not invite the trial courl 
.Jac}{ed authority to ,issue any;,,_WZadditional 'f'hybrid[ize]'" 66 its jurisdiction .over, UDla 
orders, rulings, and, factual determinations ful detainer matters or to apply the• ·wro 
while the case remaine<l an ·unlawful detainer degal ·rule:in determining which,counterc 
,action. We _reitel'.ate; "[i]n: an ·unlawful de- it could hear under its statutory unla 
_tainer action, the coµr.t ,sits .l!/i! ·a special statu- detainer-jurisdiction; and (4) it was .A 
tory tribunal to summarily d~c;ide the \~sue~ that persuaded the trial court that· · 
authorized by. statute ,and-.rwt,as a court .. of was .•still asserting a "[legal] right to 
general jurisdiction )\4th .the po~er to hear sion" and that the court needed to retain 
and determine 9ther) ssue,s!' . Gr.ana4 99 ,unlawful detainer jurisdiction, even . tb,o · 
Wll!lh.2d at 571; ,6.(\3 P.2d .83!),- .Acc_ordingly, Maged had clearly relirrquished.- all po 
we vacate (1) ,pai;t fouqif t)le trial court's TY rig4ts to .property. Angelo's invite.cl, 
A,ugust .15, 2()0@ .o{del.', conclud)ng the "issue argument.fails: ,. . ,., 
of legal poss~~:'.~n to ,the .. [property]. is n_ot / _ [14, 151 ,r 53 The invited error d ,' 
yet ,~esolved , _and (2) all of the tn~ ':::?.'prohibit[s]a party 'froni setting up an' 
courts orders, · rulings,_ and_ factual . detenru- at trial and then complaining of il ori. 
nations entered after August 15, · including, ·peal.' " City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 w 
?~t not limi,ted t~, the tri~l court's_ s~mmary 7171 720, 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (quoting s 
Judgm~nt d;smi;i~_:!1 ":t~ preJudice . of Pam, 101 Wash.2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d 
'."1aged s. construc~~e . eVIct10~ · counterclaim, (l9S4), overru/.ed on other grounds by s 
1\,, final order and Judgment m favor of An- v. Olson, l26 Wash.2d 315, 893 P.2d · 
~elo, and its aw~d to ~pilo of attorney fees (1995)). The invited error doctrine, h~w~ 
mcurred after this date. does not apply to subject matter jurisdic 
F. Invited Error Doctrine Not Applicable 
11 52 Angelo .argues that, to _the extent the 
,trial court erroneously ruled on a Jurisdic-
tional issue, we s-hould excuse the error be-
cause Maged allegedly "invited" the error by 
filing his motion to am~n.d his ans"1Ver and_ to 
include counterclaims. 64 . Br. of · Resp't at 18. 
Maged responds that (1) he did not ask the 
. 'trial court to hear his coliliterclaims under its 
u,nl.awful detainer jurisdiction; (2) instead, he 
hearing when it granted Angelo authority to re 
let the property. thus, fully resolving the "right to 
possession,". terminating tlie unlawful detainer 
action. and opening the option of converting the 
unlawful . detai~er proceeding into an ordinary 
civil action for damages to consider Maged's 
counterclaims. 
62. CP at 102 . 
63. See infra pp. 35- 36, in the Attotney Fees sec-
tion of this analysis. 
.64. Angelo provides no argument to support its 
bald assertion that the invited err.or doctrine may 
excuse a trial court 's error based on lack of 
issues. As we earlier noted, . Wash{ri 
~ourts have l~ng hel.d that "[plartim,;., , , 
confer subject . matter jurisdiction oni 
court by agreement between themselv : 
·court either has subject matter· juristll,'c. 
or it does not." In re Marriage oJ F , · 
115 Wash.App. at 667, 63 P.3dS21 (emp 
added). Angelo has cited no autih6rity ho 
ing that that the invited . error doctrinliJ 
plies to a trial court's eri;pr in -. 
jurisdiction that it does not have.67 
\ 
subject matter jurisdiction. Beca\)se this'. 
assertion fails to comply with the RAP 10.3( 
requ,irements, we do not further consider.it.,, 
65. Reply Br. of Appellant at 7. 
.66. Reply Br. of Appellant at 6 (quoting V -~ 
29), ' 
67. We ac~owledge, however,. Division One!i 
cent explanation .that article 4, section 6 of ' 
state constitution grants the .superior c 
broad jurisdiction over ·real estate disputes/ n, 
compassing even a landlord's failure to fol 
chapter 59.12 RCW's statutory--requirementid 
commencing an unlawful detainer action. H 
mGELO PRORERTY CO., LP v. HAFIZ Wash. 1093 
Cite as274 P.3d 1075 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2012) 
.. ~154, Angelo baldly asserts that -Maged diction to issu~any further-orders; rul-
:?llked the trial coµrt to , c,oi:isider his counl{l.r- ings, and factual determinations after this 
,l!laims a!ter , as~grting unl~:-ivful detainer j~_- date while 'purporting to retain unlawful de-
risdiction under chapter 59.12 RCW. This tainer jurisdiction. For. the same ,reasons, 
argument however, mischaracterizes we vacate all of the trial 'court•s·· post-August 
Maged' re 'est, which was that the trial 15, 2008 ·orders;rulings; and factual determi-
court ' rst needed to convert the unlawful nations, · · 
det · er action, into an ordinary civiLaction 
under Munden .and then it co.uld . hear his 
_<;~~n~rclaim_s: Accordingly, we ,holci that t)ie 
,invjted error doc;trine does JiOt .apply J:ier~. 
II. ,' REMAINING AsSJGNMENtS OF ERROR 
' ,i 55 In addition to ~ther e~qrs sub;ume\l 
1
in the arguments :µready ,adch:rssed, M_age1 
also assigns error to the following trial court 
actions after · August · J.5, 2008:(1) striking 
· ·Maged'.s, supplemental affidavit in opposition 
to summary-judgment, (2): denying Maged'.s 
-motion for revision·under:CR 54(b), .. (3) strik-
·ing Maged's affidavit in support. of his ,motion 
· ;for revision, (4) striking ;Maged's a'.ttorneyis 
post-hearing declarati1m; (5); enter,ing1at,final 
order and judgment agajnst . N.(aged, ~nd_ (~) 
several of the trial coiiri's firtdings ·of'fact 'and 
conclusions of law.· ' · 
· . . 156 In vacating the tria! court's summary 
judgment for Angefo arid , , dismissal ?f 
Maged's counterclaim, 'we have alr~lo\dY hel_d 
that (1) the trial court lacked sribjed"m'attei: 
jurisdiction over Maged's constructive evic-
tion counterclaim.in the. c,1,mtext -of the. µµ,law-
ful detainer action; (2) ,the trial court erred 
ill concluding that, the ;'issue of legal posses-
~ion ~ the. [property] ["-'.as) not ,yet re-
solved" 68 11,S , of Aug\lst 15, 2008; (3) the tria1 
.court lo~t its statuti?n: uni.awful detainer au-
thority, oV\ff the limited property possession 
issue .after August 15, when the trial ~qµrt 
~xpressly restor~d to Angelo the right to 
possess the property, which Maged had un-
equivocally ··relinquished the month before; 
and (4) as such, the trial'·court lacked juris-
Auth. of the City . of Seattle ·v. Khadija Bin., 163 
Wash.App. 367, 369, 373- 376, 260 P.3d 900 
(2011); see"also Tacoma Rescue Mission v. Stew, 
art, 155 Wash.App. :250, 254 n. 9, 228 P.3d 1289 
(2010). 
Division One's broad interpretation of the su-
. perior court"s·-retention •of unlawful detainer ju-
risdiction in- the ·,above situation. however, does 
not squarely address the issue before us her~: 
'tJnlik'e the procedurally' nbncompliant landlord 
in Khadija Bin, Angelo properly ·commenced its 
· m: , AIToRNEY FEEs 
,r 57 · Maged assigns en-or t? the tri:\.l 
courti~ lfward 'to Angelo of attorney fees in-
curred belo"' after August · 15, 2008, by which 
date he had clearly relinquished all posses-
sion df the :pl'operty to Angelo and, thus, ~he 
trial court had lost jurisdiction to enter addi-
tional orders under chapter 59.12 RCW. We 
agree. For the rl'!.asons ~lil-, have already 
st;atea in _reversinlflne tnaLcourt's summary 
judgment order and other post-August 15, 
2008 orders, rulings, and factual determina-
tions, we also vacate the trial court's award 
to Angelo of attorney fees incurred after 
August 1~, 2008. 
11 58 Both Angelo · and Maged · request at-
torney fees on appeal. · We awM'd reasonable 
attorney fees if allowed by statute, rule, or 
contract, and if a party reql!ests such_ fees in 
his ' op~i4ng brief. ' RAP 18.l(a); , Malted 
Mousse; Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wash:2d 518, 
535, 79 P.3d ii54 (2003). Here, secti9n 42 of 
the lease agreement entitles. the prevailing 
party to reasonable attorney fees for any 
action or proceeding under the le'ase. Ange-
lo's unlawful detainer action and Maged's 
constructive eviction claim stem from the 
parties' op)igations under their lease. , Th_ere_-
fore, because Maged prevails on appeal, we 
award him attorney fees and costs'on appeal 
under RA:P0"I8.l, and we deny Angelo's re-
quest; 
· ;.~l~wful detainer action and invoked th_e trial 
·court'i; ·statutory· unlawful detainer jurisdiction 
under chapter 59.12 RCW, which, as we have 
already ~Jlplained, i~. a jurisdi<;tion lim_ited . _i_n 
scope, at least at that point. Nor does ~had11a 
Biti discuss a superior court's attempt ·to hybn-
.. ,dize'.' its unlawful detainer and general-civil ac-
tionjurisd.iction as the trial c_ourt attempted here. 
· A¢cordingly; Khadija Bin does not apply to the 
issues bf!fore us in this· case. ·· · · · · 
68. CP at 102. 
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In the Matter of the Appeal of David · R. 
WILLIAMS d/b/a Industrial Communi-
cations From a Decision of the Wyo-
ming Public Service Commission In 
Docket No. 9661, Sub 1 Dated May 18, 
1979, As Altered By Its Decision Dated 
August 29, 1979. 
David R. WILLIAMS, d/b/a Industrial 
Communications, Appellant · 
(Petitioner), 
v. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
WYOMING and Commercial Cornrnuni"-
cations, Inc., Appellees (Respondents). 
No. 5410. 
Supreme Court of, Wyoming, 
April 10, 1981. 
Rehearing,Denied r.iay 12, 1981. 
Radio common carrier appealed from 
an order of the District Court, Laramie 
County, C. Stuart Brown, J., which af-
firmed an order of the Public Service Com-
mission reducing its service area. The Su-
preme Court, Raper, J., held that: (1) Pub-
lic Service Commission had jurisdiction to 
regulate radio common carriers by imposing 
restrictions on grant of certificates of pub-
lic convenience and necessity and its exer-
cise of such jurisdiction was not preempted 
by Federal Communications Commission, 
and (2) Public Service Commission, which 
determined that operations of two radio 
common carriers overlapped and were inter-
fering with the other contrary to public 
interest did not act improperly in reducing 
radio common carrier's service area. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error 111=>171(1) 
Generally, parties are bound by theo-
ries they advanced below. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>23, 882(1) 
Under doctrine of i!}vited error, if a 
party induces action by a court or an agen-
cy, he will not be heard on appeal to argue 
error based upon that action; however, a 
challenge to a court's or a quasi-judicial 
body's jurisdiction over subject matter can 
never be waived and it is open to considera-
tion by reviewing court whenever it is 
raised by any party or it may be raised by 
court of its own motion. 
3. States <3=>4.10 
Public Service Commission.had jurisdic-
tion to regulate radio common carriers by 
imposing conditions on grant of certificates 
of public convenience and necessity and its 
exercise of such jurisdiction was not pre-
empted by Federal Communications Com-
mission. W.S.1977, § 37-2- 205(a); U.S.C.A. 
Const. Art. 6, cl. 2; Communications Act of 
1934, § 22l(b), 47 U.S.C.A. § 221(b). 
4. Public Service Commissions <U=6.6 
Public Service Commission has continu-
ing jurisdiction over public utilities and 
thus the power to amend certificate of pub-
lk necessity and convenience. 
5. Telecommunications 111=>406 
Public Service Commission, which de-
termined that operations of two radio com-
mon carriers overlapped _and were interfer-
ing with the other contrary to public inter-
est, did not act improperly in reducing radio 
common carrier's service area after. giving 
it notice that it had burden of demonstrat-
ing that its certificate of public convenience 
and necessity could not be revoked. 
6. Public Service Commissions <3=>32 
Ultimate weight to be given evidence 
before Public Service Commission as trier 
of fact is to be determined in light of exper-
tise and experience of members of that 
agency. 
Michael A. Neider, Salt Lake City, Utah 
(argued) specially admitted for purposes of 
this case, and Walter P. Faber, Jr., Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and Ward White of Guy, 
Williams & White, Cheyenne, for appellant. 
John D. Troughton, Atty. Gen., Thomas J . 
Carroll, III, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Steven 
R. Shanahan, Lawrence J . Wolfe, Asst. At-
tys, Gen., Cheyenne, (argued) for appellee 
Public Service Commission. 
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David H. Carmichael (argued) of Carmi- because of the doctrine of 'federal pre-
chael, McNiff & Patton, Cheyenne, for ap- emption'? 
pellee Commercial Communications, Inc. "B. ·whether the Wyoming Public Ser-
Before ROSE, C. J., and McCLINTOCK • , 
RAPER, THOMAS and ROONEY, JJ. 
RAPER, Justice. 
From an order of the district court af-
firming an order of the Public Service Com-
mission (PSC), David R. Williams d/ b/a 
Industrial C9mmunications (appella~t) feels 
aggrieved and appeals. Several issues are 
presented. Their focus is upon the PSC's 
authority to regulate radio common carri-
ers.1 Appellant states the questions raised 
as follows: 
"1. Whether the Commission exceeded 
its authority in attempting to allocate 
common carrier two-way radio telephone 
channels when the allocation and grant-
ing of such channels is in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC). 
"2. Whether the Commission exceeded 
its authority by requiring the parties to 
obtain or relinquish radio channels ·and 
otherwise comply within a cei,tain period 
of time because the parties have no con-
trol over the FCC which has exclusive 
jurisdiction of such matters. 
"3. Whether the Comrriission exceeded 
its authority in attempting to limit Indus-
trial Communication's radio service area 
when the grant of any common carrier 
radio service area is in the exclusive juris-
diction of the FCC. 
"4. Whether the Commission without a 
basis in fact or law arbitrarily and capri-
ciously reduced Industrial Communica-
tion's service area granted in 1977." 
Appellee, Commercial Communications, 
Inc. (Commercial), views the case more sim-
ply as asking: 
"A. Whether the regulatory action tak-
en by the Wyoming Public Service Com-
mission, in the instant case, is prohibited 
• Retired March 26, 1981, but continued to partic-
ipate in the decision of the court in this case 
pursuant to order of the court entered March 
30, 1981. 
vice Commission exceeded its statutory 
authority in modifying previously fosued 
Certificates of Convenience and Necessi-
ty, in the instant case, by attaching· cer-
tain conditions to those Certificates and, 
if so, may the Petitioner, David R. Wil-
liams d/b/ a Industrial Communicat ions, 
successfully assert reversible error at this 
point in the proceedings?" 
We will affirm the district court. 
In January of 1977 Commercial filed its 
application with the FSC for authority to 
commence radio telephone service to the 
cities of Rawlins and Evanston in south-
western Wyoming. This was done pursuant 
to § 37- 2-205(a), W.S. 1977, which provides: 
"(a) No public utility shall begin con-
struction of a line, plant or system, or of 
any extension of a line, plant or system 
without having first obtained from the 
commission a certificate that the present 
or future public convenience and necessi-
ty require or will require such construc-
tion. This act shall not be construed to 
require any public utility to secure a cer-
tificate for an extension within any city 
or town within which it has lawfully com-
menced operation, or for an extension 
into territory contiguous to its line, plant 
or system for which no certificate is in 
force and is not served by a public utility 
of like character or for any extension 
within or to territory already served by 
it, necessary in the ordinary course of its 
business. If any public utility, in con-
structing or extending its line, plant or 
system interferes or is about to interfere 
with the operation of the line, plant or 
system of any other public utility already 
authorized or constructed, the commission 
on complaint of the public utility claim-
ing to be injuriously affected, may after 
hearing make such order and prescribe 
the terms and conditions for the location 
I. Radio common carriers generally provide mo-
bile telephone service and · on occasion paging 
services such as beepers. 
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of the lines, plants or systems affected, as 
to it are just and reasonable. The power 
companies may, without the certificate, 
increase capacity of existing plants." 2 
Various parties, including appellant, ·filed 
protests and sought to intervene in the pro-
ceedings conducted by the PSC upon such 
an application. 
Appellant filed its own application for a 
certificate of copvenience and necessity in 
February of 1977. In it, authority was 
sought to provide radio telephone service to 
all or parts of the southwestern Wyoming 
Counties of Lincoln, Uinta, and Sweetwa-
ter. Protests were filed by various parties 
including Commercial, and leave to inter-
vene was requested. 
On August 22, 1977, appellant petitioned 
for leave to amend its application in order 
to include Sublette and Carbon Counties. 
As later found by the PSC: 
" • • • The Commission denied the peti-
tion in an order dated August 25, 1977, 
but in response to a motion made by 
Industrial in the pre-hearing conference 
held August 29, 1977, the Commission 
allowed Industrial to present evidence 
pertaining to Sublette and Carbon Coun-
ty." 
All matters were consolidated for hearing 
by the PSC. On August 29, 1977, a pre-
hearing conference began. During this 
conference settlement negotiations were 
carried out by the parties. As a result a 
stipulation was agreed to. This agreement 
was dated September 1, 1977, and was in-
corporated by reference into the order is-
sued by the PSC on November 29, 1977, 
which provided in pertinent part: 
"2) Each of the above applicants agrees 
and stipulates that each shall and does 
hereby withdraw as a protestant and/or 
intervenor, as the case may be, in and to 
the application and requested amend-
ments of each of the others in the respec-
2. Radio common carriers are public utilities as 
defined by § 37- 1-IOl(a)(vi)(B), W.S. 1977: 
"(vi) 'Public utility' means and includes ev-
ery person that owns, operates, leases, con-
trols, or has power to operate, lease or con-
trol: 
• • 
tive Docket No. and case, and further 
agrees and stfpulates that each could 
have and is hereby considered as having 
furnished sufficient evidence to justify 
and warrant the complete granting of the 
respective application and requested 
amendments thereto by the Wyoming 
Public Service Commission, except as spe-
cifically limited herein. 
"9) Each of the above applicants agrees 
and stipulates that the application and 
requested amendments of each as stated 
above should be granted under the fol-
lowing terms and conditions: 
"(d) Commercial Communications, Inc. 
and David R. Williams will jointly ap-
ply to the FCC for a construction per-
mit and license for VHF channel 7 (fre-
quency 152.120 MHz) for Carbon Coun-
ty, Wyo., and shall share equally in the 
cost of obtaining and installing said 
channel, operating said channel and the 
use of said channel. Neither Commer-
cial nor Williams shall use said channel 
during any period so as to prevent the 
use by the other of one-half of the 
channel time during such period. None 
of the other applicants shall protest 
Commercial's and Williams' application 
to the FCC for said channel. 
"(e) Commercial and Williams shall 
within three weeks from the date here-
of arrange to meet in Evanston, Wyo-
ming to study and determine if any 
interference will occur to either be-
cause of the use of VHF channels 1 and 
9 in that area. If it is determined that 
undue interference will occur, Commer-
cial and Williams agree to work out a 
solution and agree that any such inter-
ference will be deemed to be caused 
equally by the operations of both and 
"(B) Any plant, property or facility for the 
transmission to or for the public of telephone 
messages, for the conveyance or transmis-
sion to or for the public of telegraph mes-
sages, or for the furnishing of facilities to or 
for the public for the transmission of intelli-
gence by electricity;" 
:\'. 
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shall be equally the responsibility of 
both. This shall not be construed to 
require a change in effective radiated 
power or antenna direction of any pres-
ently existing transmitters. 
"(f) Each applicant shall receive au-
thority as requested in each individual 
application and requested amendments 
thereto except as limited in this stipu-
lation." · 
On August 2, 1978, Commercial filed a 
complaint and petitioned for cancellation of 
appellant's certification of public conve-
nience and necessity. It alleged that appel-
lant was blocking and obstructing Commer-
cial's efforts to commence service in Raw-
lins and Evanston and that Commercial had 
signed the September 1, 1977 stipulation 
because of the coercion, threats, and busi-
ness duress instigated by appellant. In the 
alternative it asked that the PSC declare 
that Sublette and Sweetwater Counties 
were not included in appellant's certificate 
as service areas. Appellant filed an answer 
and counterpetition on August 29, 1978. In 
it the claim was made that it was Commer-
cial, not appellant, that had refused to co-
operate in bringing radio telephone service 
to southwestern Wyoming. 
On December 1, 1978, the PSC entered an 
order setting the matter for hearing and 
listed the following issues as those to be 
resolved: 
"a) Whether Industrial has in any man-
ner violated the Commission's Order of 
November 29, 1977; 
~'b) Whether there was fraudulent in-
ducement upon any party to sign the 
Stipulation of September 1, 1977; should 
such be found to exist, what impact, if 
any, does this ha:ve upon the Stipulation 
and the parties who relied thereon; 
"c) What is the scope of the Stipulation 
with regard to the operating authority 
provided therein; and 
"d) To what extent, if any, has the public 
been harmed by the inability of the par-
ties to comply with the Commission's Or-
der of November 29, 1977 and what ac-
tion, if any, is required in the public 
interest to alleviate such harm as may be 
found to exist." 
The PSC then directed : 
· "c) Both parties shall be under the same 
burden of producing sufficient evidence 
to show why their respective certificates 
of November 29, 1977 should not be re-
voked, altered or amended in any manner 
as may be required in the public inter-
est." 
Finally, the order noted: 
"5. The Commission shall not issue an 
Order to Show Cause to either petit ioner 
in this proceeding as to why their respec-
tive certificates should not be revoked or 
amended in any manner, but _s.l.lall instead 
proceed upon a formal complal'i1t basis. 
However due to the nature of ~~ch par-
ty's petition in this matter, each. . party 
shall consider their respective certificate 
grants to be in question and shall direct 
their evidence to include consideration of 
this point." · 
Hearings on the matter commenced ,Janu-
ary 23, 1979. On May 18, 1979, the PSC 
released its opinion and order. It provided 
in part: 
"14. Resolution of the present contro-
versy between Industrial and Commercial 
cannot be obtained without first exam-
ining and clarifying the certificated ser-
vice area of each party. To the extent 
this clarification may amend and re-
define either party's present service area, 
neither may thereafter complain for they 
were specifically informed of this possi-
bility in the Commission's Notice and Or-
der Setting Hearing referenced herein-
above at paragraph eight (8). 
"The certificated service areas of Com-
mercial, as noted previously, would con-
sist of: (1) that area encompassed by a 37 
dbu contour eminating [sic] from Aspen 
Mountain; (2) that area encompassed by 
a 37 dbu contour eminating [sic] from 
Hogsback Ridge; (3) a primary (90%) and 
secondary (75%) service area, non-exclu-
sive, radiating from Medicine Butte five 
(5) miles northeast of Evanston; and (4) a 
primary (90%) and secondary (75%) ser-
vice area, non-exclusive radiating :from 
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Nine-Mile Hill, nine (9) miles north of 
Rawlins. 
"The certificated service areas of Indus-
trial would consist of: (1) a primary 
(90%) and secondary (75%) service area, 
non-exclusive, radiating from Marsh Peak, 
Utah; (2) a primary (90%) and secondary 
(75%) service area, non-exclusive, radiat-
ing from Medicine Butte, Wyoming; and 
(3) a primary (90%) and secondary (75%) 
service area, non-exclusive, radiating 
from Nine-Mile Hill. 
"15. There has been a great deal of con-
fusion concerning the areas certificated 
to Industrial for RCC service, primarily 
due to various ambiguities and errors in 
Commission's Order of November 29, 
1977. Industrial first petitioned for au-
thority to serve all or portions of Uinta; 
[,] Lincol,n and Sweetwater Counties, Wy-
oming. It later requested, and was de-
nied, leave to amend its application to 
include the Counties of Sublette and Car-
bon. Industrial renewed its amendment 
request at the pre-hearing conference of 
August 29, 1977 and was allowed to in-
clude Carbon County, but Sublette was 
again refused due to lack of public notice. 
The Order of November 29, 1977 incor-
rectly states, in paragraph four (4) of the 
Findings of Fact at page five (5), that the 
Commission allowed Industrial to present 
evidence concerning Sublette County. To 
the extent this Finding of Fact at para-
graph four (4) of the Order of November 
29, 1977 is inconsistent with the testimo-
ny and evidence of record, it is hereby 
corrected by deleting Sublette County 
from the last sentence thereof. 
"The confusion surrounding the service 
area of Industrial continues to exist how-
ever due to the various references 
throughout the Stipulation of September 
1, 1977 to the 'application and requested 
amendments of each party.' Although it 
may be argued this language has the 
effect of including Sublette County, this 
argument is devoid of any merit or sub-
stance as the parties cannot by stipula-
tion usurp the jurisdiction specifically 
vested in this Commission by statute. • • • 
"l(l. Each party to this proceeding has 
essentially asked the Commission to re-
solve the differences between them either 
by certificate cancellation or further di-
rective. Each party has alleged the other 
is responsible for failing to comply with 
the terms and conditions of the Stipula-
tion and that such other party is solely 
responsible for the failure to provide ser-
vice to the public as ordered on Novem-
ber 29, 1977. Each has alleged numerous 
facts and produced certain testimony and 
exhibits to substantiate their respective 
positions. The only certain fact is that 
both parties have not complied with the 
order directing service be implemented to 
and for the public. • • • 
• • 
"Upon full and careful examination of 
the testimony and evidence produced in 
this proceeding concerning the various ac-
tions by each party herein, the Commis-
sion finds there is insufficient evidence to 
support a finding that the Stipulation of 
September 1, 1977 was a direct result of 
undue duress and influence upon Com-
mercial Communications. Accordingly, 
the document shall remain in full force 
and effect as between the parties of in-
terest herein and the other signatories to 
said document. Commercial was repre-
sented at all stages of the proceeding by 
legal counsel and was under no obligation 
to execute the document in question. 
"The Commission has reviewed the record 
at great length and must conclude the 
public has indeed been harmed by the 
inability of the parties to comply with the 
Stipulation, but finds that it cannot attri-
bute fault to either party individually; 
both parties must bear a portion of this 
responsibility. Each party has made 
some effort to comply with the terms of 
the Stipulation, but neither has ap-
proached the matter in good faith due to 
the possible adverse business conse-
quences that may result from the pro-
spective relinquishment of VHF channels. 
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!he ~rimary_ concern of the Commission Channels would 
m this case 1s not the competitive inter-
ests of the parties, but the public interest 
which is to be served by their respective 
utility operations. Each party is fully 
aware there are but a few VHF channels 
presently authorized by the Federal Com-
munications Commission and that all such 
channels are presently in use in south-
wester~ Wyoming. Accordingly, each 
party JS aware that pursuit of his own 
best interest requires the authorization of 
as many VHF channels as possible which 
are free from co-channel interference 
with another utility. Both parties to this 
proceeding are aware of the channel 
problem and both are reluctant to accom-
modate the other's operations. Industrial 
presently utilizes five of the seven availa-
ble channels and has petitioned the FCC 
for authority to utilize the remaining 
two. Commercial presently operates on 
only two channels, and is unwilling to 
execute any document whereby those 
would be the only channels it may use 
prospectively in the State of Wyoming. 
It is apparent, neither party is concerned 
with the public interest; both are seeking 
to further their own business interest. 
The Commission recognizes its responsi-
bility in this matter and sees that resolu-
tion may only be obtained by a determi-
nation as to which utility shall be entitled 
to use certain channels in specific loca-
tions in southwestern Wyoming. Based 
upon the testimony and evidence of rec-
o_rd and the previous attempts of the par-
ties to comply with the terms of the 
Stipulation, the Commission finds that 
Commercial should be entitled to operate 
on VHF Channels 1 and 9 in the Rock 
Springs, Green River, Evanston and La-
Barge areas, and that Industrial should 
continue operations on its existing Chan-
nels 3, 5, 7, 11 and 13. 
be acceptable to this 
Commission in furtherance of the public 
interest each utility is required to serve. 
"18. The controversy herein centers 
around two Wyoming cities, to-wit: Ev-
anston and Rawlins, Wyoming. The ap-
plication of Commercial specifically 
sought to serve these cities while the 
application of Industrial would seem to 
include 'Such by implication. The afore-
mentioned channel allocation shall resolve 
the dispute in and around the Evanston 
area, leaving only the Rawlins area in 
dispute. Each party stipulated in 1977 
they would share VHF Channel 7 and 
that such a joint application would be 
made to the FCC. The parties subse-
quently met in accordance with the terms 
of the Stipulation, but due to various 
problems alleged by each party, neither 
was able to comply with the ierms of the 
Stipulation. Industrial determined ser-
vice could be rendered from existing 
Marsh Peak facilities, and Commercial 
determined that an independent applica-
tion would be required due to the inabili-
ty of the parties to comply with the terms 
of the Stipulation. 
"17. The Commission recognizes the fact 
it does not have jurisdiction over the allo-
cation of radio frequencies, but it does 
have jurisdiction over what is required in 
the public interest. The aforementioned 
Channel allocations are the result of the 
Commission's determination as to what 
"The Commission finds there is no testi-
mony in evidence of record to support a 
finding it is impractical or impossible for 
either party to complete the terms of the 
Stipulation as such concerns the Rawlins 
service area. Accordingly, the Commis-
sion finds the Stipulation shall continue 
to be in full force and effect and that 
both parties shall hereafter be required to 
jointly apply to the FCC for shared au-
thority on VHF Channel 7. 
"19. The final issue as framed by the 
Notice and Order Setting Hearing which 
requires resolution herein, is whether or 
not either party should have their operat-
ing certificate revoked. As noted previ-
ously, it is difficult if not impossible for 
this Commission to attribute fault to any 
one party based upon the confusing and 
often contradictory testimony and evi-
dence of record. As noted hereinabove, 
the Commission has found the Stipulation 
to be in full force and effect and that 
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each party is still bound by the terms and 
conditions contained therein. The Stipu-
lation also provides that such will contin-
ue until otherwise ordered by this Com-
mission. Accordingly, both parties shall 
be ordered to obtain the FCC authority 
recommended herein within six months of 
the date of this order, and to thereafter 
provide service within nine months of 
FCC channel a,uthorization. Should ei-
ther party fail to so act, either individual-
ly or jointly, the Commission shall imme-
diately take steps necessary to revoke 
their respective certificate authorities 
granted in the Evanston and Rawlins ser-
vice areas." 
Both appellant and Commercial filed for 
rehearing and clarification. On August 29, 
1979, the PSC denied their petitions. Ap-
pellant then sought review of the PSC or-
der in th~ district court. Following the 
submission of briefs by appellant, Commer-
cial and the PSC, on September 17, 1980, 
the district court judge affirmed the PSC's 
order. 
Appellant's first challenge to the PSC's 
order claims that the "Commission exceeded 
its authority in attempting to allocate com-
mon carrier two-way radio telephone chan-
nels when the allocation and granting of 
such channels is in the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC)." Appellant's second challenge at-
tacks PSC's establishment of time limits. 
However, as to these issues, appellant dur-
ing the PSC's hearings advocated that the 
PSC both allocate channels and create time 
restrictions for compliance. Appellant's 
counsel stated during his closing remarks to 
the Commission on March 7, 1979, that: 
"It seems to us that is the better way to 
handle it, and we believe this Commission 
has the power and authority to do it is to 
have these parties deal on muchly [sic] 
exclusive channels and that this Commis-
sion order compliance with that kind of 
an arrangement within a certain period 
of time. 
"In that period of time and within that 
period of time they do not do it, it then 
should be a question about revoking a 
certificate, because as long as these mat-
ters are tied up in the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, we are not going to 
have service that is needed in the south-
west portion of Wyoming. 
"Now, what we would like to see is to 
come to some kind of a directive from 
this Commission telling the parties, 'Look, 
you are going to have to do it this way so 
that our people can get the service that 
you tell us is needed.' 
"I would suggest to the Commission that 
the Commission has the power, and I 
think if we are going to resolve this mat-
ter within the foreseeable future, this 
Commission should act on it, and we, of 
course, will supply the Commission with 
the authority and statistics and data that 
we believe it can act upon. 
"Thank you." 
In appellant's brief filed with the Com-
mission on April 27, 1977, it was argued 
that: 
"Each of the parties is presently operat-
ing on five mobile radio channels in 
southwestern Wyoming. The fastest and 
least expensive way to insure full inter-
ference free service to the public is to 
prevent the continuing dispute about in-
terference in situations where two per-
sons have authority over the same chan-
nels in wide area coverage situations. 
Thus, although enforcing the Commis-
sion's order based on the stipulation 
would be one solution to the present im-
passe, the better approach appears to be 
to require the parties to operate on dif-
ferent channels to avoid all interference 
problems and require the parties to take 
such action immediately under the risk of 
losing Commission authority to operate. 
"It is the position of Industrial that the 
Wyoming Public Service Commission has 
the power to regulate RCC's [radio com-
mon carriers] operating in the State of 
Wyoming so long as such regulation does 
not violate the applicable FCC rules in 
regard to the procedural granting of 
channel licenses and the physical opera-
tion thereof. • • • 
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"The exercise of the above described 
authority in this case would not infringe 
on the authority of the FCC. • • • 
"As was proposed above, it appears 
that the best way to obtain radio common 
carrier service for the public in south-
western Wyoming on an interference free 
basis, is for this Commission to take ac-
tion within its powers and require . the 
parties to provide service forthwith. • • • 
The Commission could enforce its order 
by revoking the certificate of any party 
who failed to comply with the Commis-
sion's order within a fixed period. The 
order would necessarily include the re-
quirement that the parties settle their 
disputes before the FCC and require that 
Industrial withdraw its application for 
channels 1 and 9 in Evanston. The Com-
mission might also consider the limitation 
of further applications by the parties to 
the FCC for additional UHF channels 
except on some equitable basis which 
would insure interference free service to 
the public. Commercial's own expert be-
lieves the Commission has the power to 
invoke the above solution." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Thus it is clear that appellant asked the 
PSC to do as it did. Now on appeal appel-
lant challenges that action. 
Appellant also alleges that the PSC ex-
ceeded its authority by prescribing his radio 
service area. However, this issue was nev-
er raised before the PSC. In fact in appel-
lant's Application for Rehearing and Clari-
fication of Order, he argued that the Com-
mission had failed to establish primary and 
secondary service areas: 
"2. The Commission's Memorandum 
Opinion and Order failed to provide In-
dustrial primary and secondary service 
areas radiating from Aspen Mountain 
and Hogsback Ridge, for service in Lin-
coln and Sweetwater Counties, Wyoming 
which authority Industrial was granted 
by the Commission's order of November, 
1977. * * •" 
[1, 2] As a general rule, parties as bound 
by the theories they advanced below. Lara-
mie Printing Trustees v. Krueger, Wyo. 
1968, 437 P.2d 856, 859. Further, under the 
doctrine of invited error, if a party induces 
action by a court or an agency, he will not 
be heard on appeal to argue error based 
upon that action. Weber v. Johnston Fuel 
Liners, Inc., Wyo. 1974, 519 P.2d 972, 978. 
However, there is an exception to that rule. 
As noted in Matter of Various Water 
Rights in Lake DeSmet Reservoir, Wyo. 
1981, 623 P.2d 764, 767, a challenge to a 
court's or a quasi-judicial body's jurisdiction 
over the subject matter can never be 
waived. "[I]t is open for consideration by 
the reviewing court whenever it is raised by 
any party, or it may be raised by the court 
of its own motion." Gardner v. Walker, 
Wyo. 1962, 373 P.2d 598, 599. 
[3] In this case appellant's challenges in 
essence question the jurisdictiol\ of the PSC 
to grant conditional certificat~s of conve-
nience and necessity. This is done on two 
levels. First, it is contended that there is 
no statutory authorization for the PSC's 
action. Second, appellant argues that the 
PSC's conduct infringes upon the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and thus violates the 
concept of federal preemption. Since ap-
pellant's challenges raise questions concern-
ing the PSC's subject matter jurisdiction, 
they must be addressed on their merits. 
Jurisdiction may be questioned at any time. 
Merritt v. Merritt, Wyo. 1978, 586 P.~1d 550, 
555. 
First, as to appellant's statutory argu-
ment that the PSC lacked jurisdiction to 
impose conditions upon the grant of a cer-
tificate of convenience and necessity, the 
language of § 37-2-205(a), W.S. 1977, indi-
cates that he is erroneous. It states in part 
that where a conflict between two utilities 
may result, the PSC "may after hearing 
make such order and prescribe the terms 
and conditions for the location of the lines, 
plants or systems affected, * * * [which] 
are just and reasonable." Further, as ob-
served by this court previously, "[t]he dis-
cretion vested in the commission by the 
statute is broad indeed • * *." Big Horn 
Rural Elec. Co. v. Pacific Power & Light 
. II 
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Co., Wyo. 1964, 397 P.2d 455,458. Thus, we 
conclude that the statute granted the PSC 
the authority to impose the various condi-
tions imposed in this case. 
Next, we must consider whether the ex-
ercise of this jurisdiction has been barred 
under the doctrine of federal preemption-
which results from the Supremacy Clause, 
Art. VI, clause 2 of the United States Con-
stitution.3 In Florida Lime and Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 1963, 373 U.S. 132, 
142, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248, it 
was observed by the Supreme Court that: 
"The principle to be derived from our 
decisions is that federal regulation of a 
field of commerce should not be deemed 
preemptive of state regulatory power in 
the absence of persuasive reasons-either 
that the nature of the regulated subject 
matter permits no other conclusion, or 
that the Congress has unmistakably so 
ordained. • • •" 
The Court in that case following its obser-
vation then looked at three criteria in order 
to make its determination. First, it con-
sidered whether it was possible for one en-
gaged in interstate commerce to comply 
with both the federal and the state regula-
tions. Second, it pondered upon the ques-
tion of how important it was that there be 
national uniformity-without any state var-
iations-in the regulation of the subject 
matter in question. Third, the Court inves-
tigated what Congress had intended when 
it established the federal regulation. Here, 
the Court noted that the presumption was 
against Federal preemption unless Congress 
had manifested a clear intent to the con-
trary. 
This case was followed in ATS Mobile 
Telephone, Inc. v. Curtin Call Communica-
tions, Inc., 1975, 194 Neb. 404, 282 N.W.2d 
248,4 where the question was whether the 
II, Art. VI, clause 2, United States Constitution: 
''This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby, any Thing In the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding." 
Nebraska PSC had jurisdiction to regulate 
radio common carriers. The Nebraska Su-
preme Court, after applying the three-
prong test, concluded no federal preemption 
had occurred and that the Nebraska PSC 
had good jurisdiction. 
We agree with the conclusion that there 
has been no federal preemption. First, the 
parties can comply with both the PSC's and 
FCC's rules and regulations. Second, there 
is no reason for federally imposed uniform-
ity in the regulation of radio common carri-
ers. As said by the Nebraska Supreme 
Court, "it is clear that the mobile radio 
telephone paging service is local in nature 
and there is no need for national uniform-
ity." ATS Mobile Tel. v. Curtin Call 
Comm., Inc., supra, 282 N.W.2d at 253. Fi-
nally, Congress had expressed an intent not 
to preempt the area. In 47 U.S.C. § 22l(b), 
it was stated: 
"(b) Subject to the provisions of section 
301 of this title, nothing in this chapter 
shall be construed to apply, or to give the 
Commission jurisdiction, with respect to 
charges, classifications, practices, serv-
ices, facilities, or regulations for or in 
connection with wire, mobile, or point-
to-point radio telephone exchange service, 
or any combination thereof, even though a 
portion of such exchange service consti-
tutes interstate or foreign communication, 
in any case where such matters are subject 
to regulation by a State commission or by 
local governmental authority." (Empha-
sis added.) 
Courts have generally recognized that this 
language "is a clear statement that Con-
gress did not intend to preempt state regu-
lation of mobile carriers • • • ." Fields v. 
Davis, 1977, 31 Or.App. 607, 571 P.2d 511, 
4. This case was overruled to the extent that it 
applied to one-way paging devices in A TS Mo-
bile Telephone, Inc. v. General Communica-
tions Co., Inc., 1979, 204 Neb. 141, 282 N.W.2d 
16. However, for our purposes in dealing with 
two-way radio telephone service (see appel-
lant's statement of issues, supra), the case Is 
still good law as to the question before us. 
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?l~. ~s. a result we must ~phold the PSC's As to other reductions in appellant's ser-
Junsd1~tion ~ regula_tE; radio common carri- vice area, the PSC had given notice that it 
ers ?~ 1mposmg co~d1tions on the grant of a was reviewing appellant's certificate and 
~rt1f1cate of pubhc convenience and neces- that appellant had the burden of demon-
sity .. See also Matter of Rule Radiophone strating that it should not be revoked. The 
Service, Inc., Wyo. 1980, 621 P.2d 241. evidence presented to the PSC was conflict-
AppeHant's final claim is that the PSC ing as to what interference might exist 
"without a basis in fact or law arbitrarily between appellant's services and Commer-
and capriciously reduced Industrial Commu- cial's. The Commission's conclusion that 
nication's service area granted in 1977." the best way to resolve the matter was to 
~owever the PSC, when it noticed the set- reduce the service areas was supported by 
~mg of the matter for hearing in 1979, substantial evidence that appellant's and 
mformed both appellant and Commercial Commercial's operations overlapped and the 
that they would be required to bear the operations of each were interfering with 
"burden of producing sufficient evidence to the other contrary to the public interest. 
show why their respective certificates of Therefore, this court cannot substitute its 
November 29, 1977 should not be revoked, judgment on this issue for that of the 
altered or amended in any manner as may PSC's. Sage Club, Inc. v. Employment Se-
be required in the public interest." curity Commission of Wyoming, Wyo. 1979, 
[4-6] First, the PSC found that the or- 6?1 P.2d_ 1306. The ultimate weight to be 
der of November 29 1977 · ti . gwen evidence before the PSC as a trier of , mcorrec y m- . . . 
eluded Sublette County in appellant's ser- fact JS_ to be deter~med m the light of the 
vice area. It is clear that the Commission expertise and experience of the members of 
has continuing jurisdiction over public utili- that _agency. Matter of Rule Radiophone 
ties and thus the power to amend certifi- Service, Inc., supra. 
cates of public necessity and convenience. Affirmed. 
Big Horn Rural Elec. Co. v. Pacific Power 
& Light Co., supra, 397 P.2d at 461. It is 
only proper that the PSC should have the 
ability to correct a previous order which 
contained a mistake. Besl Corp. v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 1976, 45 Ohio St.2d 
146, 341 N.E.2d 835. 
w..__ ___ _ 
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thought or refere:nce regarding suicide, no 
matter how obscure or remote in time the 
thought may have occurred, in order to fulfill 
the heightened duty to warn others." 
AB a final matter, the Carriers argue that 
adopting a narrow definition of ."suicidal ten-
dencies" would render LC. § 33-512B a nulli-
ty because liability would rarely be imposed, 
and this the Court cannot do. However, 
simply because the duty to warn would arise 
less frequently does not make the statute a 
nullity; it simply means that the statute cre-
ates a narrow, limited duty. Therefore; 
based upon the Legislative history and public 
policy this Court finds the Legislature in-
tended the. term "suicidal tendencies" in · LC. 
§ 33-512B to mean a present aim, direction 
or trend toward taking one's own life. 
2. Brian's Essay 
[11] Clearly, Brian's essay provided evi-
dence that he had contemplated suicide in 
the past. However, having determined the 
meaning of "suicidal tendencies" in LC. 
§ 33-512B, the Court mu.st now examine 
whether Brian's essay provrded evidence of a 
present aim, direction or trend toward taking 
his own life. 
Brian's discussjons of his contemplating 
suicide are all In' past tense. For instance, 
Brian wrote "[f1or a long time and .a lot of 
reasons I was contemplating suicide" and 
that he had suicidal thoughts "a lot during 
my early teen years." · Conversely, when he 
discusses the present and future, he explains 
that the reasons for his d'epression and sqi-
ddal ideation are gone and that he "can now 
enjoy life and all its little pleasures witho~t 
any guilt." Brian also wrote that he had 
turned his life around . and that he was cur-
rently happy. None of this indicates a pres-
ent or future intention to commit suicide. In 
fact, with these words the opposite conclusi 
is the only conclusion. to be inferred. 
The only evidence of suicidal thoughts 
areasonable teacher could read in that esa 
is that those thoughts had all been in '' 
past, but were resolved. Any eviderice . tJljt 
they might return or that Brian was con• · 
plating suicide when he wrote this 
would be speculative. Additionally, none • 
the expe1t affidavits filed by the Carri 
showed these thoughts written by Brill 
could· be connected to any pr~sent suiai 
ideation. · McNulty could not have de 
mined that Brian was currently or in · 
future contemplating suicide without 
ulating about his intentions; Brian's cl 
stated thoughts and feelings indicate that 
wa& happy -at that tirrie and was no Jon 
contemplatirig suicide. There simply is( 
sufficient evidence that Brian had a 
aim or desire to commit suicide at the 
he wrote the essay to trigger a duty to 
AB a result, the Court need not address .. 
further issues presented by the parties. · 
V. • CONCLUSION 
Th~ term "suicidal tendencies" 
§ 33-512B is narrowly defined to 
present aim, direction, or trend toward ' 
ing one's own life. Under this .de 
Brian's essay did riot create inthe ·Appe 
a duty·· to warn. We reverse and 
Costs' ci:, Appellants. .-: f.\ 
Cl{!/{'J~sti~.e SCHROEDER and Jua4 
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the Matter of the Appeal of PROFES-
IONAL ENGINEERING CONSUL, 
TS, P.A., from an Order of the Divi-
lon of Taxation on Denial of Certain 
Income Tax Credits. 
No. 94,021. 
Supreme Court of, Kansas. 
April 28; 2006. 
ound: Department of Revenue ap-
ed decision by the Board of Tax Ap-
·, (BOTA) granting corporate inco.me 
cr,edit. Case was transferred. 
lding, The Supreme Court, Luckert, 
h()ld that BOTA lacked jurisdiction to 
't the credit, where the Department 
.not rule on the credit for the tax year 
question and taxpayer· never made the 
' on its return. 
~ ed. 
~ ation e,:,3550 
. oard of Tax Appeals (BOTA) orde.rs 
°'11bject to review under the Act for Judi-
R.eview aNd Civil Enforcement of AgenGy 
· , KS.A. 77-601 et .seq. 
d1"inistrative Law and Procedure 
I i=,7 49, 791 
When revi~wing agency record to, deter-
. if there is substantial competent evi-
to support the findings, the court must 
· • the' record for evidence ,to support the 
and, in. doing so, must consider the 
nee in the light most favorable to the 
· pr.evailing below .. K.S.A. 77-621(c). 
T~ation e:=>3550 . , 
µ the Board of, Tal\ Appeals (BOTA) 
jurisdiction ... to 'consider a credit,. so does 
iut re~ewing BOT1\'.s acti()n. 
Jipeal and Error >S=>23 
-; An appellate court always has ' the ob li-
on to question jurisdiction on its own 
6. Taxation e,:,3547 
··The Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) is a 
cr~_ature of the legislature; its authority and 
power is only such as is expressly or impli-
edly given by legislative enactment. KS.A. 
74-2437(a), 74-2438. 
7. Taxation e:=>354 7 
If the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) 
attempts to exercise jurisdiction over a sub-
ject matter not conferred by the legislature, 
its orders with respect thereto are without 
authority of.law l}nd void. K.S.A. 74-2437(a), 
74-2438. 
8. Taxation e:=>3547 
The Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) 
lacked jurisdiction to grant credit against 
corporate .income tax, where the Department 
of Revenue's written final determination did 
not rule on the credit for the tax, year in 
question and taxpayer never made the claim 
on its return; no ruling or interpretation by 
the director of taxation had been made with 
regard to the credit, and no statute, express-
ly or impliedly, gave to BOTA the power to 
grant a credit against corporate income tax 
which the Department did not allow or disal-
low in any ruling, interpretation, finding, or. 
der, decision, or final determination. KS.A. 
74-2437(a), 74-2438, 79-32,160a. 
9. Taxatioi:i ,s:,3547 
The Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) does 
not have jurisdiction to grant a corporat.E, 
income tax credit against the tax owed by a 
taxpayer if the Department of Revenue has 
not allowed or disallowed the credit in any 
ruling, interpretation, finding, order, deci-
sion, or final determination. KS.A. 74--
2437(a), 74-2438. 
Syllabus by the Court 
The Kansas Board of Tax Appeals .does 
not · have . jurisdiction to grant a corporate 
income tax credit against the tax owed by, a 
taxpayer if the Kansas Department of Re-\'e-
nue has not allowed or disallowed the credit 
not· apply in any ruling, interpretation, finding, order, 
the error -is jurisdictional. decision; or final determination. 
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Michael D. Burrichter, of Legal Services 
Bureau,. Kansas Department of Revenue, ar-
gued the cause and was on the briefs for 
appellartt · Kansas Department of Revenue: 
·. M~rk A. Burghart, ,9f 4Jderson, Alderson, 
Weiler, Conklin, Burghart.& Crow, L.;L.C., of 
Topeka, argued the cause and was on the 
brief for appellee Professional Engineering 
Consultants, P.A. 
· The opinion was delivered by LUCKERT, 
.J.: 
· This is an appeal by the· Kansas Depait -
ment of Revenue (KDR) from a final order of 
the Kansas Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) 
ruling that Professional Engineering Con_sul-
tants, P.A. (PEC) qualified for a corporate 
income tax credit under K.S.A. 79-32,160a of 
the Job Expansion. and Investment Credit 
Act of 1976, K.S.A. 79-32,153 et seq., for the 
tax year ending September 30, 1997. While 
several issues are raised,' the determinative 
issue is whether BOTA erred in ruling that -
PEC qualified for the tax credit when PEC 
did not claim the credit on its income tax 
return and KDR neither allowed nor disal-
lowed a claim for the credit in its Corporate 
Income Tax Audit Report (Audit Report) or 
its Written Final Determination, 
FACTS 
PEC is a corporation headquartered in 
Wichita which provides professional engi-
neering services, including consultation ser: 
vices. PEC made significant capital expendi-
tures beginning in 1997 when · it. purchased 
another engineering firm and hired new em-
ployees in connection with those expendi-
tures. Based upon these expenditures, PEC 
claimed certain income tax credits under the 
Job Expansion and Inv~stment Credit Ac;t of 
1976, ·K.S.A. 79-32,153, et seq., on its corpo-
rate income tax returns filed for tax years 
ending September 30, 1997; September 30, 
1998; and September 30, 1999. 
KDR audited PEC for the tax years end-
ing September 30, 1997; September 30, 1998; 
and September 30, 1999. KDR issued a 
Corporate Income Ta.x Audit Report. KDR 
disallowed some of the claimed credits and 
issued an assessment of additional corporate 
income tax consisting of tax in the amount of 
$94,617; penalty of $9,461; and interest 
$24,904. The only ,mention? in ther.Audi~ , 
port of ~ credit ~nder K.S.A: 79-32,160:i,1 
in disallow.ng. the claim for the tax , 
endil)g ;S~ptember 30, 1998,. which was; 
second year of the audit period. , 
PEC timely appealed to the Secretary 
Revenue by requesting an informal cod 
ence pursuant td K.S.A. 7!f-3226 ahd paid, 
tax amount as a deposit pqrsuant to K. 
75--5153. PEC complained about th(! 
ings regarding the K.S.A. 79-32,160ii" 
but did not ~ ention 'tf1e . fux year or y 
which it was disputing. · After' the'· 
trative proceedings, the S!!cr'etary's .d .. 
issued a Written Final Determination' 
holding tire assessment in, its .,entirety 
explaining why PEC was not entitled.) 
K.S.A. 79-32,160a tax credit fQr the_ tax 
ending Septe,mber 30, 1998, the secon4 ,7 
of the audit period. There was no rp.en · 
the credit either being allowed or disall 
for the first year of the audit period,. tlie 
year ending September 30, 1997. 
PEC timely appealed to BO'i'A. 
held · that PEC qualified for the tax ' 
pursuant to K.S.A. 79-32,160a' for 'th 
year ending September · 30, Y997, the1 
year of the 3-y'ear audit period. Additil 
ly, BOTA upheld KDR's dete1!!1-ina~11; 
PEC did not qualify for the credit for the 
year ending September 30, 1998; ~Y sta 
that PEC did not qualify for any per,io~ o 
than in the period from 1996 to 1997. 
ruling, thus, _covered the third year ? .. 
audit. Both"PEC and KDR filed peti. 
for reconsideration, which BOTA denied.' . 
KDR timely appealed BOTA's-grant 
credit for the tax year enping Septembef 
1997. PEC did not appeal; thus, pos 
credits for tax years ending Septembe1r 
1998, and September 30, 1999, are no 
issue. This court transferred the case ' · 
the Court of Appeals on its own motion1P 
suant to K.S.A. 20..-3018(c). 
ANALYSIS 
KDR argues that BOTA erred in granij 
the .credit under KS.A. 7g....32,160a for 
tax year ending September 30, 1997. Mo 
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cally, KDR ai·gues there was -not sub- "10. The Department of Revenue audited 
ti'ail . competent evidence to support the Taxpayer and disallowed the credits." 
'A's 'findings tbat PEC had made a claitri 
credit . or for . the finding that KDR 
denied such a claim. KDR also argues 
lacked jurisdiction to grant the credit 
KS.A. 79-32,160a for the t ax year 
g Septilmber 30, 1997, because the tax.-
had · not made a claim for the credit 
.KDR had ,not ruled, made a determina-
··or issued an order regarding the credit: 
;;t-. 
· Standard of Review 
1 ' BOTA orders are subject to review 
er the Kansas Act for Judicial Review 
· · ivil E~forcement of Agency Actions, 
' ··· 77--601 et seq. In re Tax Appeal ·of 
Communications -Co., 278 Kan. 690, 
101 P.3d 1239 .(2004). K.S.A. 77-621(c) 
out the scope and standard of review 
· provides, as relevant to the parties' argu-
, · . that a court nray grant relief if· it 
· es ''(2) the agency has acted beyond 
'!uilidicti0n conferred by any provision of 
· or '\7) the agency action is based: on a 
·nati:on of fact, made or implied by the 
cy, that is not supported by evidence 
· · Stjbstantial when viewed in light of the 
~: as a whole." See In re GIG Field 
:··' tPCo., :2'79 Kan. 857, 866, 112 P.3d 138 
). 
) · When reviewing the record to deter-
,if there is substantial competent evi-
·to support the findings, the court must 
·, the record for evidence to support the 
gs and·, in . d·oing so, must consider the 
~ e ·1n the light most favorable to the 
· prevaiiing below. In re Tax Appeal of 
' · .. Interstate Gas Co., 276 Kan: 672, 
1,o/,9'P.3d 770 (2003). 
Mings Regarding Whether PEG Made 
and KDR Considered the 1997 Tax 
Credit Claim 
the following BOTA 
. · The Taxpayer ·claimed income tax 
·dits under the Job E xpansion and In-
astmerit Credit Act, K.S·.A 79-32,160a, 
, three tax years ending September 30, 
11197 through September 30, 1999. · 
According to KDR, these •findings have no 
support in the record with regard to the tax 
year ending· September 30, 1997, because 
PEC did not claim a tax credit pursuant to 
K:S.A. 79-32,lo0a for that ·year. According 
td KDR, for the tax year ending September 
30, 1997, PEC filed claims for an income tax 
credit under KS.A. 7g....32,153 b~sed upon an 
investment made on August 1, 1989;- and for 
a. second· credit-under the same statute for an 
investment. made .on Oetober ·l,. 1996. PEC 
did not; however, · file - a claim for the · tax 
credit .at issue ,in ,this'· case, a claim. pursuant 
to K !S.A. 7g....32;160a-,for the: tax year ending 
September 1, 1997': ,;P;EJC .. ,does- not dispute 
that it did not claim -a tax credit pursuant to 
K.S.A .. 79-32,160a . on .its,1i'nco:me-·,tax return 
filed for the tax year endh;ig;September 30, 
1997. 
However, PEC argues that :it' made the 
claim during the audit and infornial confer-
enc·e before KDR. The record does not sup-
port PEC's assertion. When KDR audited 
PEC ani:l disallowed some of its claimed tax 
credits, KDR issued a Corporate Income Tax 
Audit Report which specifically informed 
PEC that "(t]he enhanced credit claimed un-
der K.S.A. 79-32,160a for ·tax year ending 
9/30/98 has been , disallowed'.' · because, in or-
der t0 qualify for the er.edit, at least 20 new 
employees must be hired in positions relating 
to headquarters funchons (Ind "(f J or tax 
year 9/30/98 there was only an increase of 
eleven ·employees and no indication of the 
type of positions filled." (Emphasis .added.) 
In its ,r equest for an informal conference with 
the , Secretary of Rev~nue, the document 
which PEC specifically point/; to as evidence 
it made the claim, PEC questioned . KDR's 
conclusion that it did not qualify for the 
crediti however, PEC made no mention of 
the time per,iod for which the credit was 
claimed. Then, when PEC's appeal was de-
nied, the Secretary's designee issued a Writ-
ten Final Determination upholding KDR'.s 
assessment and explaining why PEC was not 
entitled to a K.S.A. 79-32,160a tax credit .for 
the Jax, year ending September 30, 1998. 
The ·record makes clear that KDR's con-
tention is correct: PEC did not claim a tax 
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credit pursuant to KS.A.-·79-32,160a for the 
tax year ending Septei:nber 30, 1997. Addi-
tiqnally, the record reflects that. KDR did not 
~tiow -or disallow: a credit .under . KS.A. 7~-
82,160a for the tax year ,encjing September· 
ao, 1997. Basically, there was,no mention of 
the credit relating to tax year 1997 by either 
PEC or KDR; • there is nothing in the docu-
ments mentioned above whi_ch reflects the 
credit was being claimed or was being .al-
lowed or ,disallowed. 
· However, PEC contends that KDR was 
precluded from raising this issue before 
BOTA in its petition for reconsideration and 
is similarly precluded from ,raising the issue 
before this court because it is bound by .the 
stipulated issues on appeal, citing Manhattan 
Bible College v. Strit;esky, 192 Kan. 287, 290-
91, 387 P.2d 225 (1963) (parties are bound by 
stipulations fixing the issues). The parties 
stipulated to the following issues on appeal 
before BOTA: 
"A. Whether the headquarters facility fa-
cilitated . the creation of at least twenty (20) 
new full-time positions required by_ KS.A. 
74-50,114(g) and/or K.S.A. '19-32,160a(a). 
"B. Whether PEC's job: expansion and 
investment credit should be computed us-
ing employment"·and investment monthly 
averages for those months after -which the 
-investments have .- been made and employ-
ees, engaged or must the credit be comput-
- ed using twelve month averages." 
(3, 4) As KDR notes, the stipulations do 
hot reference the specific years of the credit 
claims. Stipulated issue A merely identifies 
the point of contention between the parties, 
which was whether PEC qualified for the tax 
credit under the specific applicable statutory 
provisions. This issue was raised in both the 
Audit Report and the W1itten Final Determi-
nation, but only with regard to the tax 'year 
ending September 30, 1998. Stipulated issue 
B was also specifically tied to the 1998 year 
in both those documents. Thus, according to 
KDR, it was not until the BOTA dedsion 
that there was a need for clarification· arid, 
consequently, the motion for reconsideration 
was the appropriate procedural step for rais-
ing the issue. KS.A. 77- 529(a)(l) (petition 
for reconsideration is jurisdictional prerequi-
site for seeking judicial review); see Kansas 
lndustrial,.·Consumers v. Kansas C 
tion Comm'n, 30 Kan.App.2d 332, 338; ,· 
P.3d 110 (2002). (purpose of requiring a pe 
tion for re<::onsideration is to permit 
agency "to correct errors which are called. 
its attention and thereby perhaps avoid _ 
cial review''). Additionally, if _ BOTA I 
jurisdiction to consider the credit, , so d 
court.- Feviewing .BOTA's action. An ap 
late court always.has the obligation to qu 
tion jurisdiction on -its own • motion. 
Donald v. Hannigan, 262 Kan. 156, Sy!. 
936 P.2d 262 (1997). Therefore, the ar 
ment was not untimely, at least from a p_ · 
dural standpoint. · · ' · 
PEC argues, however, it ·was un · 
from a substantive standpoint because 
had placed the issue of the credit for !-
before BOTA through the arguments, 
dence, and proposed findings of fact 
conclusions of law KDR submitted to BO, 
As a ,result, PEG argues KDR preclu 
PEC from "introducing evidence that wo 
show that the Department routinely ta 
exemptions, credits and- even refunds ,. 
account during the audit and appeals · · 
cesses when the same may not have 
reflected on ·a tax return" in order to-com 
with KS.A. 79-3226 which requires the :; 
rector of taxation to examine ·each return·. 
"determine the correct amount of the -
Although we agree that KDR qears .sq 
responsibility for- the confusion in this 
even if PEC had been given the oppo 
to present ... evidence that KDR does cal\! 
exemptions, credits, and refunds during), 
audit based .on -information not l'.~flec,te.q 
the taxpayer's return, at most this ev:i<½ 
would have bolstered PEC's argument .·_ 
the claim could have been made during : 
audit period. Such evidence does not chan 
the fact that KD R did not calculate the c 
during its audit of tax year 1997. 
(5) In ·addition, PEC argues that KD 
invited the eri·or. PEC relies upon the '· 
era! rule that parties who invite error:' 
stipulating to questions of fact that misle 
the trial court into an erroneous finding) 
fact are prevented from complaining on , 
peal. See State, ex rel, v. Masterson, 
Kan. 540, 550, 561 P.2d 796 (1977) (invi 
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: -rule, "valid though it may be where 
'ons, of fact are conaerned," did not 
y to court'.s determination of questions of 
, see also -In re Estate of Broderick, 34 
1~pp.2d 695, Sy!. 1! 10, 125 P.ad 564 
) ("[w)here a party procures· a court to 
ed in a particular way thereby inviting 
·cular, ruling, that party is precluded 
· ·assailing such proceeding and ruling on 
!late review"). Even. if the . confusion 
ii _by KOR amounted to invited error, 
Invited error rule does not apply where 
· error is jurisdictional. Thompson v. 
· ·, 208 Kan. 658, 661, 493 P.2d 1259 
}. 
'e; therefore, examine whether BOTA ob-
jurisdiction to allow _ a credit under 
79-32,160a for the tax year ending 
hlber 30, 1997. 
I 
Jurisdiction 
',7~ BOTA" 'is a creature of the legisla-
. · Its authority and power is only such as 
·ressly or impliedly given by legislative 
ent. · If it attempts to exercise juris-
n over a subject matter not conferred 
e legislature, its orders with respect 
are without authority oflaw and void. 
tions omitted].'" Board of Johnson 
~ y Comm'rs v. Duffy, 259 Kan. 500, 508, 
iF'!2d 716 (1996) (citing Vaughn v. Mar-
226 Kan. 658, 660, 603 P.2d 191 [1979) ). 
OTA's statutory authority to hear ap-
from decisions of KDR has two. sources. 
·. 74-2437(a) provides that BOTA has 
6wer and duty "[t]o hear appeals from 
director of taxation and the director of 
rty valuation on rulings and intei-pre-
by said directors." (Emphasis add-
. KS.A. 74-2438 provides that "[a]n ap-
·may be taken to [BOTA) from any 
ng, ruling, order, decision, final deter-
..ion or other final" action on any 
'.of the secretary of revenue or the secre-
s designee by any person aggrieved 
by." (Emphasis added.) 
) _ KDR's Written Final Determination 
•not rule on any claim for a KS.A. 79-
llOa tax credit for the tax year ending 
tember 30, 1997. Although the Written 
Determination refers to the 3 years of 
the -audit, the only year speciiiically refer-
enced regarding a credit pursuant to KS.A. 
79-32,160a .is the year ,imding September 30, 
1998. Moreover, the Written Final Determi-
nat-ion notes the review is based upon the 
letter of final assessment dated August 17, 
2001, i~ which KDR specifically stated that 
''.[t]he enhanced credit claimed under ~.S.A. 
79-32,160a (or tax year ending 9/30/98 hl}S 
been dis~l_owed." There was no reference to 
a · credit"'.._pursu:µit , to KS.A. 79-32,160a for 
any other:tax year, 
Additionally, :,,the silence regarding the 
year ending ,Septemb!!r 30, 1997, cannot be 
read as implicitly allowing the credit because, 
as ·prevjoui,ly dis~ussed, the claim had not 
been made on PEC's retl)I'n. Thus, to have 
been either allow~d or dis;tllqwed, th_e credit 
would ha:ve had to be raised and . considered 
during ~he audit. _ Yet, the audit did not 
allow or disa\Iow the <:!laim. See Angle v. 
United States, 996 F.2d 252, 254 (10th _Cir. 
1993) (district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over a taxpayer's refund claim 
where the taxpayer alleged new and different 
grounds for allowing the refund from those 
asserted "in · its timely filed refund claims with 
the IRS); see also·K.S.A. 79-3230 (referring 
to credit which is claimed -by taxpayer). 
Consequently, there 'was no ruling or inter-
pretation by the director of taxation with 
regard to whether PEC was entitled to a 
KS.A. 79--32,160a tax credit in the 1997 tax 
year for .BOTA'to review. 
Moreover, when, PEC filed its Notice of 
Appeal with BOTA, it asked BOTA to 
"reverse the final determination of the Sec-
retai-y's Designee and find that PEC is 
statutorily entitled to the credits claimed 
on its returns for tax years ending Sep-
tember 30, 1997 through September 30, 
1999, abate the assessment is.sued by the 
Department arid refund -the deposit made 
by PEC with statutory interest." (Em-
phasis added) 
Thus, PEC did not claim the credit in the 
pleading upon whldh BOTA's jurisdiction is 
based. See generally State v. Woodling, 264 
Kan. 684, Syl. ~ 2, 957 P.2d 398 (1998) ("An 
appellate court obtains jurisdiction over the 
rulings identified in the notice of appeal. 
Grounds for jurisdiction not identified in a 
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notice o.f appeal may not be considered by 
the court."). 
As the Court of 'Appeals stated ih In re 
Applicati6'n of Park Comm'rs for Ad Vala~ 
rem Ta:x E xemption, 14 Kan.App.2d 777, 799 
P.2d 505 (1990),' when considering whether 
BOTA had jurisdiction to r evoke a city's 
exemption from ad valo'rein taxes for stables 
on certain park property, where the 'city's 
application for exemption only listed ii resi-
dence, and "'the 'residence . and the ~tables 
were not so intertwined . as to constitute one 
subject of dispute: "No statute, · expressly or 
impliedly, gives BOTA power to investigate 
property which is not- the · subject of a dispute 
before it." 14 Kan.App.2d at 782, 799 'P.2d 
505; see also Salina Airport Authority v' 
Board of Ta:x Appeals, 13 Kan.App.2d 80, 87, 
761 P.2d 1261, rev. denied 244 Kan. ·' 738 
(1988) (BOTA has no powerto order county 
appraiser t(> investigate pro petty which is not 
subject of · controversy brought before 
BOTA:). 
[9J A 1997 tax credit under K.s.A: 79-
32,160a was no~ part of the dispute which 
. was brought befp,re BOTA. No statute, ex-
pressly or impliedly, gives BOTA the ppwer 
to grant a credit ,against corporate income 
tax which KDR did not allow or disallow in 
any ruling, fotjerpretatio~. finding, order, de~ 
cision, or final determi;nation. BOT A did not 
have jurisdiction to grant PEC a credit un-
der KS.A. 79-32,160a against the corporate 
income tax owed by PEC for the tax year 
ending September 30, i997. 
Reversed. 
w·-._._ __ , 
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CITY OF MANHATTAN, Appellee, 
v. 
Carl W. FERIL, Appellant. 
No. 94,525. 
Court of Appeals of Kansas. 
May 19, 2006. 
Background: Defendant was convicted, in 
the Municipal Court, of second-offense 
driving under ·the influence of al · 
(DUI). Defendant appealed. After a 
trial, defendant was convicted: in the . 
trict Court, Riley County, Paul E . Mill 
J., of second-offense DUI. Defimdant. 
pealed. ' · · :,, 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, · 
quardt, J., held that: 
(1) identity of the perpetrator is ribt 
· ' · · of the corpus delicti · of driving uh 
the influence, and ' 
(2) defendant's encounter with officer. 
not a custodial interrogation, for :M 
randa purposes. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law e=>1139, 1158(4) 
When reviewing a motion to sup 
the appellate court determines whethei: · 
factual underpinnings of the trial .court's\ 
cision are SU pported by .substantial com· 
tent evidence; however, the ultimate . I~ 
conclusion drawn from those facts is a 1 . 
question requiring the appellate coi,rt to 
ply a de novo standard of review. 
2. Criminal Law e=>l158(4) 
The appellate court does not reweigh 
evidence, when reviewing a motion to .. ·
press. 
3. Criminal Law e=>l159.2(7) 
On appeal, the r,eviewing court must 
cide whether a rational factfjnder could ha 
found the accused guilty beyond a reaso · 
doubt. 
4. Criminal Law = 1134(8) 
The standard of r eview on a motion f. 
judgment of acquittal in a criminal · 
sufficiency of the evidence. 
5'. Criminal Law e=>552(1) , 
'/ 
A conviction of even the gravest offe · 
may,be sustained by circumstantial evide 
6. Criminal Law e=>535(2)_ 
In order to establish corpus delicti, 
extrajudicial . confession of a criminal deti 
CITY OF MANHATTAN v . . FERIL Kan. 667 
Cite as 134 P.3d 666 (Kan.App. 2006) 
toustJ:ie corroborated by other evidence had not been taken into custody, and motor-
to. show that the crime was commit- ist was not deprived of his freedom. 
\It it need not be corroborated as to the 
n· who committed the crime, since iden-
o! the perpetrator is not a part of the 
·, delfcti and may be established by an 
upicial confession alone. 
l! ' there is any evidence te~ding to es-
h, , the · corpus delicti of the offen.se 
' ' against the accused, then it is the 
!!f the trial court to submit the question 
!~ther the offense occuned to the jury. 
Officer's testimony that he received ra-
·•htact from neighboring jurisdiction, 
· t hat white truck with extended cab 
T~ plates was driving without head-
1,s'atisfied the corpus delicti of driving, 
tion for driving under the influence 
mXansas. 
Officer's testimony that he detected an 
a! . alcohol while talking to defendant, 
.efendant's eyes were bloodshot, and 
defendant failed to complete the field 
tests, satisfied the corpus delicti of 
tion, in prosecution for driving under 
_ue'nce (DUI). 
l)efenda:iit's extrajudicial confession to 
/; that defendant had been driving, did 
· · · uire independent corroboration with 
bt to establishing the identity of the 
.er, in prosecution for driving under the 
uence (DUI). 
Officer's conversation with motorist at 
venience store was not a custodial interro-
on, for Mir.anda purposes; motorist's re·-
se . to officer's comment, that a report 
, been received about someone driving 
out heaalights, was voluntary, motorist 
13. Criminal Law =412:2(2)' ' 
A "custodial interrogation," for Miranda 
purposes, occurs when a person who has 
been taken into custody or otherwise de0 
prived of his or het freedom is q~estione? . 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for 6ther judicial coristructiorls and def-
initions. 
Syl/:abus by ·the Court 
1. When reviewing a motion to sup-
press, the appellate cdurt determines wheth-
er the factual und~tpjnrifugs of . the trial 
court's decision ate supf8rted by sub~tantial 
competent eviaerice'. How~ver, the ultimate 
legal conclusion dra:wn frdn'l 'thbs.e facts is a 
legal question requiring the' appellate court 
to apply a de novo sfaridard o{ :t'eview. ' 
2. The standard of review on a motion 
for a judgment of ~cquittal in a criminal case 
is sufficiency of the eviderice. 
. ··,·· 
3. A conviction of even the gravest of-
fense may be sustained by .circumstantial 
evidence. 
4. If there is any evidence tending to 
establish the · corpus delicti · of the effense 
charged against the accused, then it is the 
duty of the trial court to submit the question 
of whether the offense occurred to ·the jury. 
5. Identity of the perpetrator is not 
part of the corpus delicti: ' 
6. A custodial interrogation occurs 
when a person who has been · taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his or her 
freedom is questioned. 
John W. Thurston ~~d Troy V. Huser, of 
Huser Law Offices, P . .f\., of Manhattan, for 
appellant. 
Katharine J . Jackson, assistant city attor-
ney, and Matthew Richter, city p1;osecutor, 
for appellee. 
Before RULON, C.J., MARQ.UARDT and 
HILL, JJ. 
